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Abstract
This thesis provides empirical evidence of the banking competition-stability
nexus from the Basel jurisdictions with a main focus on the United States (US)
banking sector from 2000 to 2015. In order to assess this relationship, three papers
in the format of journal articles were used to explore different theoretical concepts.
The first paper, is a systematic literature review of 4,859 abstracts to identify
the different types of systemic risk measures and the challenges regulators face in
addressing systemic risk. 56 measures of systemic risk developed post-2000 were
identified and critically appraised to inform academics and regulators of the
models’ vulnerabilities. Additionally, a number of measures were calculated using
US bank data. The findings of this paper suggests that the majority of these
measures tend to focus on individual financial institutions’ risk rather than the
entire system stability. This directly reflects the current regulations, which aim to
ensure individual institutions’ soundness. As macro-prudential regulation evolves,
policy-makers face the issues of understanding contagion and how such regulation
should be implemented.
The second paper is an empirical analysis of banking cost efficiency, the aim of
this paper is threefold, firstly to conduct an empirical literature review of banking
sector efficiency over the last two decades, thereby identifying banking risk and
regulatory variables used to access efficiency. Secondly, Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) are applied to measure efficiency
within the Basel jurisdiction’s banks. Thirdly, it aims to investigate the determinates
of cost efficiency in the US banks by employing System Generalised Methods of
Moments (GMM) regression analysis using panel data. This paper found the GMM
analysis econometric measures of efficiency provided more statistically significant
regression models than when using accounting based measures of efficiency. Also it
was found that credit and liquidity risks are negatively associated with efficiency,
and regulations designed to mitigate these risks have a negative impact on efficiency.
The final paper combines the literature and calculations from papers one and
two, to examine the role of risk, regulation and efficiency within the banking
competition and financial stability relationship. Using GMM regression, this paper
found a neutral view of the competition-stability nexus within the US banking
sector, where both competition and concentration fragility co-exist. In addition, a
unique polynomial competition-fragility relationship was found. Interestingly using
the Composite Index of Systemic Stress (CISS) as a measure of systemic risk,
altered the competition-stability relationship to identify a concave relationship.
This suggests that the competition-stability nexus within one country can differ at
the microeconomic (financial stability) and macroeconomic (systemic risk) level.
In regards to increased risk, credit, leverage, diversification and liquidity risk was
found to be negatively associated with financial stability. Whilst increased capital
requirements as proposed by Basel III enhanced stability, the Net Stable Funding
Ratio (NSFR) was unexpectedly found to hinder stability, providing caution to
regulators as this is currently implemented.
The findings within this thesis provide an incentive for further academic research
in the area of liquidity & systemic risk, which would be relevant to practitioners and
policy-makers to enhance their understanding of banking competition and financial
stability.
Keywords:
Banking, Financial Stability, Systemic Risk, Regulation, Competition,
Concentration, Efficiency, Financial Stability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last number of decades banking market structure and its impact on
profitability and more recently stability has been debated by academics,
practitioners and regulators alike (Beck, De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013; Boyd &
Nicolo´, 2005; X. Fu, Lin, & Molyneux, 2014; IJtsma, Spierdijk, & Shaffer, 2017;
Jayakumar, Pradhan, Dash, Maradana, & Gaurav, 2018; Keeley, 1990; OECD,
2010; Schaeck & Ciha´k, 2014, inter alia). Various factors have contributed towards
enhancing integration and competition between financial institutions over the
course of recent decades. Both the financial sides of the world economy and the
real economy have become substantially more coordinated. Varying degrees of
deregulation of the financial markets has taken place worldwide and financial
institutions are less restricted on their activities and the areas they can operate.
Up until the late 20th century bank competition, certainly in the western world,
was restricted due to barriers to entry or geographical location. For example, in
the USA individual states controlled banking licenses which allowed them to
protect state banks from competition and foreign bank entry creating local
monopolies. This created markets which contained a large number of smaller
banks (low concentrations) with minimal competition. Protected monopolised
banks were able to create larger profits, hence an incentive for the banks to want
competition regulatory protections. However, this also created inefficiencies as well
as potentially, restricting innovating, diminishing entrepreneurship, stalling growth
and reducing the demand for labour. Following a succession of competition
1
regulation change, consolidation and advances in technology transformed the
banking landscape into what we know today. Innovative advances in the
technology and telecommunication scectors have been far-reaching and thus,
encouraged further specialised advances within financial institutions. These
advances essentially diminished the expenses (cost) of financial activities. As a
result, financial institutions have turned out to be more progressively coordinated
in regards to their activities and across geographical borders (Wilcox, 2005).
Economic theory suggests increased competition benefits consumers via additional
choice and potentially cheaper services. It also benefits the financial institutions
via increased income distribution (Beck, Levine, & Levkov, 2010), efficiency
(Bertrand, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2007) and growth (Cetorelli & Gambera, 2001).
However, increased competition may result in the unintended consequence of
lowering profitability and increasing instability (Beck et al., 2013; Keeley, 1990).
From a regulation point of view, fewer regulatory organisations have had to cope
with increased financial activity, more diverse business models and innovative
products and services. There is there is a plethora of literature regarding the level
of competitions impact on banking performance, but less is known about its
impact on overall financial stability (J. O. Wilson, Casu, Girardone, & Molyneux,
2010). The original academic interest between competition in the banking sector
and financial stability was prompted by Keeley (1990), who empirically evidenced
that increased competition within the US banking sector in the 1980s resulted in
an increase in bank failures. Since the global financial crisis of 2007/081, academics
have seek to investigate a range of risk management topics as well as re-open the
debate regarding market structure (concentration and competition) and stability.
This thesis will sort to contribute theoretically and empirically to this market
concentration and competition, banking efficiency, profitability and stability nexus.
1Referred to as the financial crisis for the remainder of this thesis.
2
1.1 Motivation
The personal motivation for investigating this subject originated from my interest
in the story of the collapsed UK bank, Northern Rock. When the Building Societies
Act 1986 was passed this permitted societies to demutualise and become a limited
company like other banks. Since then all ten building societies that demutualised
(BSA, 2015) between 1989 and 2000 have either collapsed (e.g. Bradford & Bingley
and Northern Rock) or have been acquired by larger banks (e.g. Abbey National,
Halifax and Woolwich). They are all case studies of market competition pressures
that have led to being acquired or to take excessive risk.
Following the financial crisis, research within risk management has sought to
understand what happened, subsequently leading to a phase of identifying
indicators for future possible financial crisis. J. O. Wilson et al. (2010, P.1)
suggested “Future research could also be directed to provide a better understanding
between competition, capital, profitability, liquidity and risk”. The motivation of
this thesis is to contribute to and support to this trend. The rescues of a number
of the largest banks2, the creation of larger banks by the absorption of failed ones3
and national insolvencies4 during the financial crisis re-opened the discussion of
the negative externalitly of too-big-to-fail (TBTF)5 policy (BOE, 2013; Haldane &
May, 2011). An expectation from a larger (systemic) banks to receive a
government or sovereign bailout in case of failure may reduce their incentives to
exercise discipline and may increase risk-taking, ultimately increasing the sector’s
financial fragility. Such a scenario could also provide an incentive to smaller banks
2E.g. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the USA, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group in the UK,
UBS in Switzerland and Dexia by the Belgian, French and Luxembourg governments.
3E.g. JPMorgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns and Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill
Lynch in the USA. Lloyds TSB’s acquisition of Halifax Bank of Scotland (to form the Lloyds
Banking Group) in the UK and France’s BNP Paribas’ acquisition of Fortis’ Belgian and
Luxembourg assets.
4E.g. Iceland in 2008, Ireland in 2010 and Cyprus in 2013 (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Huizinga, 2013).
5Originally this term was universalised by Stewart McKinney during a 1984 U.S. Congressional
hearing, discussing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) intervention with
Continental Illinois (Stern & Feldman, 2004).
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to pursue an unsustainable growth strategy to enhance their size in order to be
considered as TBTF. In addition, theoretical undercapitalised banks may have
incentives to roll over loans to distressed borrowers (inefficient firms) instead of
restructuring or liquidating them6, effectively reducing credit supply to newer
borrowers (potentially more efficient firms) hampering the economic recovery.
Homar and van Wijnbergen (2017) analysed recapitalisation interventions during
recessions following 69 banking crises during the period from 1980 to 2014, and
provided positive and significant evidence in support of bailouts which enhanced
the banks’ probability of recovery (i.e. shortening recessions). There was no
evidence that other interventions such as liquidity support or guarantees on bank
liabilities enhance probability of recovery. Further, TBTF could lead to increased
market concentration, restricting competition adding to the moral hazard
incentives to take excess risk to generate higher levels of return and potential
inefficiencies. Such a dilemma provides a cause for further investigation from a risk
management, regulation and a market design perspective.
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Research
The primary goal of this thesis is to enhance the understanding of the banking
competition and financial-stability nexus across the Basel jurisdictions, with a
focus on the United States banking sector. In order to achieve this, the papers
within this thesis extend the understanding of financial stability, banking efficiency
determinants and the competition and concentration relationship. Specifically, the
aims and objectives of this study are:
1. To investigate the literature to gain a wider understanding of the concept of
banking financial stability:
• Provide a broad review of the various definitions;
6Write-offs may impact regulator capital requirement or trigger counterpart risk due to
securitisation
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• Conduct a systematic literature review in order to identify the models
developed post 2000 to measure financial stability;
• Identify the data used to empirically test these models;
• Replicate a number of the sector level systemic risk measures using US
data;
• Review the current regulations in place to address systemic risk and
identify regulatory challenges from the literature.
2. To investigate the determinants of Banking Efficiency:
• To employ Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to calculate bank level cost
efficiency scores;
• To employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to calculate bank level
production efficiency scores;
• To identify a number of determinants of banking efficiency such as credit
risk, liquidity, regulatory ratios.
3. To evaluate the impact of efficiency, competition & concentration on banking
financial stability:
• To calculate various measures of banking competition within the Basel
jurisdictions;
• To calculate various measures of banking concentration within the Basel
jurisdictions;
• To analyse the determinants of financial stability such as credit risk,
liquidity, regulatory ratios at a bank level;
• To analyse the determinants of financial stability at a bank level with
sector level variables of competition and concentration;
• To analyse the role of systemic risk within the banking competition and
stability relationship.
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1.3 Organisation of this thesis
The thesis is organised in the format of research papers where chapters are
designed in the format of journal articles. The structure of the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 1: Introduction
The introduction chapter will provide a brief background and the motivation for
the topic as well as providing the thesis structure and summarising the notable
elements and key findings of this thesis. This chapter will also discuss the
epistemological stance of this thesis.
Chapter 2: Review of Related Literature
This chapter reviews the literature that will inform the rest of the thesis. The
focus will be to outline the traditional market structure theories which will be
tested within the later chapters and the banking regulatory environment which
will be referred back to throughout the thesis. Note, this chapter is not in the
format of a journal article.
Chapter 3: Financial Stability Measures and Regulation Challenges
This chapter provides a critical overview of the existing methodologies and
regulations regarding systemic risk. Following a systematic literature review, this
chapter aims to contribute by providing a transparent overview of the measures of
systemic risk that have been developed post-2000. Furthermore, a number of the
measures are evidenced using US data, such calculations will be used within later
chapters.
Chapter 4: Banking Efficiency Determinants
This chapter surveys the banking efficiency literature and examines previous
empirical evidence regarding banking efficiency determinants. In order to
investigate the efficiency structure paradigm (ESP) in the following chapter, Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
methodologies are used to generate bank level efficiency scores. Empirically within
this chapter, US bank data is used to identify the determinants of cost efficiency
pre and post the financial crisis.
Chapter 5: Banking Efficiency, Concentration and Competition and
Financial Stability
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This chapter combines knowledge and calculations from the previous chapters and
empirically examines the relationship between banking efficiency, concentration,
competition and financial stability. This chapter also provides evidence of the
various market structure, risk and regulatory determinants of financial stability.
Chapter 6: Conclusion
This final chapter summarises the key findings from this research in order to
articulate this thesis’ contributions to theory and practice. This section also
addresses the research limitations and provides suggestions for future research.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are in the form of an academic journal article which
contains its own literature review, methodology section, finding and discussion and
summary/conclusion. Although each paper is freestanding, in the sense they
investigate the implications of bank efficiency and market
competitions/concentration, yet all are related in the examination of the
determinants of banking stability. Thus, the contribution of the thesis can be
viewed as a collection of contributions of each paper. This thesis will focus on the
27 member jurisdictions subject to the Basel Accords7 and Global Systemically
Important Banks (G-SIBs) (see Table 2.2 in Section 2.4 for a list) given that they
are subject to similar regulations. However, due to data limitations the majority of
the empirical evidence will use US banking sector data. Due to this for consistency
purposes when mining the data from Bloomberg Professional Service all nominal
values for non–US banks were converted into USD for fair comparisons. According
to Bloomberg (2019) the foreign exchange used to translate the values is the cross
currency rate at the time of the annual report publication (or the translation rate
declared in the annual report). The data used within this thesis will be discussed
further in the relevant methodology sections of each paper. Figure 1.1 provides an
indication of the data availability and will form the bases for investigate the BIS
7The 27 country jurisdictions include, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (BIS, 2016).
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Figure 1.1: Balanced Panel Data Availability
Source: Bloomberg (2016)
Basel jurisdictions rather than just an individual country. It is worth noting that
balanced data is not necessarily required. For example, in regression analysis, as
long as the dependant variables are balanced the independent variables can be
unbalanced8. As suggested by Baltagi (2008) and Hall (2005) all the panel data
used was deflated by their corresponding years consumer price index (CPI) to the
2000 price levels to control for inflation effects. For empirical purposes within this
thesis where dummy variables have been used to classify a systemic banking crisis
such periods are defined following Laeven and Valencia (2013). Their classification
is widely used within similar empirical studies (Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, &
Richardson, 2017; J. R. Barth, Caprio Jr, & Levine, 2013; C. Borio, 2014; Cerutti,
Claessens, & Laeven, 2017; Sosa-Padilla, 2018).
The reason for adopting this structure rather than the traditional PhD thesis
structure is that it offers a number of advantages. Firstly, each paper looks at the
economic and risk management theories from different theoretical perspectives.
Furthermore, each empirical paper will have its own empirical literature review to
8Statistical significance will determine if the unbalanced datasets are reliable, as well as other
pre/post-regression diagnostics.
8
enhance the thesis comprehensiveness. Secondly, I have gained valuable experience
in writing academic articles in a clear and concise manner, a skill which is
necessary for my future academic career development. Thirdly, this structure
results in a number of manuscripts for easier dissemination to academic journals.
In addition, this thesis has been compiled using software called LATEX, therefore
the source code can be easily converting into the publishers’ LATEX templates.
Finally, and importantly, organising the thesis in this format is simpler and is
becoming increasing popular, certainly within mainland European universities.
Given that this thesis structure is similar to a European thesis style that consists
of essays/papers, producing a journal article from this is complementary (and vice
versa).
1.4 Notable Elements and Key Findings of this
Thesis
This research examines the relationship between banking competition and financial
stability from a number of mutually supportive theoretical foundations. To
understand the theory of financial stability, a systematic literature review was
carried out to identify the techniques used to measure this concept. Also, to
understand banking competition theory the concepts of efficiency and market
concentration are empirically explored in relation to competition. In addition,
while exploring these issues the current regulatory context is taken into account to
understand how they also influence the competition-stability nexus.
The key findings of this research are as follows,
1. In Chapter 3, a systematic literature review is conducted to identify systemic
risk measures developed post-2000. 56 different methods were obtained,
which are categorised into five types depending on the area of risk they focus
on. This grouping allows for a critical assessment of the techniques. A
number of the methods were replicated to produce country level indicators
which will be used in the later empirical papers. To date, only one other
comprehensive systematic literature review on systemic risk has been
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conducted, by Silva, da Silva Alexandre, and Tabak (2017). Their article
mainly categorised systemic risk research and produced an author network,
they did not critique or identify the techniques used to measure systemic
risk, unlike this chapter. The main finding of this systematic literature
review is that the majority of these measures tend to focus on individual
financial institution’s risk rather than the entire banking system stability.
Also within this chapter, a table summarising the data requirements for each
method was produced, and to the best of my knowledge, this is the first of its
kind. This table identifies the data typically used to measure systemic risk
and identifies the areas for future development. The most commonly used
data is equity and fundamental data. One of the least used data types is
from the foreign exchange market, despite the fact that when this type of
data is used to measure systemic risk it usually yields interesting and
significant results. Furthermore, the majority of data used is from developed
countries therefore generalising elsewhere is difficult. Finally, this paper
looked at macro potential regulation being developed to tackle systematic
risk to identify a number of different regulatory challenges.
2. Within Chapter 4, SFA cost and DEA productivity efficiency is calculated
for a number of countries’ banks, however it was found that balanced panel
data sets were required for statistically significant results. In addition,
countries with small sample sizes resulted in insignificant model
specifications. In analysing the determinants of efficiency using US panel
data, the econometric measures of efficiency (SFA) within the GMM analysis
provided more statistically significant regression models than the use of the
accounting based measure of cost to income ratio9. Proxies for bank level
credit and liquidity risk, were both found to negatively impact cost efficiency.
This suggests that financial institutions that incur higher costs from
non-performing loans (NPL) or from raising funds are more inefficient. In
9The alternative econometric measurement of efficiency DEA (calculated via linear
programming), however, provided inconsistent results or insignificant model specifications.
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addition, regulations designed to mitigate these risks, Basel’s Tier 1 Capital
Ratio (T1CR) and a proxy for the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) were
also found to negatively affect cost efficiency. To the best of my knowledge
this is the first time such regulatory ratios have been used in the study to
determine efficiency. Typically, research in this area uses country level
aggregates/index or dummy variables to assess regulatory impacts on
efficiency. The findings of this paper using bank level variables contradicts
previous findings, suggesting the use of bank level regulatory data may
provide a more accurate picture10. These findings suggest an unintended
consequence of the regulations, as their compliance costs (holding extra
capital or purchasing further funding) hampers efficiency.
3. Chapter 5 investigates the competition-stability nexus using US Bank panel
data. Empirical evidence found in this chapter supports a neutral view of
competition versus stability where both competition and concentration
fragility co-exist. This has not been found in previous empirical research
using US data. In addition, this study investigates whether a non-linear
relationship exists. By including a cubic function within the GMM regression
analysis, evidence of a polynomial competition-fragility relationship was
found. Existing literature suggests the possibility of non-linear relationships,
with a number evidencing a concave/convex relationship via the inclusion of
a quadratic function. However, no empirical study has introduced a cubic
function before. Without the cubic function the evidence also supported a
competition-fragility relationship, suggesting previous empirical literature
which identified a linear relationship could have potentially investigated a
monotonic/polynomial relationship. In addition, the measures of systemic
risk which were calculated within Chapter 3 were introduced within the
competition-stability nexus to identify whether this altered the relationship.
The use of systemic risk measure within this empirical literature is rather
limited, however this chapter found a contrasting view of the
10Assessing directly how institutions’ regulatory ratios impact their cost efficiency.
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competition-stability nexus, similar to Leroy and Lucotte (2017).
This chapter also investigated a number of risk and regulatory characteristics
as determinants of financial stability. The majority of bank level
characteristics were found to be statistically significant in line with the
existing literature and theory. However, the inclusion of a proxy for the
NSFR was found to hinder stability. This regulatory proxy for liquidity risk
has not been used within this literature before. This negative association
suggests that as financial institutions seek to enhance long-term stable
funding, this could hinder profitability (similar to finding in Chapter 4) and
subsequently stability.
1.5 Epistemological and Methodological
Framework
Finance and economics, although belonging to the conventional soft or social
sciences, more often than not are treated as though they are fields of hard sciences.
Consequently, the research in these fields of social sciences has been dominated by
a positivist ontology which relies on the assumption that there exists a single
objective reality that can be achieved/perceived through controlled and structural
approaches using statistics and mathematics.
Research within the competition-stability nexus field of finance tends to also be
all ‘positivist’, in that the authors claim to give reliable and empirically
sustainable answers to questions that policy-makers regard to be important.
Empirical ‘realists’ determine whether a statement is true by comparing what is
claimed with empirical evidence. This creates what is known as correspondence
theory of truth. Positivists usually regard explanation as a process of discovering
the necessary law-like generalisations that cover the singular instance to be
explained. Positivism is regarded as rather out-of-date for some, although it has
been particularly influential in the development of the disciplines of finance,
economics and accounting (Ryan, Scapens, & Theobald, 2002).
Looking into positivism, positive is not always positive, it means you are
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Table 1.1: Comte’s view of positivism throughout the 19th century
Stage Study Explanation
Stage 1 Theological
(Fictitious)
Religion without science
Stage 2 Metaphysical
(Abstract)
An abstract power guides events in the world
according to principles, scientific mind-set that
believe a higher power/system. For example,
ethics and aesthetics do not deal in facts and are
therefore unverifiable
Stage 3 Positive
(Observation &
Experimentation)
Scientific method only, disregarding any
metaphysical principles
Source: adapted from M. V. Wilson (1927) and Vincent (1995)
certain, not optimistic or pessimistic, just neutral (free from emotion), positive
about knowing. Positivism is often credited to Auguste Comte (Crotty, 1998).
Comte first used the word positivism in an essay written in 1848, then introduced
it definitively as he developed his first major work (The Cours De Philosophie
Positive) into a specific political theory of scientific religion (Vincent, 1995).
Comte’s views of the development of positivism is summarised in Table 1.1. In this
research area and certainly within typical journal articles found within mainstream
US literature, Comte’s view that the only valid knowledge is knowledge gained
through the scientific method is still prominent.
Therefore, from a philosophical perspective, this thesis is from a
realist/objectivist stance and agrees with ontological materialism11.
This thesis will observe what is already ‘accepted knowledge’ and is therefore in
existence, can be viewed, read and discussed. The justification for the
methodologies employed within this thesis is more important than its theoretical
perspective. Notwithstanding (as Comte also warned) there are limitations of an
11Which is the belief that material things, such as particles, chemical processes and energy are
more real for example than the human mind, and the belief that reality exists regardless of human
observers.
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over reliance of mathematical approaches (Gane, 2006). Even the ‘perfect’ method
maybe rendered misleading if misused. Further, justification by using complex
mathematical analysis and excessively lengthy, technical literature may betray
illiterate audiences.
Within this epistemological and methodological framework, following any
statistical analysis, the interpretion of findings will be based on fact (statistical
significance) and all assumptions stated. Similarly, with other empirical studies in
this area and following the principles set by Karl Popper (originally in 1959), this
thesis cannot state that a theory is true, it can only provide evidence to support
such a theory. Therefore, results can only falsify (reject) a theory (Popper, 2005).
1.6 Research Questions and Hypotheses
This section summarises the research questions and hypotheses that are investigated
within this research. These questions are derived from the aims of this study as well
as the identified gaps in the later literature reviews.
1. How does the academic literature define and measure systemic risk?
2. What are the determinants of banking efficiency in the Basel Jurisdictions?
3. How does banking competition impact financial stability in the Basel
Jurisdictions?
For the second and third research question, following a positivist paradigm, a list
of hypotheses was derived from the empirical literature review within the respective
chapters. The purpose of stating the following hypotheses is to clarify exactly what
is under investigation within each empirical chapter later. From the second research
question the following five research hypotheses are tested in chapter 4:
Hypothesis 1: The use of econometric calculations of efficiency is superior to
traditional accounting measures.
This hypothesis suggests that the use of SFA or DEA as a measure of
efficiency within regression analysis is superior to using traditional
accounting based measures of efficiency such as the Cost to Income Ratio.
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Hypothesis 2: Business model diversification has a negative impact on efficiency.
This hypothesis suggests that as a financial institution increases its
diversification (altering the intermediation process) this negatively affects
cost efficiency. This hypothesis will be tested using US bank panel data,
which to the best of my knowledge has not been addressed.
Hypothesis 3: Increased credit risk has a negative impact on efficiency.
This hypothesis suggests that as financial institutions face increased credit risk
this negatively affects their cost efficiency due to the impact on outputs. This
hypothesis will be tested using US bank panel data, which to the best of my
knowledge has not been addressed.
Hypothesis 4: Increased capital requirement regulations enhances efficiency.
This hypothesis suggests that as financial institutions face increased pressure
from regulators to reduce credit risk this positively affects their cost efficiency
due to the impact on outputs. This hypothesis will be tested using US bank
panel data, which to the best my of knowledge has not have been addressed
before.
Simultaneous rejection of H3 and H4 would indicate that credit risk regulation
may not been optimal given the detrimental impact on cost efficiency.
Hypothesis 5: Increased liquidity has a negative impact on efficiency.
This hypothesis suggests that as financial institutions increase their liquidity
position, this hampers cost efficiency, due to the opportunity cost nature of
holding more liquid reserves. This hypothesis will be tested using US bank
panel data, which to the best my knowledge has not been addressed before.
From the third research question, the following seven research hypotheses are
tested in Chapter 5:
Hypothesis 6: The market power paradigm persists.
This hypothesis suggests that the structure-conduct-performance paradigm
(concentrate) and/or the relative market power paradigm (competition) exists,
in the context of the US banking sector (See Figure 2.1).
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Hypothesis 7: The efficiency structure paradigm persists.
This hypothesis suggests that the relative efficiency or scale efficiency paradigm
exists in the context of the US banking sector (See Figure 2.1).
The simultaneous rejection of H6 and H7 would support the non-relationship,
quiet life hypothesis.
Hypothesis 8: Increased levels of competition negatively affects financial stability.
In the context of the US banking sector, this hypothesis would support the
competition-fragility view proposed by F. Allen and Gale (2004). The rejection
of this hypothesis would support the competition-stability view proposed by
Boyd and Nicolo´ (2005). Note that the rejection of hypothesis 6, would result
in the inability to test this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 9: Increased capital requirement regulation positively affects financial
stability.
This hypothesis suggests that increased capital requirements under the Basel
III regulations have a positive impact on financial stability. These capital
requirements are discussed further in Section 2.3.1. This hypothesis will be
tested using US bank panel data.
Hypothesis 10: Increased liquidity regulation positively affects financial stability.
This hypothesis suggests that the newly imposed Basel III regulations for
liquidity risk have a positive impact on financial stability. These liquidity
requirements are discussed further in Section 2.3.1 and 3.4.3. This hypothesis
will be tested using US bank panel data.
Hypothesis 11: Being named as a SIFI or D-SIB positively affects the institutions
financial stability.
This hypothesis suggests that being a named a SIFI by the FSB or classed
as a D-SIB by domestic regulators has a positive impact on an institution’s
financial stability. These classifications are discussed further in section 2.4.
This hypothesis will be tested using US bank panel data.
Hypothesis 12: The use of recently developed models to measure systemic risk
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provides contrasting results in the competition-stability nexus compared to
traditional accounting measures of financial stability.
This hypothesis suggests that the use of market level measures of systemic
risk other than using traditional accounting based measures of stability (such
as the Z-Score) alters the competition-stability relationship. Providing
evidence to support this hypothesis would support similar findings by
Abedifar, Giudici, and Hashem (2017) and Leroy and Lucotte (2017). This
hypothesis will be tested using US bank panel data.
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Figure 1.2: Design of the Quantitative Research
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Chapter 2
Review of Related Literature
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to briefly review the literature of key concepts that
will be covered within this thesis. Later, within each paper a further literature
review, predominantly focused on empirical studies will be discussed prior to any
methodology and analysis. Firstly, within this section the theoretical paradigms
that will be later tested within this thesis are noted. Secondly, a review of the
banking regulation literature will be presented with a focus on the US regulation.
This is due to the majority of the analysis within this thesis being based on the
US banking sector due to data availability. Further, the premise of systemic risk
and macroprudential regulation will be discussed, ahead of the first paper (Chapter
3), which conducts a systematic literature review on this topic. Finally, this leads
onto a discussion of the Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI), a
classification introduced by regulators, to identify institutions which require extra
supervision (due to size and importance rather than incompetence). SIFI’s will be
included within Chapters 4 and 5’s empirical analysis.
2.2 Banking Structure
The premise of this thesis is to evaluate the effects of banking competition on
financial stability. The effects of market power on banking performance and
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stability has been a contentious debate amongst academics and policy-makers in
recent years. This multifaceted relationship consists of concentration and efficiency
inter alia leading to market power. Theoretically, the relationship between market
structure and performance can be investigated by two debated paradigms, the
Market Power Paradigm (MPP) and the Efficient Structure Paradigm (ESP).
MPP suggests a positive relationship between the level of market share and
individual performance whilst ESP argues the positive relationship between
market concentration and performance is due to a firm’s superior efficiency
(Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977). The null hypothesis suggests there is no
relationship between level of market share and performance. Figure 2.1 shows the
paradigms and hypotheses within the Structure Performance Relationship Theory.
Within MPP, a large proportion of this literature focuses on whether (or to what
extent) market power/structure influences the firms ability to set prices. In theory,
ceteris paribus the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm advocates a
higher market power in concentrated markets can allow an institution to
influence/set prices (Bain, 1951). SCP however, only provides a current snapshot
of the competitive environment, assessing this theory over a short timescale does
not explain how the market has evolved or take into account future change. The
selection of variables to test each SCP component, requires careful consideration.
Structure is often measured in terms of market concentration, however there are a
number of different possible measurement techniques emerging from the network
theory literature. Further, the likes of firm conduct (C) can impact both the
market structure (S) and firm performance (P), for example a firm could pursue a
strategy of growth via integration (Tirole, 1988). Relative Market Power (RMP)
takes this notion further and argues that only firms with a substantial market
share and well-differentiated products can assert market power when pricing their
products and earn enhanced profits (Shepherd, 1983). Distinguishing between the
SCP and RMP paradigms can be challenging. This is due to the fact that the
affects of both efficiency and market power could simultaneously exist within
variables that represent market structure and/or could be notified by the level of
market concentration (Zouari, 2010). Within ESP, Relative Efficiency (RES),
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which is also know as X-Efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966), proposes that firms with
exceptional management or innovative technologies are able to lower their costs
base to achieve higher profits. As a result such firm’s are assumed to gain a larger
market share which could result in high levels of market concentration, therefore
gaining from a positive profit-structure relationship (Smirlock, 1985). Scale
Efficiency (SES) argues similar in respect to management and technology, but
argues the firms ability to produce more (increase production scale), can lower unit
costs in order to achieve higher profit per unit, to ultimately enhance market
share. Alternatively, the Quiet Life (QL) hypothesis (Hicks, 1935), advocates that
a non-competitive market reduces institutions’ managements effort to achieve
operational efficiency. Without an incentive to maximise profit managers may
spend resources, with the focus to achieve or maintain market power. Therefore
inefficient managers/firms may still persist. In contrast, according to
Schumpeterian’s view on competition, a level of monopoly may be preferred
compared to perfect competition, because monopolistic rents are an effective
incentive to improve and innovate.
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Figure 2.1: Structure Performance Relationship Theory
Source: Adaptation of Hannan (1991) and Smirlock (1985)
Bain (1951) was the first to test the impact of market share and concentration
on individual performance (within the American manufacturing industry) and
concluded that increased market concentration led to higher profit rates for
individual companies. One of the earliest literature reviews of empirical evidence
from the banking sector was conducted by Rhoades (1977), who concluded that
out of 39 studies, 30 found a quantitatively small relationship between market
structure and banking performance. Later Rhoades and Rutz (1982) conducted a
large (for its time) empirical analysis in the US and concluded there was an overall
inability to link market concentration and performance within the banking sector.
Interestingly, they argue that the main driver in profitability is actually from the
banks’ ability to reduce risk. Rhoades and Rutz (1982) came from a standpoint
that the QL hypothesis should apply in particular to the banking sector as they
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often avoided evidencing significant abnormal returns due to their fiduciary role
within society and the nature of their regulated environment.
2.3 Regulation
Historically, J. R. Barth, Caprio Jr, and Levine (2008, 2013) noted there are
significant cross-country variations in banking, regulation, supervision and
information availability. Broadly, there are four main supervisory models:
Functional; Institutional; Integrated; (Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn,
Rojas-Suarez, & Weisbrod, 1998) and Objectives (Ciha´k & Podpiera, 2006). The
functional model is where there are a number of supervisors responsible for
different business lines. For example, an institution licensed to engage in banking,
insurance and market activity, will have to comply with multiple supervisors. The
institution model is where an institution is assigned a supervisor depending on the
main business/legal status of the institution. The supervisor will be responsible for
overseeing both conduct and prudential activities. Even if the institution
diversifies outside of that supervisors expertise, the supervisor would still remain.
The integrated model (commonly know as single or consolidated model) is where
one supervisor has the responsibility for all institutions and its functions. An
attenuated version of this model would be where a supervisor is responsible for
banking and insurance, but there is a separate authority for the market activity.
The objectives model is where the supervisory responsibilities are distributed
between a number of supervisors (typically two), one for prudential oversight and
one for conduct oversight for example. The responsibility for macro-prudential
oversight, however, may be located elsewhere or be non-existent.
Simon (2010) discusses two types of regulators, optimizers and managerialists,
within the context of banking. The former tends to focus on resolution of isolated
threats and uses tools such as mandating disclosure, reducing negative
externalities with Pigouvian taxes (Carlton & Loury, 1980) or Calabresian liability
rules (Attanasio, 1988). The latter learns from historical information and case
studies to derive analytical indicators, for example stress-tests, to induce
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self-correction mechanisms. For example in the US, Acharya, Berger, and Roman
(2018) found that institutions which are subject to regulatory stress-tests tend to
reduce credit supply, particularly to relatively risky borrowers, e.g. large
corporates which exhibit higher risk, in an attempt to decrease their credit risk.
Table 2.1, adapted from Hannoun (2010), provides a synopsis of alternative
regulatory toolsets available to contest financial stability.
Countries with efficient supervision and monitoring of financial institutions
tend to react to banking system shocks better (Anginer & Demirguc-Kunt, 2014;
Anginer, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, & Mare, 2018; Hoque, Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos,
& Douady, 2015). Following the financial crisis, many countries reviewed their
institutional structures of financial market supervision and regulation. Numerous
changes took place, including the transfer of responsibilities between existing
organisations, the amalgamation of stand-alone agencies into other organisations
(typically central banks), and the establishment of new bodies, especially in the
areas of macro-prudential system oversight. Additionally, there were changes to
reinforce the institutional apparatus for the resolution of failing institutions.
The financial crisis highlighted a series of gaps that pervade, not only national
regulatory regimes, but also the greater body of international financial law.
International regulatory forums like the Basel Committee and International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) had neglected the likes of
securitization, mortgage-related securities, derivatives, shadow banking or TBTF
institutions that increasingly dominated the financial system of advanced economic
countries (Brummer & Smallcomb, 2015).
The Group of 20 (G20) was named the world’s leading economic forum,
fundamentally displacing the Group of 7 (G7). The Financial Stability Forum
(FSF) was renamed the Financial Stability Board (FSB) with a mandate to
co-ordinate standards setting activities of different regulation agencies and to
ensures the complex interdisciplinary issues do not get neglected, if they fell
outside the scope of different supervision mandates (FSB, 2009b). Figure 2.2
highlights the current regulatory implementation process.
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Table 2.1: Potential Policies to Diminish Systemic Risk
Policy Objective Example Tools
Fiscal Build fiscal safeguards Reduce debt; pigouvian taxes
Sector support when
stressed
Capital injections; asset & liabilities
guarantees
Manage aggregate
demand
Taxation; automatic stabilizers;
discretionary countercyclical measures
Monetary Price stability Policy rate; standard repos
Liquidity management Collateral policies; interest on reserves;
policy corridors
Lean against financial
imbalances
Increase policy rate; raise reserve
requirements
Provide support on
downside
Decrease policy rate; lower reserve
requirements; inject liquidity;
quantitative and credit easing;
emergency liquidity assistance
Exit strategies Legislation
FX reserve buffers Gold reserves
Prudential Macro-prudential
(system-wide)
Countercyclical capital charge; forward-
looking provisioning; systemic capital
charge; leverage ratio; LTV caps; robust
infrastructure
Microprudential
(individual-institutions)
Quality/quantity of capital; leverage
ratio; liquidity standards; counter-party
credit risk; limits to bank activities;
strengthened risk management
Source: Hannoun (2010, p.8)
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Figure 2.2: The Vertically Integrated Regulatory Process
Source: Brummer (2014, p.108)
The current vertical integration process aims to provide consistency in regards
to the quality and level of regulation across jurisdictions. The agenda setting
process can be rather persuade politically given that it tends to be a negotiation
amongst world leaders (e.g. the G-20), from various different stances.
Organisations that develop the standards typically possess no enforcement
mandate, rather they seek consultation with the industry participants before
defining any rules. This consultation can attenuate the original proposal. For
example, during the Basel III consultation process there was a compromise
between Switzerland, the US and the UK, resulting in total regulatory capital
being 8% rather than a higher original proposal (Howarth & Quaglia, 2016).
Ultimately, the implementation of the rules comes down to the individual
jurisdictions and their legislative process. Some jurisdictions are more efficient
than others regarding this implementation. For example, in the adoption of Basel
III, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has completed the adoption of the majority
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Basel III in law, whilst the majority of standards are still currently being
considered by legislators in the case of the European Union jurisdictions (BIS,
2018). Thus, the implementation process may also be subject to political
motivation.
2.3.1 The Basel Accords
The Basel Accords were developed in the 1980s following the formation of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 1974, to enhance
international cooperation in banking supervision. Basel I was introduced in 1988,
predominantly focusing on financial institutions’ capital adequacy (in the event of
unexpected loss). Generally financial institutions responded by moving higher risk
assets off the balance sheet as Basel I failed to address the operational side and
supervision of this capital adequacy (Mohanty, 2008). Basel II was issued in June
2004 with a revised framework focusing on minimal capital requirements, setting
standards for institutions to develop their own internal capital adequacy models
and enhancing disclosure. Prior to its implementation Rodr´ıguez (2002) warned
that it was not clear if Basel II could guarantee the soundness of the banking
system and prevent moral hazard due to state deposit insurance schemes.
Following the financial crisis Basel II was widely criticised (e.g. Acharya, 2009;
Kaufman, 2009; Moosa, 2010; Tarullo, 2008). Caruana and Narain (2008) argued
that Basel II failed to address all the regulatory issues that arose during the
financial crisis which went beyond capital adequacy. As the capital requirements
were based on a risk-adjusted measure of assets, financial institutions innovated to
create securitised products to remove risky assets from their balance sheets to
lower their capital requirements and increase counterparty risk and leverage
(Acharya & Richardson, 2009a). Further, Basel II failed to take into account
leverage and liquidity (Distinguin, Roulet, & Tarazi, 2013). Subsequently Basel III
was introduced in July 2010, with enhanced capital requirements, risk coverage
and containing leverage. The Pillar 1 capital requirements include:
• Quality and Level of Capital – This has an emphasis on common equity (4.5%
of risk weighed assets).
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• Capital Conservation Buffer – Which is common equity of 2.5% of risk weighed
assets.
• Countercyclical Buffer – A discretionary range of common equity (0-2.5%) to
be applied by individual jurisdictions, depending on the economic
cycle/unacceptable build-up of risk.
• Capital Loss Absorption at Point of Non-Viability – Forcing institutions to
reduce moral hazard and increase the private sectors contribution in resolving
future crises.
It is argued that the enhanced levels of regulatory capital compared to Basel II
would limit the availability of credit supply and reduce economic activity
(B. Allen, Chan, Milne, & Thomas, 2012; Miles, Yang, & Marcheggiano, 2013).
Also A. Barth and Seckinger (2018) warns that banking sectors with a higher
degree of heterogeneity, face an exacerbated problem of allocating resources among
individual financial institutions after an increase in the non risk-weighted capital
adequacy requirements.
The risk coverage element stipulates that institutions must strengthen their
capital treatment of securitised assets, maintain significantly higher capital for the
trading book (derivative activity) and assess their counterparty credit risk
network. In the event of exposure to qualifying central counterparties, a 2% risk
weight exposure will require further capitalisation. Whilst the regulatory
consensus has focused on increasing capital requirements, there is a continued
debate around precisely what types of capital requirements are needed and how to
structure them depending on country-specific factors (Anginer et al., 2018). Pillar
2, focuses on risk management and supervision, emphasising the need for a firm
wide governance and risk management system. This system must now capture risk
arising from off-balance-sheet exposures and securitisation activity. Pillar 3 covers
market discipline, which further requires institutions’ openness regarding the
calculation of regulatory capital ratios, off-balance-sheet exposures and
securitisation activity. All banks within the jurisdiction of Basel must comply with
the pillar requirements. However, the Globally Systemically Important Financial
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Institutions (G-SIFI) are subject to higher loss absorbing capacity, depending on
their classification (See Section 2.4 and Table 2.2 for more details). Outside of
these pillars Basel III stipulates the new Global Liquidity Standards and
Supervision Monitoring regulation, comprising of a Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(LCR), Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and the Principles of Sound Liquidity
Risk Management and Supervision (See section 3.4.3 for a discussion).
2.3.2 EU Regulation
Within the EU following the financial crisis, regulation and supervisory oversight
has become more concentrated at the EU level (rather than country level), under
the European supervisory architecture, in order to achieve regulatory convergence
and to centralise cross-border supervision (where appropriate). In 2010, the
European Council and Parliament accepted the European Commission’s proposals
to increase micro-prudential supervision via the European System of Financial
Supervision (ESFS) which includes the European Supervisory Authority (ESA)
and establish a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)1 to oversee
macro-prudential regulation. Loipersberger (2018) conducted an event study which
found that the European Central Bank announcements supported the notional
that this type of single supervisory mechanism prevents banks from taking
excessive risks and thereby stabilizes the financial sector. Further, The European
Banking Authority (EBA)2 is an independent EU Authority tasked with ensuring
effective and consistent prudential regulation and supervision across the European
banking sector. These changes were made to address supervisory inefficiencies
highlighted in the Lamfalussy Report (Schaub, 2005), which critiqued the previous
co-ordination of rule-making at the EU level and supervision at the member state
level. Regarding the macro-prudential supervision by the ESRB, authors have
1The ESRB was set up as a body without legal personality or autonomous intervention power
2Interestingly, in November 2017, the EU announced that the EBA will relocate to Paris,
Berninger, Kiesel, and Schiereck (2018) found this is associated with significant losses in the stock
market valuation of French banks (the other seven bidding hosts’ banking stocks were unaffected).
The authors argued this is a natural experiment to test the effect of geographically close regulation.
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critiqued the ability to make an efficient and effective decision in a situation of
crisis (Ferran & Alexander, 2011; Haar, 2015). With circa 60 voting members, the
main criticism is of the board’s structure which may be unable to meet its
objectives. Furthermore, the ESRB is meant to be an independent organisation,
but it may appear (to observers) to be a coordinator amongst member states’
central banks.
2.3.3 US Regulation
In the 1980s and 90s deregulation within the US banking sector was common,
influencing levels of competition. Due to the growth in foreign banks operating in
the US, the International Banking Act 1978 was passed in an attempt to reduce
their competitive advantage3. In 1980, The Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Contact Act was passed. This legislation was implemented as calls
that regulated interest rates did not benefit both, banks and consumers. Allowing
institutions to set their own interest rates, changed the dynamic of competition,
giving consumers more choice. Part of this 1980 Act eliminated activity
restrictions on thrift institutions4 ultimately allowing them to issue consumer
loans/credit cards and give them greater access to commercial customers, thus
allowing them to be more competitive against other financial institutions. As US
domestic banks sought to enhance their asset base, overseas lending became more
significant, prompting the US Congress to introduce the International Lending
Supervision Act in 1983. This required institutions to maintain capital gains
against international loans, the first of its kind (Schooner & Taylor, 1998).
Further, The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 1994, repealed a
number of interstate restrictions, ultimately allowing for cross state consolidation
and allowing institutions open branches elsewhere, enhancing competition further.
Nowadays in the USA, multiple federation agencies are involved in financial
regulation with each dedicated to regulate specific sectors of the financial system (e.g.
3Effectively imposing the same restrictions domestic banks have on foreign banks.
4These are financial institutions that have a simple business model of taking in deposits and
originating mortgages.
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Depository institutions, futures market and securities trading). State regulatory
agencies also provided additional regulation for the same sectors as well as principal
regulation of the insurance sector. Prior to the financial crisis, in the US, there were
five different federal agencies in charge of regulating depository financial institutions,
namely: (i) The Federal Reserve; (ii) The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC); (iii) The Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC); (iv) The National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA); and (iv) The Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS). Depending on a financial institution’s structure and their main functionality,
it may be eligible for regulation by a number of federal agencies as well as numerous
state regulators. For example, the OCC is an independent bureau (part of the US
Treasury Department) with a number of roles, it charters, regulates and stress-tests
national/state-wide banks. However, they also performs regular audits of national
banks to ensure compliance with federal law and regulations. Further, the OCC
regulated commercial banks as well as their subsidiaries, allowing them to have
fewer activity restrictions, opening them up to newer products and services, altering
market competition (Wilcox, 2005). On the other hand if the OCC was to find a
deficiency within a financial institution, it can broadly administrate sanctions on
violators.
In June 2007 the US Treasury Department announced they would restructure
the US financial regulation system due to a number of concerns, firstly because the
US regulation system was too complex. As above, many regulatory agencies at
different federal or state level were regulating the same financial institution.
Secondly, the lack of co-ordination between federal and state agencies often created
a challenging enforcement environment. Thirdly, competition between regulatory
agencies to exercise regulatory authority discouraged or hindered the development
of new products and services. Finally, the regulatory system did not efficiently
regulate the new financial conglomerates operating around the world.
Early 2008, as part of the restructure, the US Treasury Department proposed
a blueprint that they would consolidate the Federal level regulatory agencies into
three agencies with different objectives. These objectives are to oversee financial
stability, prudential and conduct regulation. This plan advocated for:
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• The Federal Reserve to be responsible for financial stability as well as
implementing monetary policy supplying liquidity (if required) and
exercising formal supervisory powers.
• A creation of a new Prudential Financial Regulatory agency which would have
powers to ensure financial institutions are adequately capitalised and ensures
that they have appropriate risk management controls. This regulator would
also ensure that any financial institution that has government guarantees does
not display moral hazard within the markets (taking excessive risk knowing
that the government has already supported them).
• A new conduct of business regulatory agency. This agency would be
responsible for overseeing business practices and setting standards regarding
selling products and services.
This blueprint was never implemented due to opposition, other legislative priorities
and political change.
Following a political change in 2009 (within the first 100 days of President
Obama’s Administration) the US Treasury Department introduced a white paper
called A New Foundation (USTD, 2009). The main focus of this was to address
financial stability and systematic risk oversight, with a focus on the G-SIBs.
Furthermore this white paper made explicit reference to international regulatory
standards and improving international co-operation particularly in connection with
the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
The main white paper proposals which formed the basis of the Dodd-Frank Act
2010 include:
• The creation of a new Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), with
a mandate to identify systemic risk and advise the Federal Reserve on which
institutions are systemically important. The FSOC acts as an umbrella agency
which coordinates information sharing between the other regulatory agencies.
• The creation of The Office of Financial Research (OFR) which supports the
FSOC via collection of institutional data and conducting analysis.
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• The expansion of the Federal Reserve’s mandate on supervising any financial
firm that is classed as globally or domestically systemically important (not
just banks).
• To combine the OCC, FDIC and the OTS, to form a new prudential regulator,
the National Bank Supervisor5.
• The formation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency. This is
required as the previous prudential regulators did not provide adequate
attention to consumer protection6.
Compared to the previous administration’s blueprint proposal of the three regulatory
agencies approach7, the Dodd-Frank Act was not a large reform process as it did
not significantly reduce the number of federal agencies within the US.
In respect to competition in the US, the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of
Competition, is responsible for the anticipation and prevention of anti-competitive
business practices. The Bureau is responsible for reviewing proposed mergers,
investigating non-merger business practices that harm competition and has the
enforcement power via antitrust laws (competition law). However, the US
Government has given authority to examine financial institution mergers for
approval to relevant supervisory bodies (Federal Reserve Board, FDIC and OCC).
Nevertheless, the more authoritative Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division
must independently review all proposed mergers. This review must then be
presented back to the supervisory body in charge. Following this review, if the
Antitrust’s analysis contrasts with the supervisor’s analysis and the merger is still
approved, the Antitrust Division can appeal the decision via the courts. Further,
the banking laws enforce that supervisors must take into account the competition
affects and not allow anti-competitive consolidation, unless it is in the public’s
5This proposal was not included in the Dodd-Frank Act however, the OTS was disbanded and
its responsibilities spread between the Federal Reserve, the OCC and the FDIC
6The Dodd-Frank Act formed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) based on
this proposal.
7A similar structures to the likes of Australia, Canada and Europe.
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interest. During the financial crisis this exception was used a number of times in
the effort to save a number of financial institutions from collapse.
In the US, regulators have a continuous physical presence at the largest
financial institutions by conducting onsite examinations at least every 18 months,
with poorly-rated institutions examined more frequently (Kupiec, 2016). Using the
CAMELS ratings banks are rated from 1 to 58 (FDIC, 2016). Furthermore, at the
micro level of supervision, using confidential supervisory CAMELS9 ratings,
Kupiec, Lee, and Rosenfeld (2017) found that a poor examination rating has a
large negative impact on bank loan growth. This finding illustrates that the bank
supervision process successfully constrains the lending activities of banks operating
in an unsafe and unsound manner. They also found in the data, consistent with
regulatory standards, a monotonic increase in the frequency of bank examinations
as CAMELS ratings deteriorate.
2.3.4 Macroprudential Regulation
Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran (2009) suggest that in dealing with future crises,
local and international regulation should put more emphasis on macroeconomic
policies rather than the likes of restructuring. Further, Longstaff (2010) argues
that macroprudential regulation is needed as the likes of liquidity shock in a
specific country’s banking system result in contagion to all financial markets.
Negative externalities resulting from individual bank behaviour and their financial
interconnectedness are not taken into account by microprudential policies, which
enhances calls for a more macroprudential regulation approach (Crockett, 2000;
Knight, 2006). According to Barwell (2013) the term ‘macroprudential regulation’
81 or 2 are judged to be healthy and well-managed, while banks with inadequacies receive 3 to
5. A rating of 5 is issued to banks with the most serious safety and soundness issues. If a bank is
rated 3 or above they receive specific examiner guidance (Prompt Corrective Action guidelines) to
improve. Failing to do this they will face remedial actions (LaFond & You, 2010).
9Which stand for Capital, Asset quality, Managerial skills, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity
to market risk. Aparicio, Duran, Lozano-Vivas, and Pastor (2018) provides proxies for CAMELS
(p. 64) Papanikolaou (2018a) provides proxies for CAMELS (p. 82).
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apparently dates back to the 1970s, but the term itself remains obscure. In a
literature review of macroprudential policy Galati and Moessner (2013) noted that
since 2008 usage of the term ‘macroprudential’ in speeches by central bankers had
risen significantly. In both advanced and emerging economies macroprudential
policies have been more actively applied since the crisis. Usually these regulations
were changed alongside other bank capital flow restrictions, capital/liqudity
reserve requirements, and monetary policy (Akinci & Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018).
Macroprudential regulation is designed to contribute towards the preservation
of financial stability. Macroprudential supervision refers to the observation of the
whole financial system which commonly comprises of tasks including (i) risk
identification, (ii) risk assessment, (iii) policy assessment, (iv) implementation and
(v) monitoring/follow-up (Sarlin, 2016). This task for regulators is challenging
given the sizeable, complex, interconnected, highly diverse, and constantly
changing nature of the financial system (Flood, Jagadish, & Raschid, 2016). A
macroprudential policy system should not adopt a one-size-fits-all (Lombardi &
Siklos, 2016). In order to identify effective macroprudential policy, regulators will
have to enhance their current understanding and observe its usefulness within
specific contexts via empirical back-testing or a natural experiment (following a
real world crisis). Furthermore, any framework should be dynamically adjusted
over time as knowledge is gained and experience is acquired.
Recently there have been a number of attempts to quantify macroprudential
policy frameworks (Cerutti et al., 2017; Lim, Krznar, Lipinsky, Otani, & Wu, 2013;
Lombardi & Siklos, 2016). Lim et al. (2013) ranked 39 countries’ institutional
systems based on the individual roles of governments and central banks in
macroprudential regulation. Using 2010 IMF data on financial stability and
macroprudential policy they produced three different non-mutually exclusive scales
(from 1 to 4). The authors found a negative correlation between the central bank’s
involvement in the macroprudential policy framework and policy response. For
example, if the central bank is involved, policy response time tends to be longer.
Descriptively they generalised that smaller open economies, with the central bank
ordinarily the authority tended to have a more integrated approach, while more
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complex economies allocate a larger authority role to the government. Cerutti et
al. (2017) created an effectiveness indicator of 12 timeseries macroprudential
instruments developed to suppress credit cycles for 119 countries. Generally
macroprudential tools were effective at reducing credit growth, but the
effectiveness varied depending on the instrument applied and the timing during the
state of the credit cycle. Lombardi and Siklos (2016) found similar evidence when
they developed an index for 46 economies of their capacity to deploy
macroprudential policies. Their index compares the existing macroprudential
frameworks with meeting the objectives set by the G20 and the FSB. Interestingly,
they found that the economies which were the mostly affected by the financial
crisis are the ones had already built up their macroprudential capacity. But, it is
currently difficult to evaluate how effectively macroprudential regulations
frameworks are likely to maintain financial stability as this will only be possible
when they have been in place for a considerable period of time and potentially
faced some sort of exogenous or endogenous shock (Lombardi & Siklos, 2016;
Masciandaro & Volpicella, 2016). However, in a recent assessment of the
effectiveness of macroprudential policies in 57 countries using a dynamic panel
data model (GMM), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) found that the likes of
targeted policies (e.g. limiting house price appreciation) seem to be more effective
than macroprudential policy. In the US S. Kim, Plosser, and Santos (2018) found
that macroprudential policies targeting leveraged lending were effective at reducing
banks’ leveraged lending activity10. However, from the authors evidence it is less
clear whether such policy has addressed its broader goal of reducing the risk that
these loans pose to overall financial stability.
10Predominately it was the largest, and most scrutinised, banks that cut their leveraged lending
activity significantly.
36
2.3.5 Systemic Risk and Regulation
Holistically following the recent financial crisis11, policy-makers aimed to address
institutional and system wide risk with a range of regulatory tools. To contest
institutions’ contribution towards systemic risk, their policies are aimed at curbing
moral hazard as well as mitigating contagion effects such as the formation of the
macroprudential Financial Stability Board in 2009 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.
Policies to reduce participation in financial crisis include, for example, capital and
liquidity buffers as well as encouraging diverse business models and risk management
techniques (such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) Basel III Accords).
There have also been advances in the regulatory framework to address the issue of
countercyclical buffers to counteract the overdrawn market movements arising from
both negative and positive financial spillovers (Basel III, Solvency II). B. Allen et al.
(2012) stated that the requirements under the Basel III accord result in structural
adjustments that might affect the supply of credit in the economy.
Persaud (2013) argues that financial regulation is based on the premise that
regulators can make the system safer by ensuring that individual institutions are
more secure. Eder and Keiler (2015, p.306) also advocates this approach stating
that “historically financial regulation has concentrated on ensuring the stability of
each individual [financial institution] and neglected the risk stemming from the
financial system as a whole”. Yet Baker (2013) argues that privileged market
participants with their own agendas have been efficacious in thinning such policy
content. Furthermore, they claim that regulators are inclined to proceed cautiously
when making policy decisions which are founded on empirical evidence12. This is
compounded by the gradual process of conceptualising a macroprudential policy
that then needs testing. Hence, an implementation of effective macroprudential
regulation transformation could take decades. De Chiara, Livio, and Ponce (2018)
11Programmes developed to mitigate the affected of financial crises: In the US, the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) and Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP); In Europe by the
European Central Bank, quantitative easing (QE) and Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT);
and in the UK the Funding for Lending FFL.
12This is because empirical evidence can take time to reach an overall consensus and be accrued.
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argues that flexible supervision (banks select regulation that has been designed for
their level of risk) would enable the regulator to obtain the same quality of
information about the banks’ risk, while significantly reducing welfare costs. i.e
more stable financial institutions would be willing to enhance capital and become
more transparent in exchange for less stringent intervention by supervisors. In
addition, Haber and Perotti (2008) argue that some financial institutions could
benefit from having close ties with governments and regulators to have a stronger
influence in policy making.
2.3.6 Shadow Banking
The shadow banking sector’s roles in the financial crisis has been investigated by
comparing its impact with the more traditional banking system’s impact (Hsu &
Moroz, 2009; Meeks, Nelson, & Alessandri, 2014). A. Barth and Seckinger (2018)
argues that the introduction of Basel I & II, resulted in a considerable increase of
investment volume towards the shadow banking sector. The term shadow banking
system has numerous different meanings; from a regulatory standpoint the FSB
(2011b) loosely describes it as the system of credit intermediates that are involved
in activities outside the regular banking system. Furthermore, the shadow banking
system increased systemic risk due to range of activties such as maturity, liquidity
and leverage transformation. Similarly within the literature, Claessens and
Ratnovski (2015) defined shadow banking as all financial activities outside of the
traditional banking system, that requires a private or public backstop to operate.
Additionally the shadow banking system is a network of dedicated financial
institutions that intermediate via securisation and secured funding (Adrian &
Ashcraft, 2016). Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2012) classified the
shadow banking system into two categories: the internal shadow banking sector
which consists of banking activities that are conducted by subsidiaries of
traditional financial institutions13; an external shadow banking sector which
13For example, a bank which has its own wealth management unit or provides funding to other
institutions which are part of the shadow banking system. Furthermore, typically the largest non-
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consists of regulated institutions and independents that engage in banking
activities, which does not represent their primary business. This includes
companies such as independent wealth management institutions, broker-dealers
and credit hedge funds. These categories could also be classed as independent
shadow banking, companies which specialise in trading the likes of collateralised
debt obligation and structured investment vehicle or government sponsored shadow
banking which are government-sponsored enterprises, for example, Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae of the US.
2.3.7 Accounting Issues
Prior to the financial crisis, ‘mark to market’ or ‘fair value’ accounting practices
were increasingly adopted under the assumption that efficient capital market theory
implies that asset prices in such markets are more reliable than the use of a cost
based approach or expert judgment. This placed the emphasis on current asset prices
when producing institutions’ balance sheets. The ramifications of this could be felt
in the event of liquidation, where asset prices can significantly drop. This would have
a detrimental effect on institutions short term balance sheet. Mu¨gge and Stellinga
(2015) argue that regulators face a trade-off when adopting this type of accounting
practice. They claim that up-to-date information on banks’ financial positions is
crucial for market supervision. Nevertheless, regulators cannot support standards
that are over transparent which allow the market to identify stressed banks as this
could exacerbate a problematic situation. Historical or cost accounting practices
have become a poor guide to the health of a bank due to their complexity. Hitherto,
regulators have allowed institutions to switch between accounting rules in the name
of financial stability (Mu¨gge & Stellinga, 2015).
The combination of fair value accounting and the use of Value-at-Risk models
(advocated in Basel II) in the determination of minimum capital requirement
ultimately was too parochial and misleading. Post-crisis it was acknowledged by
bank subsidiaries of banking groups are their wealth management unit, broker-dealers business, or
market based funds.
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the UK’s Financial Services Authority’s Turner Review (FSA, 2009, p.22) that
sophisticated mathematical modelling techniques such as VaR, “ended up not
containing risk, but providing false assurance that other prima facie indicators of
increasing risk (i.e. credit extension and balance sheet growth) could be safely
ignored”. A lack of consistency in accounting practices can have direct
implications for systemic risk evaluation. For example, under Basel III, the capital
adequacy is calculated using total assets which is derived from risk-weighting
formulas specified by the Basel Accord, not the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS)14. Yet, the majority of the systemic risk measures and bank
fundamentals are in general calculated according to IFRS. Furthermore, the ability
to use more creative accounting techniques by switching standards, or the use of
shadow banking, was entrenched in a number of historical financial scandals and
crises.
2.4 Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(SIFI)
Following years of being rather implicit regarding which institutions were
significant, in November 2011, the Financial Stability Board (BIS, 2011b)
published the first list of Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(G-SIFIs). See Table 2.2 for a list of the SIFI’s and how this has changed over the
past seven years. The allocation of financial institutions into the buckets (1 to 5)
in Table 2.2 is defined by BIS (2013b). Each bucket requires a different level of
additional common equity loss absorbency as a percentage of risk-weighted
assets15. Notably, this list was dominated by the large western banks (mainly from
the US and UK) with JP Morgan Chase constantly being in the second highest
bucket (4). However, in recent years there has been an emergence of the four
14see Mu¨gge and Stellinga (2015) for an overview of the most important accounting standard
negotiations and modifications.
15Bucket 1 requires 1.0%, Bucket 2 requires 1.5%, Bucket 3 requires 2.0%, Bucket 4 requires
2.5%, Bucket 5 requires 3.5% (no financial institutions has been allocated into bucket 5 as yet).
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largest Chinese banks, with two being promoted to higher buckets. Being named
as a SIFI results in the institution being subject to further regulation namely: (i)
higher requirements regarding the loss absorbency capacity (depending on which
bucket); (ii) higher leverage ratios; (iii) more intense supervision; and (iv) a defined
process in the event of a restructuring or orderly wind-down (process explained in
FSB (2011a)). As well as the G-SIFI, a number of countries have produced lists of
Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) for institutions that do not
classify as a SIFI, but are considered as institutions that could damage country
level banking systems in the event of failure. Often these institutions are subject
to additional capital requirements, more stringent stress tests and extra scrutiny
from domestic regulators. Since 2009, the US has identified 22 institutions, whilst
nine EEA member states identified their D-SIBs in 2013. Elsewhere, Australia,
Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan and Switzerland have also identified
their D-SIBs. Initially, it would be assumed that this is a positive status, branding
them amongst the most important institutions in the world. However, an event
study by Kleinow, Nell, Rogler, and Horsch (2014) noted that negative sentiment
prevailed. Further, equity movement prior to the SIFI announcements suggested
that the market participants had anticipated such news. The negative sentiment
could be explained as the market participants’ expectations of lower earnings due
to stricter supervision and higher capital requirement ceteris paribus, resulting in
lower equity prices. On the contrary, in the event of moral hazard and/or
bankruptcy, market participants may assume these institutions are more likely to
attract government assistance16 raising equity prices.
As an example of how being classified as a SIFI can impact the balance sheet,
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate noticeable changes in leverage following the financial
crisis. Due to Basel III, financial institution are expected to maintain a leverage
ratio in excess of 3%, however the SIFIs are expected to maintain up to 6%. As
demonstrated in Figures 2.3a and 2.4a there is a high correlation between the change
in total assets and change in debt for the SIFI banks. Balance sheet expansions and
16Further, potential creditors and shareholders may be more inclined to deal with institutions
for this reason, enhancing the banks’ profitability opportunity ceteris paribus.
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Table 2.2: Current List of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs)
G-SIB Name Country Bucket
20
11
†
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
Agricultural Bank of China China 1 1 1 1 1
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Spain 1 1 1
Bank of America United States X 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
Bank of China China X 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Bank of New York Mellon United States X 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Banque Populaire CE France X 1 1 1 1 1
Barclays United Kingdom X 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
BNP Paribas France X 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
China Construction Bank China 1 1 2 1
Citigroup United States X 4 3 3 3 4 3 3
Commerzbank Germany X
Credit Suisse Switzerland X 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Deutsche Bank Germany X 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Dexia Group Belgium X
Goldman Sachs United States X 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Groupe BPCE France 1
Groupe Cre´dit Agricole France X 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
HSBC United Kingdom X 4 4 4 4 3 3 3
ICBC China 1 1 1 2 2 2
ING Bank Netherlands X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JP Morgan Chase United States X 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Lloyds Banking Group United Kingdom X
Mitsubishi UFJ FG Japan X 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mizuho FG Japan X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Morgan Stanley United States X 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Nordea Sweden X 1 1 1 1 1 1
Royal Bank of Canada Canada 1 1
Royal Bank of Scotland United Kingdom X 2 2 2 1 1 1
Santander Spain X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale France X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Standard Chartered United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
State Street United States X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sumitomo Mitsui Japan X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UBS Switzerland X 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Unicredit Group Italy X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wells Fargo United States X 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
† In 2011 the financial institutions were not allocated into difference buckets
(BIS, 2011b)
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contractions (Figure 2.4a) tend to be conducted through changes in debt and not
through changes in the book value equity. In nominal value terms (within the SIFI
sample) on average, book debt is 5.392 times larger than book equity. Therefore
a 1% change in debt will nominally be much greater than a 1% change in equity.
Following the financial crisis the majority of the SIFI reduced their levels of debt
while change in equity remained largely positive. This is very predominate from
Figure 2.3b to Figure 2.4b which highlights the reduction in leverage.
2.5 Summary
This chapter provides the key theoretical foundations and regulatory framework
which underpins the remaining chapters within this thesis. The banking structure
paradigms and hypotheses discussed at the beginning of this chapter will be referred
back to in Chapters 4 and 5, when these concepts are empirically tested. The
regulations discussed within this chapter provide the regulatory context for the
time-scales used within the later empirical chapters. Chapters 3, 4 and 5, will make
reference to these regulations discussed. Also, this chapter discussed the creation of
the Systematically Important Financial Institutions, within the empirical chapters
(4 and 5) they will be included within the samples and their impact on the wider
sample given their enhanced regulatory status will be discussed. Lastly, within
the conclusion of this thesis (Chapter 6), the findings and contributions from the
empirical chapters will be put into context using the topics discussed within this
chapter.
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Figure 2.3: SIFI Balance Sheet Change Before the Crisis
(a) Equity and Debt (b) Leverage
Figure 2.4: SIFI Balance Sheet Change After the Crisis
(a) Equity and Debt (b) Leverage
Source: Adapted from Bloomberg (2017)
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Chapter 3
Systemic Risk Measures and
Regulatory Challenges
3.1 Abstract
This paper discusses the different definitions of systemic risk and identifies the
challenges regulators face in addressing these phenomena. A systematic literature
review of 4,859 abstracts was conducted to categorise the various methodologies
developed to measure systemic risk. In total, 56 measures of systemic risk
developed post-2000 are critically appraised to inform academics and regulators of
the model’s vulnerabilities. Additionally, a few measures are evidenced using US
bank data. The findings of this review suggest that the majority of these methods
tend to focus on individual financial institutions rather than the entire system
stability. This directly reflects the current regulations which aim to ensure
individual institution’s soundness. As macro-prudential regulation evolves,
policy-makers face the issues of understanding contagion and how such regulations
should be implemented.
JEL Classification: G01, G15, G2, G28, C58, C6
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3.2 Introduction
Recently, there has been a plethora of interest in systemic risk in the financial
industry among academics (Anginer & Demirguc-Kunt, 2014; Bongini, Nieri, &
Pelagatti, 2015; Ellis, Haldane, & Moshirian, 2014; J. O. Wilson et al., 2010) and
regulators (BIS, 2009; N. A. Tarashev, Borio, & Tsatsaronis, 2009) alike. Over the
last two decades, the financial markets have fundamentally changed and expanded
globally, which has created numerous challenges for policy-makers. For example, in
the US from the early 1990s until the financial crisis in 2007, deregulation had been
one of the most influential changes within the banking sector (Beck et al., 2010). The
process of removing regulatory barriers affected the dynamics of the market structure
and significantly transformed the characteristics of risk that financial institutions
face and have to manage, which potentially adds to the unintended consequences of
systemic risk and financial instability.
The first main challenge regarding systemic risk assessment and measurement is
that there is limited consensus on a widely accepted definition of this phenomenon.
One of the first definitions from the BIS G10 stated that systemic risk is the risk of
an event which can trigger a loss of economic value, or confidence in a substantial
portion of the financial system, which is large enough to have significant adverse
effects on the real economy and/or society (BIS, 2001). Alternative definitions
of systemic risk include (but are not restricted to): (i) a failure of a significant
part of financial institutions (Acharya, Pedersenn, Philipponn, & Richardson, 2011;
De Bandt & Hartmann, 2000); (ii) The risk that a national, or the global, financial
system will break down (Scott, 2010); (iii) An impairment of the financial system
(Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2008); (iv) A correlation of defaults within the financial
system over time (Billio, Getmansky, Lo, & Pelizzon, 2010); (v) A malfunctioning of
the entire financial system (Bach & Nguyen, 2012; Rodr´ıguez-Moreno & Pen˜a, 2013);
and (vi) loss of economic value or a widespread loss of confidence in the financial
system (Cummins & Weiss, 2014). The need for a comprehensive approach to access
the exposure of the financial sector to systemic risk was highlighted well before the
recent financial crisis of 2007 (Eisenberg & Noe, 2001). There is a common view that
systemic risk can be categorised by both cross sectional and time series dimensions
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(Hartmann, De Bandt, & Peydro-Alcalde, 2014). Cross-sectional dimensions relate
to the correlation of risk types throughout the system at given points in time. Time-
series dimensions relate to changes of risk types or market conditions throughout, for
example the economic cycle or the potential development of asset/liability bubbles.
The likes of asset/liability price bubbles tend to be more dangerous when credit is
involved (Anundsen, Gerdrup, Hansen, & Kragh-Sørensen, 2016; Jorda`, Schularick,
& Taylor, 2015; Virtanen, To¨lo¨, Vire´n, & Taipalus, 2018). Risk within the financial
sector can be either exogenous or endogenous, unexpected shocks from outside the
system are exogenous, whilst interaction amongst market participants can develop
endogenous financial risks (Danielsson & Shin, 2003).
For empirical purposes Laeven and Valencia (2013) classify a systemic banking
crisis as a significant signal of financial distress in the banking system triggered
by the likes of bank runs, excessive losses within the banking system and bank
liquidations. There are a number of different crisis database/categories used within
empirical studies which include; the ECB Heads of Research crisis dataset (Babecky`
et al., 2012), the ESRB crisis definitions (Detken et al., 2014), and a newer database
for financial crisis in European countries (Duca et al., 2017).
Individual financial institutions can impact systemic risk of the financial
system in a range of different ways, they can be categorised as contribution to and
participation of systemic risk. Contribution to systemic risk arises from an
institution’s actions having a knock-on effects on other institutions, which is also
known as moral hazard. Examples of this behavior could be the liquidation of a
financial institution’s assets under fire sale and volatile market conditions (Coval &
Stafford, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). This type of action by one institution can
lead to a situation where another institution is facing solvency issues due to
depressed asset prices. Participation of systemic risk relates to the financial
institution’s susceptibility to amplifying systemic risk due to their inability to
absorb shocks arising from other institutions or macroeconomic shocks.
Not every period of distress is classed as a financial crisis. For example the
financial system can still functional in the event of an individual institution failing.
Crisis ex -port can be categorised as banking, currency or sovereign crisis amongst
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others which is presented in Table 3.1. The rest of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 3.3 the systematic literature review methodology is explained. Section
3.4 critically appraises the 56 different methodologies developed to measure systemic
risk. Also this section contains a number of real world examples of the measures
using US data. Section 3.5 identifies the data required to measure systemic risk.
Section 3.6 discusses the challenges faced by regulators in relation to systemic risk
and section 3.7 concludes.
3.3 Literature Review Methodology
As the quality and quantity of research conducted and published within systemic
risk literature has increased exponentially over recent years, the systematic review
was conducted using a combination of scoping and keyword searches. The
literature review was performed following key phases formalised by the Cochrane
Collaboration1 to ensure comprehensiveness and robustness (Jesson, Matheson, &
Lacey, 2011). During the search phase various online databases and search engines
were used2, with a range of keyword and Boolean search terms3. Overall, the
search identified 139,647 research articles, however the majority were rejected
because of their title (e.g. literature relating to medical science and information
technology) , they were duplicates, were pre-2000, and were non-English or due to
non-availability. From the above identified research articles, 4,859 were related to
systemic risk in banking. The abstracts of these 4,859 articles were reviewed and
only 56 were selected as they proposed a source of systemic risk or new method of
1The key phases are: (i) mapping the field via a scoping review; (ii) a comprehensive search;
(iii) quality assessment; (iv) data extraction; (v) synthesis; and (vi) write up.
2Databases searched included, ScienceDirect (10/12/16), Taylor & Francis Online (10/12/16),
Business Source Premier (14/12/16), Emerald Insight (14/12/16), Scopus (15/12/16), Social
Science Research Network (16/12/16) and Google Scholar (19/12/16). A further scoping search
was conducted on 02/10/17 and 04/05/18 to identify more recent systemic risk measures.
3Search terms included ‘measuring’ AND ‘systemic risk’, ‘estimating’ AND ‘systemic risk’,
‘modelling’ AND ‘systemic risk’, ‘indicators’ AND ‘systemic risk’, ‘contagion’ AND ‘systemic risk’.
Additionally ‘systemic risk’ was used as a sweeping search.
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Table 3.1: Criteria used to define types of crisis
Crisis Author Criteria Applied
Banking Caprio and Klingebiel
(1996)
The insolvency of important banks
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998)
A sharp deterioration in the quality of assets;
The involvement of the government (i)large scale
nationalisation of banks (ii) high cost of the rescue
packages (iii) the emergency measures enacted due
to an extensive bank run
Laeven and Valencia
(2008, 2013)
Deposit runs represented by a monthly percentage
decline in deposits in excess of 5%; Introduction of
a deposit freeze or blanket guarantee; An extensive
liquidity support or bank interventions defined
as an extensive liquidity support involving claims
from monetary authorities on deposit money banks
to total deposits of at least 5% and at least double
the ratio compared to the previous year
Sovereign Schimmelpfennig,
Roubini, and Manasse
(2003)
Standard & Poors’s classifies the country as being
in default; The country receives a non-concessional
IMF loan in excess of 100% of quota
Laeven and Valencia
(2008)
Soverign deafults to private lenders; Rescheduling
the debt
Currency Frankel and Rose
(1996)
A nominal exchange rate depreciation of as least
25%; This depreciation also exceeds the previous
years change by least 10%
Kaminsky, Lizondo,
and Reinhart (1998)
When their exchange market pressure index
exceeds its mean by more than 3 standard
deviation
Andreou, Dufre´not,
Sand-Zantman, and
Zdzienicka-Durand
(2009)
Applying Kaminsky et al. (1998) method to
identify country specific thresholds
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measuring it. Given that 56 articles which develop models to measures systemic
risk were ascertained, this would suggest very little agreement amongst academics
and regulators of what systemic risk is or how it is measured. Nevertheless, there
are benefits of model diversity. For example, if regulators were to impose that
institutions had to apply the same models, they may analyse potential shocks
similarly. A potential consequence of this is that institutions could react in the
same way and cause further problems. Also, if certain institutions were not
obligated to use particular models, they could potentially use other models and
gain a competitive advantage.
3.4 Models Proposed to Measure Systemic Risk
This sections provide a comprehensive review of the systemic risk models based on
the 56 identified articles. The models are broken down into five categories: (i) early
warning and credit default swap indexes (16 models); (ii) capital (12 models); (iii)
liquidity (6 models); (iv) contagion (10 models) and (v) network (12 models).
3.4.1 Systemic Risk Early Warning Systems (EWS) and
Credit Default Swap (CDS) Indexes
There is a range of existing indexes which allow regulators to gauge the
macro-economic health of a country and its financial industry. In the United
States, for example, the St Louis and Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank have
created the Bank Financial Stress Index and the United States Financial Stress
Index respectively. The Bank of America and Merrill Lynch has created a Global
Financial Stress Index which is a cross market measure of risk in the global
financial system. Duca and Peltonen (2013) promote the benefits of their financial
stress index which uses both global and domestic macroeconomic data. Their
methodology takes into account policy-maker’s preferences. Hollo, Kremer, and
Lo Duca (2012)’s Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) proposed new
ways to determine critical levels during a crisis. Their index, based on portfolio
theory, aggregates five market specific sub-indices, which includes indicators from
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the money, bond, equity and foreign exchange markets as well as financial
institutions’ book value to market price ratio. See Figure 3.1 for a graphical
representation for CISS for the US and EU, Appendix 3.8 explains the data and
methodology applied. Systemic risk indexes have their practical uses as a potential
warning tool, however because a large element of systemic risk is centered on the
economic cycle (Persaud, 2013), such EWS may only reflect this and have a
limited scope in identifying specific indicators of systemic risk. Also Davis and
Karim (2008) found in a comparative study of early warning systems that
empirical results vary according to the dataset applied and the definition used for
a financial crisis. Alessi et al. (2015) compared nine alternative early warning
models, reporting both in-sample and out-of sample statistics for the exuberance
indicators. The authors found that multivariate models, in their many forms (e.g.
probit or logit models), have great potential and add value over simple signalling
models. Virtanen et al. (2018) results from testing whether bubble theory can
predict crisis corroborate previous findings in this early warning literature. The
authors, with others, indicated that periods of accelerated growth in variables such
as real estate4, price-to-income, credit-to-GDP ratio, or debt service costs are
linked strongly to financial crises.
Therefore, these EWS cannot offer precise predictions, however they are able to
indicate heightened vulnerability. Alessi and Detken (2009, p. 35) concluded that
“central bankers on average tend to have a stronger preference for missing crisis
than to act on noisy signals for various reasons”. The use of these measures
assumes that the US financial system is a main indicator of the global financial
conditions due to its far reaching impact. Outside of the US, regulators face a
conundrum when developing an EWS. Do they pursue their own indicators,
indicators which are used in the US or indicators developed from their larger
trading partner? Depending on how they prioritise this could leave certain parts of
their domestic policy isolated. Furthermore, EWS as with any statistical model
(two- or three-dimensional) have their limitations when trying to encompass a
4Altunbas, Manganelli, and Marques-Ibanez (2017) also noted that exposure to real estate sector
(or developments) seems to be a major driver of banking sector risk
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Figure 3.1: US & Euro (ECB) Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress
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chronological or cross-sectional dimension and having the ability to assess multiple
countries over time. Constantin, Peltonen, and Sarlin (2018), advancing this
literature, advocated for including estimated tail dependencies networks in EWS as
they consistently outperformed models, which cover solely vulnerabilities coming
from bank-specific, sector-level and macro-financial imbalances in order to predict
bank distress events. Similar to systemic risk indexes, others have used the CDS
indexes, premia and spreads to assess systemic risk of institutions or the industry.
CDS premia are seen as a proxy indicator of how risky an institution is, as their
CDS premia reflect market participants’ view of the likelihood of default.
Bhansali, Gingrich, and Longstaff (2008) quantify the relative magnitude of
systemic risk embedded in the relatively liquid US (CDX) and European (iTraxx)
credit derivative indices through a linear three-jump model. They concluded that
systemic crises have become a much larger function of overall total credit risk.
Trapp and Wewel (2013) also used CDS premia from the US and Europe to
conclude that firms’ exposure to the same common risk factors contributes to
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Figure 3.2: US Distressed Insurance Premium
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systemic risk. Their results imply that regulators should aim to address
international bank dependencies arising from common risk factors. Alternatively,
X. Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) measured systemic risk of the financial system by
the theoretical price of insurance against financial distress, Distressed Insurance
Premium (DIP). They estimated the probability of default which was derived from
the institution’s CDS premia. See Figure 3.2 of graphical representation for DIP
for the US, Appendix 3.8 explains the data and methodology applied. Table 3.2
presents an overview of the systemic risk indexes, EWS and CDS indexes proposed
to measure systemic risk. The main advantage of using CDS premia instead of
equity return is that CDS premium has a closer link to a firm’s default. For
example, the firm’s equity price can trade at a non-zero price levels even after the
firm has defaulted on debt payments. Similarly to equity prices, the CDS premia
may reflect factors other than just the firm’s default risk (e.g. investor sentiment
and economic conditions). Rodr´ıguez-Moreno and Pen˜a (2013) tested
high-frequency market-based indicators including equity price, interbank rates and
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CDS premia. Their results suggest that CDS premium is a more accurate indicator
of systemic risk than the others. The main disadvantage of using CDS premium as
an indicator of systemic risk is that it is limited to the institutions that have
traded CDS, which tend to be located in developed countries, thus limiting their
application within countries that do not have developed CDS markets. Also, the
CDS market may sometimes send wrong signals (Li & Tang, 2016) and ultimately
provide inaccurate prices due to irrational exuberance or panics.
Therefore, the efficiency, transparency and quality of the CDS market becomes
an issue of paramount importance. In addition, numerous studies, such as Giglio
(2016); Trapp and Wewel (2013); Schneider, So¨gner, and Vezˇa (2010) inter alia,
document that CDS premia are non-normally distributed, therefore future research
should test for non-normality first or use non-parametric methods.
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Table 3.2: Systemic Risk Indexes, Early Warning Systems and using Credit Default Swaps to Measure Systemic Risk
Author(s) Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Bhansali et
al. (2008)
Measure of
systemic risk
via indexes of CDS
Implementing a simple linear version of a
three-jump model and calibrating it to assess
market indexes and tranche spread levels.
A CDS index and tranches
of investment grade US
CDX and Europes iTraxx
from March 2007 to
December 2007.
They provided evidence to show that
the information in credit derivatives
about the market’s expectations of
systemic credit risk can be extracted.
X. Huang et
al. (2009)
Distress Insurance
Premium (DIP)
Systemic risk is measured by the price
of insurance against financial distress (a
situation in which at least 15% of total
liabilities of the financial system are in
default), via estimating the probability of
default (from CDS spreads) and the equity
return correlations.
Weekly CDS spreads and
high frequency intra day,
equity price data from 12
major US Banks between
January 2000 and May
2008.
DIP was evidenced to be higher when
the average actual failure rate increases
or when the exposure to common
factors in the system increases.55
Table 3.2 Continued
Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Alessi and
Detken
(2009)
Early warning
indicator for asset
price boom/bust
cycles
This analyses various indicators (5
macroeconomic and 13 financial variables),
relative performance of global versus domestic
equity markets and money market versus
credit based liquidity indicators. A warning
signal is issued when an indicator exceeds a
certain threshold.
Quarterly data from 18
OECD countries between
1970Q1 to 2007Q4.
The global measures of liquidity
(private credit gap) is among the best
performing indicators of systemic risk
and displayed forecasting abilities. In
addition, evidence suggested that the
best indicators are global variables, this
can be explained by the fact that asset
price boom/bust cycles are largely an
international phenomenon.
Gaganis,
Pasiouras,
Doumpos,
and
Zopounidis
(2010)
A Stability
Classification
Model
A set of 11 indicators of; the macroeconomic,
institutional, regulatory environment and
characteristics of the banking sector within
three multi criteria decision techniques, to
classify banking stability.
114 countries’ banking
sectors during 2008.
Their model was capable of classifying,
in line with the Economist’s Banking
Sector Risk Rating, between 75.60%
and 79.81% of the observations
correctly, which outperformed
discriminant analysis and logistic
regression methods.
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Table 3.2 Continued
Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Kritzman
and Li
(2010)
Mahalanobis
Distance to
measure financial
turbulence
They obtain the average joint returns of
securities then apply a tolerance boundary.
Observations outside of that boundary are
statistically unusual and are thus likely to be
characterised as turbulent periods.
Monthly returns of
six asset-class indices:
U.S. Equities; non-U.S.
Equities; U.S. bonds; non-
U.S. bonds; commodities;
and U.S. real estate from
1980 to 2009.
They provide evidence that their
measure of financial turbulence
coincides with well-known episodes of
market turbulence.
Kritzman,
Li, Page,
and Rigobon
(2011)
Measure of implied
Systemic risk called
the Absorption
Ratio
They infer systemic risk from asset prices,
defined as equal to the fraction of a set of
assets’ total variance explained (or absorbed)
by a finite number of eigenvectors. A high
value for the absorption ratio corresponds to
a high level of systemic risk because it implies
that the sources of risk are more unified.
Equity returns from 51
US industries in the
MSCI USA index (1998 to
2010) and 14 US housing
markets data, along with
the Case-Shiller 10-City
National Composite Index
(1992 to 2010).
This measure predicted the most
significant equity market declines and
consolidations in the housing market.
Also the absorption ratio systematically
rose in advance of market volatility.
Hollo et al.
(2012)
Composite
Indicator of
Systemic Stress
(CISS)
Based on portfolio theory to aggregate five
market-specific sub-indices which included 15
individual financial stress measures.
Based on European data
from 1982 to 2011.
CISS identified the recent financial and
economic crisis as well as the other
stressed periods. This method can also
determine crisis levels.
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Table 3.2 Continued
Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
L. Allen,
Bali, and
Tang (2012)
Macroindex of
systemic Risk
(CATFIN)
CATFIN is constructed using an average of
three VaR and ES estimates: (i) a parametric
extreme value method using estimates of
the generalised pareto distribution; (ii) a
parametric estimate of the skewed generalised
error distribution ; and (iii) a non-parametric
approach.
Out-of-sample tests were
conducted using U.S.,
European, and Asian
equity bank returns data
from January 1973 to
December 2009.
CATFIN systemic risk measure was
able to forecast macroeconomic
downturns (measured by GDP,
industrial production, the
unemployment rate and an index
of 85 existing monthly economic
indicators) approximately six months
before they occurred.
Duca and
Peltonen
(2013)
The Financial
Stress Index (FSI)
A country-specific composite index, covering
five segments of the financial market
including: (i) Short-term interbank and
government bill spreads; (ii) negative equity
returns; (iii) volatility of the main equity
index; (iv) realised volatility of the nominal
effective exchange rate; (v) realised volatility
of the yield on short-term government bills.
Based on 28 countries,
both emerging and
advanced economies using
quarterly data from 1990
to 2009.
During known periods of crises
indicators of domestic and global
macro-financial vulnerabilities,
significantly improved the model’s
ability to forecast a systemic financial
crisis.
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Table 3.2 Continued
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Trapp and
Wewel
(2013)
Measurement of
systemic risk via
CDS Premia
Applying a copula approach to focus on
downside risk (extreme value theory). This
method is used as previous studies have
highlighted that CDS premia are non normally
distributed.
Based on 550 US and
European companies from
nine industries, daily CDS
bid quotes from 2004 to
2009.
They provided evidence that suggested
banks are exposed to common risk
factors which plays a significant role in
systemic risk within the banking sector.
Also, that the dependence between the
banking sector and a wide range of real
sectors is limited.
Bagliano
and Morana
(2014)
A US Summary
Index of Financial
Fragility
A country-specific composite index including:
(i) Short-term interbank and government bill
spreads as a measure of credit and liquidity
risk; (ii) government agency long-term bond
spreads; (iii) yield difference between BAA
and AAA rating bonds; (iv) a range of
global macroeconomic condition factors; (v)
eight sources of US financial disturbances and
fundamental imbalances; (vi) 10 oil market
variables.
Based on US quarterly
data from 1986 to
2010. The global
macroeconomic factors is
time series data from 50
different countries.
Fluctuations in the financial fragility
index can be attributed to, global
and domestic macroeconomic (20%),
financial disturbances (40—50%) over
both short- and long-term horizons, as
well as to oil supply shocks in the long-
term (25%).
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Sensoy,
Ozturk, and
Hacihasanoglu
(2014)
Financial Fragility
Index (FIX)
A principal component analysis and dynamic
conditional correlations of five variables which
include: (i) stock market indexes; (ii)
exchange rate against the US dollar and Euro;
(iii) CDS quotes of the five year sovereign
bond; (iv) overnight interbank rates; (v) two
year bond yields.
Based on Turkish daily
data covers the period
from September 2006 to
April 2014.
FIX is not an absolute measure of
financial stress, but it does serve as
a relative measure (due to dynamic
weighting). They also evidenced
that except for the overnight interest
rate, all variables play almost equally
important roles in determining the
financial fragility of the system.
Eder and
Keiler (2015)
A Spatial
Econometric
Approach
This method can decompose the variance
of bank’s CDS premiums into contagion,
systematic and idiosyncratic risk components.
Five year monthly CDS
spread data for 15 global
systemically important
financial institutions from
2004 to 2009.
Results indicate that contagion
is important in the CDS market.
Considerable risk of spill overs was
due to the interconnectedness of the
financial institutions.
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Alessi and
Detken
(2018)
Random Forest
Technique
An early warning system using binary
classification trees to identify whether the
financial system is particularly vulnerable
owing to aggregate credit and asset price
developments. Incorporating, macroeconomic
indicators, property prices and interest rate
market-based indicators.
Based on crisis timing
from 28 EU members
during 1970Q1 and
2012Q4.
The main advantages of this approach
is that it takes into account the
conditional relations between various
indicators when setting early warning
thresholds. It more accurately models
the non-linear relationship between
credit, asset prices and the occurrence
of banking crises than standard linear
regression models.
Gibson, Hall,
and Tavlas
(2018)
Systemic
vulnerability
for selected EU
banking systems
This measure is based on the covariance of
banks’ performance (as measured by daily
market value) via an univariate GARCH
estimation.
57 Banks from nine
European countries:
Austria; France;
Germany; Greece; Italy;
Ireland; the Netherlands;
Spain; and the United
Kingdom. Data from
2000 to 2016.
The index often rises before stressful
events (shocks) and captures elevated
vulnerability levels prior to certain
events.
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Papanikolaou
(2018a)
EWS of banking
bankrupt and
bailout
Regressing a range of bank level,
macroeconomic and financial variables
against distress scores or bailout dummies.
7,602 US banks of which
167 were bankrupt, 824
were bailed out, and
6,611 were non-distressed.
Using quarterly data from
2003Q1 to 2009Q4.
Banks with inadequate capital, illiquid
and risky assets, poor management, low
levels of earnings and high sensitivity
to market conditions have a higher
bankruptcy probability. Neither the
managerial expertise, nor the quality of
assets is relevant to the probability of
bailout.
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Economic Indicators
Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2010) inter alia, have attempted to
empirically relate economic variables to the 2008 crisis. Commonly cited variables
include the declines in real GDP, cross-border trade flows, sovereign debt credit
ratings as well as the exchange rate overvaluation and central bank reserve losses
(Frankel & Saravelos, 2012). Rose and Spiegel (2010, 2012) inter alia, have made
comprehensive efforts to empirically explain the differences in the intensity of the
crisis between countries. Having assessed the significance of almost 100 variables,
it would be suggested that it is unrealistic to predict future crisis with the help of
EWS indicators. McNelis and Yoshino (2016) provides evidence (using Japan as
the example) that increasing money supply (QE) is effective in times of crisis (in
terms of stabilising investment and the real exchange rate), relative to other fiscal
instruments such as tax reform or negative interest rates. Furthermore they
caution that QE policy is an emergency policy, to be used in times of prolonged
crisis5.
Generally, there appears to be no consensus on robust economic determinants
of the crisis, or on the key indicators of its development. Empirical findings vary
depending on the definition of crisis, methodology and time frame of the study
(Jun, Ahn, & Kim, 2017). Further, L. Allen et al. (2012) provided evidence that
micro-level systemic risk measures have no macroeconomic forecasting power.
3.4.2 Capital Measures of Systemic Risk
Prior to the financial crisis, banking regulation followed a microprudential
approach in assessing the resilience of financial institutions. Thus, the original
generation of stress testing models usually focused on individual banks’ solvency
risk6 (Anand et al., 2018). Capital measures can identify the organisations that are
5They do not explore the impacts of QE policies in normal times (such as inflation and loss of
credibility).
6For an empirical example Acharya et al. (2018) found that stress tests in the US generally
resulted in safer banks in terms of capital ratios and risk-weighted asset ratios.
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exposed to systemic risk and such tools are useful for regulators to identify
institutions that could significantly be affected by market shocks. Table 3.3
presents an overview of the credit and capital risk measures of systemic risk. VaR
models can be applied to measure financial stability as a simpler alternative to
structural econometric models. VaR allows for dynamic interaction between a
small number of variables with interaction driven by a set of exogenous shocks.
Through simulations, a VaR analysis can generate a probability distribution of
outcomes for the dependant variable, which can provide a measure of the
probability of distress over the given time horizon. Aymanns, Caccioli, Farmer,
and Tan (2016) suggests that the financial crisis could have been caused by the
over reliance on VaR measurement techniques7. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008)
developed an aggregate Co-Risk approach based on Conditional VaR (CoVaR).
This measure is directly fixated at individual institutions or minor cluster which
cannot be combined as measure of system-wide risk. In other words, adding the
CoVaRs of all the institutions in a system will not lead to the system-wide VaR.
Their set of explanatory variables such as market to book, return on equity, the
quick liquidity and maturity mismatch ratios were shown to be significant
predictors of systemic risk.
V aRiq is implicitly defined as the q% quantile, i.e.,
Pr(X i ≤ V aRiq) = q% (3.4.1)
where X i is the loss of institution i for which the V aRiq is defined. V aR
i
q is typically
a positive number when q > 50, in line with the commonly used sign convention.
Hence more risk corresponds to a greater V aRiq. X
i is defined as the return loss.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) denote CoV aR
Xj |C(Xi)
q the V aR of institution j
(or the financial system) conditional on some event C(X i) of institution i. That is,
CoV aR
Xj |C(Xi)
q is implicitly defined by the q%-quantile of the conditional probability
7Aymanns et al. (2016) suggested this measurement technique resulted in the institutions
conducting similar risk management techniques followed the US housing bubble which may have
triggered the crisis.
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distribution:
Pr
(
Xj | C(X i) ≤ CoV aRXj |C(Xi)q
)
= q% (3.4.2)
Institutions i’s contribution to j is denoted by
4CoV aRXj |iq = CoV aRX
j |X1=V aRiq
q − CoV aRXj |X1=V aRi50q (3.4.3)
Where CoV aR
Xj |X1=V aRi50
q denotes the VaR of j’s asset returns when i’s returns
are at their median (i.e. 50th percentile).
Lo´pez-Espinosa, Moreno, Rubia, and Valderrama (2015) proposed an extension
to CoVaR, which captures the asymmetric response of the banking system to both
positive and negative shocks in the market-valued balance sheets of the individual
financial institutions. They found that Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008)’s CoVaR
assumption of a simple linear representation in which individual returns are
proportional to system-wide returns is excessively restricted to larger banks. The
empirical evidence in Lo´pez-Espinosa et al. (2015) did suggest that CoVaR may
provide a realistic approximation for smaller banks, however it can not capture the
heteroscedasticity characteristic of financial assets which may severely
underestimate systemic risk. Girardi and Ergu¨n (2013) changes the definition of
CoVaR, using another strand of literature which attempts to explore contagion by
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) models8
(Dimitriou, Kenourgios, & Simos, 2013; Mobarek, Muradoglu, Mollah, & Hou,
2016). Combining CoVaR with ADCC-GARCH models allows for possible changes
over time in the linkage between individual markets and the global economy, which
makes CoVaR more robust in assessing systemic risk and allowing for back testing
as well.
Brownlees and Engle (2012) used the same explanatory variables as Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2008) plus Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) in developing the
SRISK index, which measures the expected capital shortage of an institution
conditional on a substantial market decline. MES is an estimate of the expected
loss an equity investor of the institution would experience if the market was to
8This method alone ignores the extreme tail risks, which could lead to an underestimation of
systemic risk (Girardi & Ergu¨n, 2013)
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decline substantially. This measure is useful for ranking firms according to their
systemic risk level but, again, does not identify specific indicators of systemic risk.
See Figure 3.3 for a graphical representation for CoVaR and MES for the US,
appendix 3.8 explains the data and methodology applied. The MES concept has
been known in the actuarial literature for quite some time under the name of
conditional tail expectations (Tasche, 2002). Tasche (2002) introduced expected
shortfall as an alternative measure of VaR, which builds on Acerbi, Nordio, and
Sirtori (2001) work in response to VaR critics. For example, Heath, Delbaen, Eber,
and Artzner (1999) comment that VaR cannot be considered as a sound
methodology for allocating economic capital in financial institutions. Acharya,
Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010); Acharya et al. (2017) provided
evidence that capital based techniques could estimate the systemic risk
contribution of institutions through their Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES)
approach, which aims to measure the extent to which firms impose negative
externalities on the system via increased leverage and MES. Closely related to
MES, Weiß, Neumann, and Bostandzic (2014) propose a measure of extreme
systemic risk, which captures the Lower Tail Dependence (LTD) of an individual
institution with respect to the sector index. In other words, it captures the
individual banks’ and the sector’s joint probability to crash together. However,
this measure evaluates an institution’s systemic relevance based on extreme events
rather than moderate tail co-movements with the market. Pierret (2015) provides
evidence that SRISK as a measure of capital shortfall outperforms CoVaR in
determining how much short-term debt (liquidity) a financial institution can raise
in a crisis period. SRISK unlike CoVaR is a function of size and leverage, which is
relevant to regulators who want to measure solvency risk. Regulators employ
capital ratios such as Tier 1 common capital and Tier 1 leverage to assess the
solvency risk, however Pierret (2015) found that they do not appear to be related
to either side of the financial institution’s short-term balance sheet. SRISKit
represents the expected capital shortfall of the financial institution i at time t in a
crisis, which is when the respective equity market index falls by 40% over the next
six month period. In such market conditions Acharya, Engle, and Richardson
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Figure 3.3: US MES and CoVaR
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(2012) state that SRISK is based on an assumption that long-term book value
debt Dit of the financial institution remains constant over the six month period
while its market capitalisation MVit decreases by its six month returns during a
crisis, which is also know as long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES).
Pierret (2015) defines the expected shortfall of capital in a crisis of financial
institution i at time t by
SRISKit = Et[k(Dit+h +MVit+h)−MVit+h | Rmt+h ≤ −40%] (3.4.4)
= kDit − (1− k) ∗MVit ∗ (1− LRMESit)
where Rmt+h is the return of the equity market index from period t to period t+ h
(h = 6 months), k is the prudential capital ratio of the country, and LRMESit =
−Et(Rit+h | Rmt+h ≤ −40%).
Rather than focusing on relative losses in capital (equity or market
capitalisation) in the way CoVaR, MES and SRISK do Kreis and Leisen (2018)
introduce Conditional Expected Default Frequency (CEDF ) which focuses
exclusively on default risk of the banking system, using equity return data. Kreis
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and Leisen (2018) back-tested their CEDF measure as well as CoVaR and SRISK,
during the two years beforehand and subsequently of the Lehman bankruptcy
(September 2008); SRISK appeared to be a better EWS as it starts increasing
from June 2007 and fairly smoothly trended upwards until July 2008 while CovaR
only significantly reacted after the event. CEDF however, was more volatile
(during December 2007 – September 2009) with a number of peaks and troughs.
This volatility could send mixed messages however, the original strong increase in
December 2007 could have sent a strong signal of possible future threats in the
financial system.
Kleinow, Moreira, Strobl, and Va¨ha¨maa (2017) examined four different
systemic risk measures9 using 122 US financial institutions’ data (2005-2014) and
concluded that the alternative measurement approaches produced heterogeneous
estimates of systemic risk. Further, different metrics may lead to contradicting
assessments regarding to riskiness of different financial institutions types (i.e.
banks, non-depository financial institutions and insurance companies). Kleinow et
al. (2017) findings suggest that assessing systemic risk based on a single risk metric
should be approached with caution. MES appears intuitively most appealing (out
of four credit risk based systemic risk measures) as it was able to accurately
outlines the time line of the financial crisis via producing consistently high
estimates of systemic risk for three different industry sectors.
The main challenge of these capital models is that a vast amount of data and
computing is required. The majority of the information comes in the form of
proxies and dummies from accounting data. It is common practice to judge the
soundness of an institution by looking at its accounting data and most reports to
regulatory agencies are based on this. However, it is worth observing that this
approach is only as reliable as the accounting standard within that country as
mentioned previously. The measures discussed within this section are all
empirically tested using data from developed countries, therefore applying these
measures to other countries with poor accounting standards may produce
9Four credit risk based measures, Co-dependence risk (Co-Risk), delta CoVaR , LTD and MES
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unreliable results. Also, the effects of shadow banking can skew the data. For
instance, prior to the recent crisis the financial institutions covertly increased
leverage by moving risk onto the balance sheets of special-purpose vehicles that
were ultimately backstopped by credit lines from the same institutions. Following
the crisis, many institutions moved such shadow bank assets back onto their
balance sheets (Adrian, 2015). After the recent crisis the regulators considered
restricting the shadow banking system activity which was considered as a gap in
the previous regulatory structure (Rixen, 2013). Regarding the computing power
required, the number of minimum observations for verification of an internal risk
management model is 250 (recommended by BIS (2010b)). Therefore, the ability
to compute this number of observations largely depends on the feasibility on the
operational capabilities of the institution. However, Kupiec (1995) states that even
using 250 observations for testing often provides a low statistical power.
Furthermore, C. E. Borio and Drehmann (2009) argue that the use of VaR models
does not address the dynamics of distress, and they are unable to incorporate the
likes of boom-bust economic cycles.
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Table 3.3: Credit and Capital Measures of Systemic Risk
Author(s) Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Bartram,
Brown, and
Hund (2007)
Presented three
methods to
quantify the risk of
a systemic failure
The first approach examines equity returns of
unexposed banks during financial crisis. The
second is based on the likelihood of systemic
failure based on a structural credit risk model
(Merton, 1974). The third approach estimates
bank default probabilities implied by equity
option prices.
334 banks from 28
countries. The five
global financial crises
within the sample
included the Mexican
devaluation in 1994,
Asian crisis in 1997/98,
the Russian long-term
capital Management
default in 1998 and the
Brazilian devaluation in
1999.
They interpret that small increases
in estimated default probabilities
of unexposed banks during crisis
generated little risk of a systemic
failure. They also provided possible
explanations for this i.e the shocks
might not be large enough and effective
policy responses might have limited
the risks or their approach might not
be able to accurately measure of risk.
Adrian and
Brunnermeier
(2008)
∆ CoVaR, which
is defined as the
difference between
the Conditional
VaR of the financial
system conditional
on an institution
being in distress.
They used panel quantile regression of equity
prices and balance sheet fundamental data
15 US financial
institutions using
quarterly data from
1971Q1 to 2013Q2, and
daily equity data over the
same period.
∆ CoVaR estimates show that
characteristics such as leverage, size,
maturity mismatch and asset price
booms significantly predict systemic
risk contribution.
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Table 3.3 Continued
Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Segoviano Basurto
and
Goodhart
(2009)
J int Probability of
Default (JPoD) and
the Bank Stability
Index (BSI)
JPoD represents the probability of all the
banks in the system (as a portfolio) becoming
distressed, i.e., the tail risk of the system.
This uses an entropy-based copula approach
that matches marginal default probability
constraints from the CDS markets. The
BSI reflects the expected number of banks
becoming distressed given that at least one
bank has become distressed.
Based on CDS data from
2005 up to October 2008
for major American and
European banks, as well
as sovereigns in Latin
America, eastern Europe
and Asia.
Their measures allow users to analyse
(define) stability from three different,
yet complementary perspectives using
very limited datasets.
Acharya et
al. (2010,
2017)
Each financial
institution’s
contribution to
systemic risk can
be measured as its
Systemic Expected
Shortfall (SES)
Measures the extent to which an institution
imposes negative externalities on the system.
They calculate realised Marginal Expected
Shortfall (MES) and SES on daily equity
returns, volatility and Beta. They compare
these with fundamental data such as leverage,
assets and market value of equity.
102 US financial
institutions using equity
and CDS data from June
2005 to December 2008.
SES increases with the institution’s
leverage and with its expected loss in
the tail of the system’s loss distribution
i.e. its tendency to be under-capitalised
when the system as a whole is under-
capitalised.
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Table 3.3 Continued
Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Khandani,
Kim, and Lo
(2010)
Consumer Credit
Risk Measure
They apply a machine-learning techniques
to construct non-linear, non-parametric
forecasting models of consumer credit risk.
Customer transactions
and credit bureau data
from January 2005 to
April 2009 for a sample of
a major commercial
bank’s customers.
The sample is a small
percentage of the bank’s
total customer base
(unique dataset).
Time-series patterns of estimated
delinquency rates from this model of
the 2007-08 financial crisis suggest
that aggregated consumer credit-
risk analytics may have important
applications in forecasting systemic
risk.
Brownlees
and Engle
(2012)
SRISK Index.
The expected
capital shortage
of an institution
conditional on a
substantial market
decline
SRISK is an index that is a function of
fundamental data such as the degree of
leverage, size, marginal expected shortfall
(MES), equity returns, market capitalisation,
liquidity ratios and book value.
94 U.S. financial
institutions from July
2000 to June 2010.
Their results provided evidence that
SRISK is useful for the ranking
of systemically risky institutions at
various stages of the financial crisis.
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Table 3.3 Continued
Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Puzanova
and
Du¨llmann
(2013)
The financial
sector is treated
as a portfolio of
debt represented
by financial
institutions’
liabilities
They derive systemic risk capital contribution
via a credit portfolio approach using a
Gaussian factor model. Systemic risk is
gauged by the tail risk of the portfolio loss
distribution. This is based on book value of
the bank’s liabilities.
54 out of 86, of the
world’s major commercial
banks from Europe, North
America, South America,
Africa, Japan and Asia &
Pacific. Using monthly
data from 1997 to 2010.
Their evidence suggests that
macroprudential supervision should
focus on a solid capital base throughout
the financial cycle and the de-
correlation of banks’ asset values.
Girardi and
Ergu¨n (2013)
Multivariate
GARCH estimation
of CoVaR
This is a modification of Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2008) Delta CoVaR by using it
in conjunction with ADCC-GARCH models.
74 US financial
institutions’ data from
June 2000 to February
2008.
This adaptation allows the Delta
CoVaR model to consider more severe
distress events (those beyond the
institution’s VaR and farther in the
tail), to back-test and to improve
consistency (monotonicity) with
respect to the dependence parameter
(Mainik & Schaanning, 2014).
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Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Jobst and
Gray (2013)
Systemic
Contingent Claim
Analysis
This measures systemic solvency risk,
generated by aggregate estimates of the
joint default risk of multiple institutions as a
conditional tail expectation using multivariate
extreme value theory. Based on equity prices
and balance sheet data.
33 large US commercial
and investment banks,
insurance companies, and
special purpose financial
institutions using daily
data between January 1,
2007 and January 2010.
This measure helps quantify the
individual contributions to contingent
liabilities and systemic risk of the
financial sector during times of stress.
Avramidis
and
Pasiouras
(2015)
They extend
Puzanova and
Du¨llmann (2013)
model
They extend the previous Gaussian approach
by proposing a model that accounts for
extreme event dependence and they quantify
the level of capital shortfall when this
characteristic is ignored.
82 of the largest
commercial banks in the
world, data from January
2000 to December 2012.
This method is able to calculate
systemic risk in the form of potential
credit losses and can allocate total
systemic risk to the financial
system participants based on their
contributions.
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Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Kreis and
Leisen
(2018)
Conditional
Expected Default
Frequency
(CEDF )
This structural model of the banking system
assuming that defaults of individual banks are
linked through correlated (changes in) asset
values.
A core sample of 15 U.S.
banks (largest by assets
during 2004 and 2016)
and an extended sample
of an additional 15 U.S.
Banks. Daily equity prices
and quarterly asset values
between 1980 and 2016
(extended sample from
1996).
Average asset loadings (correlation)
considerably increased over the course
of the last 36 years, while their
heterogeneity decreased. Due to the
limited focus, CEDF will not be able to
capture all dimensions of systemic risk
in the banking system, but it proved
to be a useful complement to existing
systemic risk measures.
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Impact of Leverage
Additional constraints on leverage arise from a number of regulatory policies.
According to Aymanns et al. (2016), the following measures effectively impose a
risk contingent leverage constraint: (i) if institutional investors trade collateralised
loans they must maintain margin on its collateral; (ii) regulators such as the Basel
Committee impose a risk contingent capital adequacy ratio10; and (iii) another
possibility is that internal credit risk management procedures may adopt a VaR
constraint11 on leverage. High levels of leverage can exacerbate risk because in
bear markets leverage increases when asset prices decease, and such drop in prices
can then impact leverage constraints, which may force institutions to sell such
assets into falling markets (quick fire-sales), thereby amplifying declines in prices
further (see Figure 3.4). Due to the nature of the demand and supply curves they
tend to be stronger when the leverage of the financial intermediary is pro-cyclical
(when leverage is high during bull markets and low during bear markets). There
are two main ways in which institutions can reduce their balance sheets leverage;
by selling risky assets (potentially impacting profitability) or raise more capital
(Sharma, Lavery, & Polyanskiy, 2010). Adrian and Shin (2008) found that in
practice during and prior to the 2007 financial crisis, most institutions tended to
do the former. A. Barth and Seckinger (2018) investigated the unintended
consequences of more stringent leverage ratios, for example a binding leverage
ratio might create an incentive for an originate-and-distribute strategy. They
suggested that higher-quality institutions are not allowed to absorb the entire
supply of debt if it is too costly to issue new equity. This can effectively enhance
the market share of lower-quality institutions, raising interest in them from
regulators and adding to the competition of higher-quality institutions.
10Financial instructions are expected to maintain a leverage ratio in excess of 3% under Basel
III.
11In simple terms VaR is a measure of how much the bank could lose at a given probability,
usually at the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4: Leverage Price Amplification of Balance Sheet Change
Source: Adrian and Shin (2008, p. 5)
3.4.3 Liquidity Measures of Systemic Risk
Historically, until the recent financial crisis, liquidity risk was rarely viewed as a
priority by most financial institutions and regulators (Vento & La Ganga, 2009).
Recently, many authors have argued that in order to prevent another systemic
crisis, liquidity requirements should be introduced to reduce the reliance on
short-term refinancing and decrease the maturity mismatch between assets and
liabilities (Acharya & Yorulmazer, 2008; Acharya, 2009; Acharya & Richardson,
2009b; Wagner, 2009). In addition, Cao and Illing (2010) proposed that if all
institutions held extra liquidity the system on aggregate would be more resilient.
The empirical findings of Distinguin et al. (2013) based on a sample of 781 US and
European banks from 2000 to 2006 suggest that liquidity risk is a predictor of
bank failure and to avoid such failures, liquidity risk should be minimized not just
on an individual bank level but at a macro banking system level as well. See
Figure 3.5 for a breakdown of liquidity risk sources within a financial institution.
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Figure 3.5: Liquidity Risk Sources
Source: Wo´jcik-Mazur and Szajt (2015, p. 28)
Berger and Bouwman (2009) using US bank data developed a number of liquidity
creation measures which capture banks illiquidity by assessing the liquidity created
for customers. They showed that larger banks (total assets ≥ $1Bn) create over 80%
of the sector’s liquidity (despite accounting for a small percentage of all US banks).
J. Bai, Krishnamurthy, and Weymuller (2018) using their Liquidity Mismatch Index
(LMI) similarly found that the US banking sector’s liquidity is largely determined
by the top 50 banks.
The majority of measures regarding systemic liquidity risk focus on negative
externalities caused by maturity mismatches (Table 3.5 provides an overview). For
78
example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) proposed using the institution’s
CoVaR measure to calibrate charges for maturity mismatches to manage systemic
liquidity risk. However, it is not clear whether this capital oriented measure can be
applied for such a purpose. Also, based on financial institutions fundamentals,
Pierret (2015) empirically investigated the link between solvency and liquidity in
line with the bank run literature (F. Allen & Gale, 1998). Using the difference
between short-term liabilities and short-term assets as a proxy for liquidity risk,
Pierret (2015) provided evidence that financial institutions lose their access to
short-term funding (liquidity) when markets expect that they will become
insolvent. Perotti and Suarez (2011) proposed a mandatory liquidity insurance
funded by taxation of short-term wholesale funding. This simple model requires
institutions to pay different rates based on their contribution to negative
externalities. However, institutions are funded by many different channels, so the
assumption of short-term borrowing as the sole source of an institution’s funding is
oversimplifying the issue and makes it difficult to interpret the results in terms of
regulatory recommendations. Also, Jobst (2014) argues that there is limited
knowledge of how to empirically measure the systemic risk of wholesale funding.
Jobst (2014) introduced a risk-adjusted liquidity measure which aims to assess the
marginal contribution of each institution to total systemic liquidity risk. This
approach is based on option pricing theory and it was acknowledged that this
model can fail due to irrational market behaviour.
There has been progress with respects to developing regulation in this area.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) agreed the Basel III framework
(BIS, 2011a) sets out a number of consistent liquidity monitoring tools, which are
expected to capture information related to: cash flow issues; balance sheet
structure; availability of encumbered collateral; market liquidity indicators and
disclosure standards (Adalsteinsson, 2014). Further, BCBS’s main approach to
reduce funding concentration is to focus on the more significant12 wholesale
funding sources (both on counterparty and product basis). Basel III set out
12Their definition of a significant counterparty or product, is if it accounts for more than 1% of
the bank’s total balance sheet.
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international liquidity requirements, including the introduction of the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR)(BIS, 2013a)
LCR =
High Quality Liquid Assets
Net Cash Outflows for 30 Day Period
× 100 ≥ 100% (3.4.5)
and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) (BIS, 2014)
NSFR =
Amount of Stable Funding
Required Amount of Stable Funding
× 100 ≥ 100% (3.4.6)
to be implemented by 2015 and 2018, respectively.
LCR focuses on financial institutions’ short-term liquidity levels (over the next
30 days) in the event of shocks. In order to do this, it adds behavioural assumptions
to the asset and liability categories, which makes it a more dynamic tool than
alternative balance sheet ratios Adalsteinsson (2014). Where as the NSFR monitors
the long-term funding stability (Ashraf, Rizwan, & L’Huillier, 2016) and identifies
maturity mismatches which could impact funding risk (Schmitz & Hesse, 2014).
Ultimately, both ratios are designed to encourage the use of more stable funding
sources and ensure financial institutions have access to funding when required.
Within LCR, HQLA constitutes two liquidity groups: Level 1 are highly liquid
assets which are not subject to haircuts such as cash, government debt and central
bank reserves. Level 2 are market valued assets such as corporate debt and covered
bonds. These assets are subject to a range of variable haircut (15% - 50%). Thus,
the LCR numerator is given by
HQLA ≡ Level1 +min
{∑
i
(1− haircuti)× Level2asseti, 2
3
× Level1
}
(3.4.7)
i.e. Financial institutions HQLA must be mainly Level 1 assets, level 2 assets
are not allowed to cover over 2/3 of Level 1 assets. The LCR denominator is an
estimation of cash inflow over the next 30 days minus cash outflows. Inflows must
not cover any more then 75% of outflows, given by the following equation
Net Cash Outflows ≡ Outflows−min {0.75×Outflows, Inflows} (3.4.8)
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Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) believe that the introduction of Basel III
liquidity requirements will reduce systemic risk at times of liquidity tension and
reduce a dependence on central banks for funding. Ha¨rle et al. (2010) evidenced
that implementing the new liquidity requirement would lead to more capital and
liquidity efficient business models and products. P. King and Tarbert (2011) also
argue that the introduction of liquidity standards is the most important aspect of
the new Basel III framework. In their view, the financial crisis was more a liquidity
shock than a credit crisis, yet increased capital for credit risk remains the priority
from the point of view of regulators. Pakravan (2014) supports P. King and Tarbert
(2011) notion, suggesting that the new liquidity measures are an attempt to avoid
a repeat future liquidity crisis. Chiaramonte and Casu (2017) empirically evidenced
this as the NSFR was found to be a significant determinant of bank sector fragility
using EU bank level data, thus supporting the need for such liquidity requirements.
A number of empirical studies have sought to assess the impact of the new
liquidity regulations. These permanently focus on the NSFR due to the nature of
LCR, for example, the complexity to derive proxies or assumptions to calculate the
total net cash outflows over a 30-day period (Equation 3.4.8). Goodhart, Kashyap,
Tsomocos, and Vardoulakis (2012) found the NSFR to be a good pre-emptive
macro-prudential tool in comparison to cyclical variation in capital requirements or
underwriting standards. M. R. King (2013) tested NSFR levels for larger financial
institutions in 15 countries and, on average, representative banks in 10 out of 15
countries appear to have an NSFR below the minimum threshold at year-end 2009.
Similarly, Dietrich, Hess, and Wanzenried (2014) explored the potential impact of
the prescribed funding structures under Basel III on the performance of the
banking industry in Western Europe with the sample of 921 banks during 1996
and 2010 to find that the majority of the banks have historically not fulfilled
NSFR minimum requirements. Assessing US bank data prior to Basel III,
DeYoung, Distinguin, and Tarazi (2018) found that on average, banks increased
their NSFR following negative shocks to their risk-base regulatory capital ratios.
There was no evidence to suggest banks increase their NSFR following negative
shocks to their simple accounting (leverage) equity ratios. The authors argue that
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these results suggest that capital and liquidity have been historically treated as
substitutes. Thus, implementing both capital and liquidity requirements will be a
challenge to banks. Alternatively, Dietrich et al. (2014) reported that banks with
higher capital ratios, lower loan growth, more interest-bearing business and
branches operating in their native country have higher NSFRs. In other words,
banks with traditional business models (based on deposit taking and lending)
should have higher NSFR than banks with a high share of non-interest income.
A number of concerns have been raised regarding the liquidity requirements
(Ko¨nig & Pothier, 2016), in relation to LCR, Keister and Bech (2012) suggest this
requirement should increase demand for central bank funding impacting open market
operations (e.g. use of the money markets). Also, Malherbe (2014) argues that cash
hoarding to maintain a certain level of funding may actually reduce market liquidity.
In relation to NSFR, Ha¨rle et al. (2010) suggest that banks with substantial capital
markets and trading businesses will be impacted the most due to NSFR requirement,
and this sentiment was also shared by M. R. King (2013) who argues that universal
banks with diversified funding sources and high trading assets will be penalised the
most. In addition, Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) proposed the idea that
the liquidity requirements may significantly lower banks’ returns. Also, Gideon,
Petersen, Mukuddem-Petersen, and Hlatshwayo (2013) expects financial institutions
to raise lending rates in order to keep their return on equity in line with market
valuations and/or to reduce credit supply to lower the share of risky assets on the
balance sheet. See Figure 3.6 for a breakdown of how financial institutions can
enhance their NSFR. This diagram suggests a number of implications for the new
longer-term liquidity requirement.
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Figure 3.6: How banks can increase their NSFR
Source:M. R. King (2013, Pg 4147)
The consultation process and implementation of NSFR was also questioned as
the calculation requires a highly-detailed classification of the funding, which banks
do not disclose or even did not collect for their balance sheets (Gobat, Yanase,
& Maloney, 2014; Ha¨rle et al., 2010). Analysts were unsure regarding the weights
given to assets and liabilities in order to reflect appropriate liquidity risk assumptions
(Gobat et al., 2014). Weighting changes will ultimately impact bank level risk. Wei,
Gong, and Wu (2017) demonstrated that if short-term debt is given a sufficiently
low weight as an example within the available stable funding, NSFR can lower the
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use of short-term debt and thus reduce banks’ exposure to excess roll-over risk.
Furthermore, the assumptions rather than empirical validation and the ratio will
have little effect on bank failures (Dietrich et al., 2014; Hong, Huang, & Wu, 2014).
See Table 3.4 for a summary of the Available Stable Funding (ASF) and Required
Stable Funding (RSF) items weightings. Note the differences in weightings to the
ASF factor for deposits. In addition, Schmitt and Schmaltz (2016) found that these
revisions had significantly reduced both the number of non-compliant banks and the
magnitude of shortfall. When NSFR is empirically tested, equation 3.4.9 is used as
a proxy as financial institutions are not required to disclose this information as yet
(Yan, Hall, & Turner, 2012; Chiaramonte & Casu, 2017).
NSFR =
Equity + TotalLT
Funding
+
(
Term
Customer
Deposits
∗ 0.95
)
+
(
Current
Customer
Deposits
∗ 0.9
)
+
 OtherDeposits
andST
Borrowing
∗ 0.5

Other
Assets
+
((
Government
Securities
+ OBS
Items
)
∗ 0.05
)
+
((
Other
Securities
+
Loans
and
Advances
toBanks
)
∗ 0.5
)
+
(
Mortgage
Loans
∗ 0.65
)
+
(
Retail
and
Corporate
Loans
∗ 0.85
) ≥ 100%
(3.4.9)
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Table 3.4: NSFR Calculation Breakdown
Assets Variables RSF 2014
Factors
RSF 2010
Factors
Cash and equivalent due from banks 0% 0%
Off-balance-sheet items 5% 5%
Government securities 5% 5%
Loan and advances to banks 50% 0%
Other securities (total securities minus government
securities and at-equity investment in associates)
50% 50%
Residential mortgage portfolio 65% 65%
Net loans (minus residential mortgage portfolio) 85% 85%
At-equity investment in associates 100% 100%
Fixed assets 100% 100%
Insurance assets 100% 100%
Investment in property 100% 100%
Other earning assets 100% 100%
Non-earning assets (Total assets minus total earning
assets and cash and equivalent due from banks)
100% 100%
Reserves for non-performing loans 100% 100%
Liability & Equity Variables ASF 2014
Factors
ASF 2010
Factors
Deposits from banks 0% 0%
Other deposits and short-term borrowings 50% 50%
Customer demand deposits 90% 80%
Customer term deposits 95% 90%
Customer savings deposits 95% 90%
Total equity 100% 100%
Total long-term funding 100% 100%
Source: BIS (2010a) and BIS (2014)
Despite the introduction of liquidity requirements in Basel III, according to Jobst
(2014) systemic liquidity risk from a macro-prudential perspective remains largely
unaddressed. Distinguin et al. (2013) argued that liquidity risk is a predictor of
bank failure, and the previous regulations do not go far enough in the US and
Europe as system level liquidity was not addressed. In an attempt to build a further
liquidity buffer within the BCBS Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs)
(FSB, 2014a) the FSB announced the Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) (FSB,
2014b). This requires financial institutions to hold excess level of risk-weighted
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assets. TLAC is designed to minimize the participation of institutions in systemic
risk from a liquidity perspective. This standards intention is to ensure that in the
event of failure of a larger, interconnected and complex financial institution can be
resolved in an orderly manner, without the need for public funded support. Following
these initiatives, supervision authorities and central banks have been developing
newer stress-testing models and tools that more rigorously take into account the
interconnections between banks and the interactions between banks’ liquidity and
solvency risk. For example, the European Central Bank’s Stress-Test Analytics for
Macroprudential Purposes in the Euro area (STAMPe) (Dees, Henry, & Martin,
2017) comprises five different analytical assessments13 and Bank of Canada’s Macro-
Financial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF) (Fique, 2017) with a focus on the
country’s D-SIBs.
13(i) Dynamic dimension that takes into account banks’ responses to a scenario, (ii) the
interaction with the real economy, (iii) the interconnections between financial institutions, (iv) the
integration of system-wide liquidity assessment and (v) the interaction with non-financial sectors.
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Table 3.5: Liquidity Measures of Systemic Risk
Author(s) Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Brunnermeier
and
Pedersen
(2009)
A model that links
an assets market
liquidity and
trader’s funding
liquidity
They define market asset liquidity as the
difference between the transaction price and
the fundamental value. They define funding
liquidity as speculators’ shadow cost of
capital.
S&P 500 futures margins
from 1982 to 2008.
Funding requirement
data from hedge funds,
commercial & investment
banks and market makers.
Their model predicts that market
liquidity declines as fundamental
volatility increased (negative
correlation). They also provided
evidence that, under certain conditions,
margins are destabilised and that
market and funding liquidity are
mutually reinforcing, leading to
liquidity spirals.
Aikman et
al. (2009)
A Risk Assessment
Model for Systemic
Institutions
(RAMSI)
RAMSI assesses the impact of macroeconomic
and financial shocks on both individual
banks as well as the banking system using
Bayesian VAR (BVAR). They also regress
bank fundamental data against credit rating.
The 10 largest UK banks
from 1972Q2 to 2007Q4.
They demonstrate how rising funding
costs and liquidity concerns can amplify
other sources of risk.
Perotti
and Suarez
(2011)
A Pigovian Tax on
short-term funding
They developed an analysis of the relative
performance of realistic price-based and
quantity-based approaches to the regulation of
systemic externalities associated with bank’s
short-term funding strategy.
They provided evidence that a pigovian
tax on short-term funding is efficient
in containing risk and preserving credit
quality, while quantity-based funding
ratios are distortionary.
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Table 3.5 Continued
Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
S. H. Lee
(2013)
Systemic liquidity
shortages due
to interbank
interconnectedness
A comparative analysis of six different types
of network structures. Their models are
described by several exogenous parameters
such as reserve ratios, deposit shares, surplus
funds and cross holdings.
They provide evidence that greater
imbalances in liquidity positions
across banks tends to aggravate the
liquidity shortage of a deficit bank.
Also banking systems becomes more
vulnerable to liquidity shocks as its
interbank networks becomes more
ill-matched.
Hu, Pan, and
Wang (2013)
Noise as
Information for
Illiquidity
Market-wide liquidity measure by exploiting
the connection between the amount of
arbitrage capital in the market and observed
noise (deviations from a given pricing model)
in U.S. Treasury bonds.
US daily cross-sections of
end-of-day treasury bill
and bond (one month to
10 year maturities) prices
from 1987 to 2011. Total
of 163 treasury bills and
bonds.
Their noise measure captures episodes
of liquidity crisis from different origins
across the financial market, providing
information beyond existing liquidity
proxies.
Jobst (2014) Systemic Risk-
Adjusted Liquidity
(SRL) Model
Using option price theory and institutions
required and available stable funding ratios.
This approach quantifies an individual
institution’s time-varying contribution to
expected losses from system-wide liquidity
shortfalls and insurance premia that provide
incentives for banks’ to internalise the social
cost of their individual funding decisions.
13 largest US commercial
and investment banks
data from January 2005
to December 2010.
The SRL model provides a tractable
framework for the assessment of
system-wide valuation effects arising
from joint liquidity risk.
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3.4.4 Contagion Measures of Systemic Risk
The emergence of systemic risk in financial networks has also been receiving
increasing attention in the literature (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, & Tahbaz-Salehi,
2015a; F. Allen & Babus, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010) and among regulators (IMF, 2012;
Yellen, 2013). Within the banking sector, financial institution interconnectedness
can have wider implications in the event of financial shock. This is because
exogenous or endogenous shocks can be intensified in various ways (Roukny,
Battiston, & Stiglitz, 2018), for example, funding concentration can spread bank
runs and capital flight (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983); similar asset portfolios (both
indirect interconnectedness) can be exposed to supressed valuations via fire sales
and deleverage (Caccioli, Shrestha, Moore, & Farmer, 2014); and intertwined
balance sheets (via derivatives and loans) can results in cascading defaults
(F. Allen & Gale, 2000). Further, Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and Steffen (2018) argues
that syndication increases the overlap of bank loan portfolios and makes them
more vulnerable to contagious effects. The likes of indirect interconnectedness
could be limited by reducing the reliance on mark-to-market accounting or by
promoting greater diversity in business strategies. Possible channels of contagion
in the banking sectors can originate from a range of sources, both on the liability
side (e.g. bank runs) and asset side (e.g. interbank lending, derivative exposure
and settlement systems)14. Garriga (2017) argues that delays in revising banks’
prudential regulation provide opportunities for banks to elude regulation and
adopt risky behaviour. This effect increases a country’s vulnerability to systemic
banking crisis. The majority of systemic risk measures that relate to contagion are
based on the assumption that the greater the correlation of indicators the greater
the systemic risk. Table 3.6 presents an overview of the proposed contagion
measures of systemic risk.
Nicolo´ and Kwast (2002) argue that institution’s interdependencies provide an
indication of systemic risk by using equity return correlations of large and complex
14See Table 1 and footnote 4 in Upper (2011) for a comprehensive list of references on the various
channels of contagion.
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US financial institutions. Their claim is based on the assumption that increased
equity return correlation may signal an increase in the potential for a shock to
become systemic. The use of equity returns does reflect market participants’
collective evaluation of an institution. However, it is unclear to what extent this
reflects the total impact of its interactions with other institutions, as this may be
private information. Patro, Qi, and Sun (2013) also conducted a similar study and
found that daily equity return correlation is a simple, robust, forward-looking, and
timely systemic risk indicator.
Using Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) measurement of banking instability (equity
pricing) and defined crisis periods in the UK over a 181-year period, Campbell,
Coyle, and Turner (2016) made the following five observations (see Figure 3.7).
First, on average two years prior to any crisis there tend to be substantial equity
gains followed by considerable declines in the year of the crisis. Secondly, economic
indicators (real interest rates, inflation and GDP growth) are higher than historical
averages in the two years prior to a crisis, as economic activity tends to accelerate
before a crisis. Thirdly, money supply is consistent with improved averages in the
years before the crisis. Fourthly, proxies for commodities display negative growth
two years prior to a crisis, however one year before and during a crisis, price
growth is considerably above historical averages. Lastly, in the years leading up to
a crisis, financial institutions lending and house price growth rates were above
average, supporting the view that significant credit growth fuels a housing asset
bubble in the lead up to financial crisis.
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Figure 3.7: UK Bank Equity Returns 1830-2010
Source: Campbell et al. (2016, p. 77)
Lehar (2005) measures risk at the level of the banking system rather than at
the level of individual institutions, by estimating the dynamics and correlations
between institution asset portfolios following Merton (1973) method of equity as a
call option of institution’s assets. This does not attempt to capture systemic risk
but the measure enables regulators to track and compare risk of the system. This
method was extended by Allenspach and Monnin (2008) who assessed co-movement
of banks assets to debt ratio as they believe that changes in the assets to debt ratio
can be considered as a good summary of changes in the overall financial health of an
institution. Allenspach and Monnin (2008) finding warns against viewing systemic
risk as a pure correlation phenomenon and highlight the danger of high and volatile
leverage at the individual institution level.
It is worth noting that the studies that use equity indices returns to assess the
contagion across different markets do provide evidence consistent with studies that
are focused on international diversification. For example, Ye, Luo, and Du (2014)
used a Multivariate Conditional Autoregressive Value at Risk (MV-CAViaR)
model to assess contagion from the US equity market to five other countries
(China, Japan, UK, France and Germany) during a crisis period. They found that
contagion from the US increased market risks of the other tested countries during
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the crisis except for China, however during the recovery period this contagion
effect was reduced and varied. These findings were consistent with previously
findings by Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003). With the assumption that a crisis
period reflects a bear equity market and the recovery period reflects a bull market,
these findings are similar to You and Daigler (2010). Their study empirically
investigated the theory of international diversification using dynamic correlation
away from the US equity market during bull and bear periods. Their findings
provided evidence that investors can get diversification benefits from Asian
markets but limited benefits from European market. They also found that during
bear periods (crisis periods) the indexes they tested became increasingly correlated
and during bull periods the evidence was mixed. This phenomenon is not just
isolated to equity prices. For example, Eder and Keiler (2015) found in European
and US financial institutions CDS premia were strongly affected by financial
contagion, whilst the Asian financial institutions were found to be rather
independent.
A more recent assessment of contagion at the industry level was conducted by
Tonzer (2015), who used the BIS aggregate bilateral cross-border asset and liability
positions reporting and macro-economic data regressed against industry bank risk
(as measured by the Z-Score). He found that countries that are connected via
foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems overseas are
significantly affected by positive spillovers. This implies that linkages in the banking
system can be beneficial, however this may not be the case in a crisis period.
3.4.5 Network Measures of Systemic Risk
Network theory or simulation models of systemic risk emerged in the early 2000s and
they seem to be homogeneous in nature, in particular, due to the type of parameters
included such as connectivity, concentration and size of financial institutions. The
majority of this research tends to focus on systemic risk through contagion effects
following a shock. Generally, there are five types of network structures that can be
tested (see Figure 3.8).
Simulations provide policy-makers with a rough indication of whether
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Figure 3.8: Network Structures
(a) Disconnected (b) Ring (c) Tree
(d) Complete (e) Star
Source: adaptation of S. H. Lee (2013) and Roukny et al. (2018)
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contagion could become a possible consequence of endogenous or exogenous
shocks. Thus, such methods can be used to identify potential financial institutions
whose failure could potentially cause system contagion and/or other institutions to
fail (e.g. node 1 in Figure 3.8e). Unlike other models, simulations can take into
account simultaneous factors, such as balance sheet data and their interaction with
interbank markets. However, the simulation studies tend to be based on similar
strong underlying assumptions, which can lead to a range of different biases.
Moreover, data availability is a serious issue with simulation methods. The
simulation method may be sophisticated, however limited access to the data may
make models redundant. Data on bilateral exposures within, for example, the
interbank market is currently limited, especially for over the counter bilateral
agreements. Therefore, some financial institutions’ exposures are intrinsically
unobservable. In time, as more bilateral agreements are conducted via central
platforms, the data availability could improve. When creating a method of
measuring systemic risk within networks it is common for them to be conceptual
or theoretical without real data. Table 3.7 provides an overview of the current
network measures of systemic risk. A more recent example by Roukny et al. (2018)
introduces a conceptual model to compute the probability of default for individual
financial institutions as well as systemic defaults within a network of banks
connected via a credit contracts network. This model is designed to be applied
using actual data with adjustable parameters depending on the data availability
within the assets/credit portfolios and balance sheet. A main advantage of this
technique is that it can be used by regulators to access both the level of
(individual and systemic) risk and identify any uncertainty arising from the
interconnectedness. Barroso, Silva, and de Souza (2018) proposed a method of
identifying from systemic risk arising from insolvency contagion arising from
aggregated cross-border debt exposure networks. Using BIS’s Consolidated
Banking Statistics database and aggregated capital buffer data, they found that
the US and UK hold the most cross-border risk bearing with the potential to cause
a shock/damage within a global network. Their approach is a useful tool for
monitoring cross-border financial systems but does not attempt to identify
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interconnectedness among individual financial institutions.
Poledna, Molina-Borboa, Mart´ınez-Jaramillo, van der Leij, and Thurner (2015)
provide a robust example of this research area, using a unique dataset which covers
four different types of exposure in the Mexican banking system. This dataset is
only available to supervisors or for systemic risk research purposes. Uniquely they
were able to provide evidence that focusing on a single layer network
underestimates the total systemic risk by up to 90%. Their results demonstrated
that the exposures related to the cross-holding of securities and from FX
transactions (both of which are traded over-the-counter) are crucially important
components of the systemic risk. However, it would be dangerous to generalise
such findings to larger banking systems such as the one in the US. Recent work
has shown how network research can be advanced. Aldasoro and Alves (2016)
analysed multiplex network structure of 53 anonymous large European banks (as
of year end 2011), presenting exposures partitioned (layered) according to maturity
and instrument type. They found a high level of similarity between the different
layers, a core-periphery structure which comprises of a large core and positively
correlated multiplexity15. Similarly Berndsen, Leo´n, and Renneboog (2018)
investigated coupling financial institutions’ multiplex networks with financial
market infrastructures’ networks and found that central financial institutions tend
to overlap across financial networks, thus their systemic importance may be even
greater than envisaged. In both cases, the layout was similar to the star structure
in Figure 3.8e, but with a number of central nodes which have similar exposures
(instrument and maturity) from other smaller nodes. These methods can be used
to evidence which institutions play an important role within a network and
identify correlated channels of transmission. Their dataset of granular level data
was compiled by two regulatory bodies for such a purpose, and is therefore not
available publicly and difficult to criticise. Even if more interconnection data was
available, practical issues such as the computing power required for larger banking
15Bliemel, McCarthy, and Maine (2014) defined multiplexity as interaction of exchanges within
and across relationships.
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systems would be substantial, for example in order to estimate loss distributions
methods such as Monte Carlo simulation would be required.
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Table 3.6: Contagion Measures of Systemic Risk
Author(s) Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Nicolo´ and
Kwast
(2002)
Institution
Interdependencies
For the dynamics of interdependencies they
use equity return correlation. Then they
relate the correlations to their consolidation
activity by estimating measures of the
consolidation elasticity of correlation through
time and cross sectionally.
Major US Banks from
1988 to 1999, taking into
account 22 consolidation
events.
They provide evidence of a positive
trend in equity return correlations net
of diversification effects. This suggests
that the systemic risk potential in the
financial sector may have increased
during the sample periods.
Bae et al.
(2003)
Contagion captures
the coincidence of
extreme returns
They observe large positive and negative
daily equity returns, then calibrate the joint
occurrences of extreme returns using Monte
Carlo simulation followed by multinomial
logistic analysis against economic indicators.
Based on 17 Asian and
Latin American markets
from April 1992 to
December 2000.
They found contagion is predictable
and depends on regional interest rates,
exchange rate changes, and conditional
equity return volatility. In addition,
contagion is stronger for extreme
negative returns than for extreme
positive returns, which is mixed.
Gropp and
Moerman
(2004)
Co-incidence of
extreme shocks
to bank’s risk to
examine contagion
Bank’s risk is measured by the first
difference of weekly distances to default
and abnormal returns, applying Monte Carlo
simulations to observed frequency of large
shocks experienced by two or more banks
simultaneously. This is consistent with the
assumption of a multivariate normal or a
student t-distribution.
67 of the largest EU banks
from 1991 to 2003.
Their measure may be able to
accurately measure contagion
among any bank pair, as long as
the probabilities of an idiosyncratic
shock hitting the two banks are quite
similar. Also their measure can be used
to identify banks which have systemic
importance within countries and across
countries.
97
Table 3.6 Continued
Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Lehar (2005) Standard tools that
regulators require
banks to use for
their internal
risk management
are applied at
the level of the
banking system to
measure the risk
of a regulator’s
portfolio
Estimate the dynamics and correlations
between bank asset portfolios. Fundamental
data included bank size, ROA, book value of
equity over total assets, long term debt and
regulatory capitalisation.
149 International Banks
(50 US, 40 Europe, 45
Japan, 14 Other) from
1988 to 2002.
Within the sample period they showed
that in line with market events the
North American banking system gains
stability while the Japanese banking
sector becomes more fragile.
Rodriguez
(2007)
A Copula approach
to measure
contagion
They used a Copula approach with time-
varying parameters that change with the
states of the variance to identify shifts in
the dependence structure in times of crisis.
This method can capture increases in tail
dependence.
Five East Asian equity
indices during the Asian
crisis (1/1/96 to 30/6/98),
and four Latin American
equity indices during the
Mexican crisis (1/1/93 to
31/12/95).
They provided evidence that the
dependence structure between equity
market returns of countries in Asia
and Latin America changed during
the crisis periods. They argue that
structural breaks in tail dependence are
an actual dimension of the contagion
phenomenon.
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Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Schwaab,
Koopman,
and Lucas
(2011)
A coincident
measure and
an indicator for
the likelihood
of simultaneous
failure
Using a dynamic factor framework based
on state-space methods. The indicators
of systemic risk are based on underlying
macroeconomic (8 US and 8 European
indicators) and credit risk components such
as exposure and actual default count.
Dataset of 450 U.S. and
400 EU-27 area financial
firms, compared with
non-financial firms from
1984Q1 to 2010Q4.
They found that decoupling credit risk
from macro-financial fundamentals may
serve as an early warning signal of
systemic risk.
Giesecke and
Kim (2011)
Dynamic hazard
model of failure
Their formulation attempts to capture the
spill over effects channelled through a complex
network of relationships in the economy. The
model is based on actual failures rates as
compared against macroeconomic and sector-
specific risk factors.
US default timing data
from 1987 to 2008.
Their evidence indicated that the
model provides accurate out-of-sample
forecasts of the term structure of
systemic risk. Also the cause of
systemic distress is the correlated
failure of institutions to meet
obligations to creditors, customers, and
trading partners.
Billio,
Getmansky,
Lo, and
Pelizzon
(2012)
Econometric
measures of
connectedness
Several econometric measures of
connectedness based on principal-component
analysis and Granger-causality networks.
Monthly returns of US
value weighted indexes
of hedge funds, banks,
broker/dealers and
insurance companies’
data from 1994 to 2008.
Their evidence suggests that the four
sectors have become highly interrelated
over the sample period, likely increasing
the level of systemic risk in the finance
and insurance industries.
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Ye et al.
(2014)
MVMQ-CAViaR
Method
They use Multivariate Conditional
Autoregressive Value at Risk (MV-CAViaR)
models to analyse the variation of market risk
among diffident countries at different stages
of the crisis period. This is based on the
equity index daily return data.
Equity market indices
include, the S&P 500
(US), CSI300 (China),
Nikkei 225 (Japan),
FTSE-100 (UK), CAC-
40 (France) and DAX
(Germany). Over number
of periods including:
Pre-crisis (January 2006
to December 2007); Crisis
Period (January 2008
to June 2009); and the
Recovery phase (July
2009 to July 2013).
Their evidence shows that their
estimated coefficients became more
significant or that the market risks of
the tested countries increase during
the crisis except for China. Also their
model demonstrated the changes in
market risk where consistent with
market events.
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Tonzer
(2015)
Linkages in
interbank markets
affect the stability
of interconnected
banking systems
(not individual
banks)
They used a spatial modelling approach to
test for spillovers in cross-border interbank
markets, using the banking system’s
international balance sheet positions data,
i.e total cross-border positions disaggregated
from the BIS bilateral cross-border asset and
liability positions data. They also used a
range of macroeconomic data with dependant
variables bringing the industry Z-Score as a
measure of Bank Risk.
Data from the US, 15
European countries,
Canada and Japan from
1994 to 2012.
The results suggest that foreign
exposures in banking play a significant
role in channelling banking risk.
Countries that are linked through
foreign borrowing or lending positions
to more stable banking systems abroad
are significantly affected by positive
spillover effects. This implies that in
stable times, linkages in the banking
system can be beneficial, while they
have to be taken with caution in times
of financial turmoil affecting the whole
system.
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Table 3.7: Network Measures of Systemic Risk
Author Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Eisenberg
and Noe
(2001)
A network
approach to
introduce a single
clearing mechanism
that produces the
number of defaults
required to induce
a firm to fail
They developed an algorithm that both clears
the financial system in a computationally
efficient fashion and provides information on
the systemic risk faced by the individual
system firms.
They provided comparative statics
which imply that, in contrast to single-
firm results, even unsystematic, non-
dissipative shocks to the system will
lower the total value of the system.
Elsinger,
Lehar, and
Summer
(2006)
To assess two
sources of
systematic risk
by analysing
the market and
credit portfolios
of all banks
simultaneously
They extend Eisenberg and Noe (2001)
model to include indirect linkages through
correlation
Austrian interbank
lending exposure cross-
sectional data (881
reporting banks) for
September 2002 (plus
three additional times
periods for robustness).
Correlation in bank’s asset portfolios
dominates contagion as the main source
of systemic risk. They also computed
the VaR for a lender of last resort and
find that the funds necessary to prevent
contagion were unpredictably low.
Chen and
Wang (2009)
CDS market
network model to
study systemic risk
They developed an algorithm in which
a bilateral connection matrix is generated
stochastically in order to simulate a plausible
CDS network reflecting the real market. The
node links are the bilateral obligations from
the CDS market.
FDIC data and market
share data of 26 banks to
create a U.S. CDS market
with the incorporation of
‘non-U.S. bank’ nodes.
The network model of the CDS market
shows how certain parameters of a
network can affect the expected loss of
the system relative to the initial loss
caused by a default.
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Canedo and
Jaramillo
(2009)
Systemic Risk
Network Model
(SyRNet)
A network model to analyse systemic risk
in the banking system that seeks to obtain
the probability distribution of losses for
the financial system resulting from the
shock/contagion process.
Mexican interbank
exposure data (25 banks)
from January 2004 to
December 2006 (unique
dataset).
Their model allows them to perform
stress tests along both the bank
default probabilities and the interbank
exposures and is used to assess the risk
of the system.
Mart´ınez-
Jaramillo,
Pe´rez,
Embriz,
and Dey
(2010)
Model systemic risk
via random shocks
that weakens one
or more financial
institutions and
a transmission
mechanism which
transmits such
effects to the rest
of the system
They enhance Canedo and Jaramillo (2009)
model to make it more robust by incorporating
CVaR in order to evaluate if the system is
become more or less fragile.
Mexican Interbank
exposure data (27 banks)
from December 2007
to June 2009 (unique
dataset).
Their results suggest that the
probability distributions of the initial
shock, the size of the losses and the
correlations, play a key role in the
determination of the robustness or
fragility of a financial system.103
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Bluhm and
Krahnen
(2014)
A macroprudential
risk management
approach building
on a system wide
value at risk
(SVaR)
This model incorporates multiple sources of
systemic risk including: size of financial
institutions; direct exposure from interbank
lending; asset fire sales using a Shapley value-
type measure; and fundamental data (Assets
such as liquid, non-liquid assets and interbank
lending. Liabilities such as deposits, interbank
borrowing and equity).
Using SVaR they provide evidence
that a fair systemic risk charge which
is proportional to a bank’s individual
contribution to systemic risk, diverges
from the optimal macroprudential
capitalisation of the banks. Also that
bank’s size and interconnections in the
form of interbank lendings, and fire sale
spirals are driven by a mark-to-market
mechanism.
Poledna et
al. (2015)
Quantify the daily
contributions to
systemic risk from
four network layers
The four network layers include deposits &
loans, security cross-holdings, derivatives
(swaps, forwards, options, and repo
transactions) and foreign exchange (FX)
transactions.
Applying Mexican
banking system data 2007
to 2013. A unique dataset
(confidential to regulators
and supervisors).
They provide evidence to show that
focusing on a single layer network
underestimates the total systemic
risk by up to 90%. Their results
demonstrate that the exposures related
to the cross-holding of securities
and the exposures arising from FX
transactions are crucially important
components of the systemic risk.
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Hautsch,
Schaumburg,
and Schienle
(2015)
A systemic risk
beta as a measure
of financial
companies’
contribution to
systemic risk,
given the network
interdependence
between firms’ tail
risk exposures
They define the realised systemic risk beta
as the total time-varying marginal effect
of a firm’s Value-at-risk (VaR) on the
system’s VaR. They use a wide range of
publicly accessible macroeconomic market,
equity return and fundamental data.
59 US Financial
institutions from 2000
to 2008
They provide evidence to highlight
how interconnected the US financial
system is and clearly marked channels
of relevant potential spillovers. In
particular, this method can classify
companies into major risk producers,
transmitters or recipients within the
system.
Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar,
and Tahbaz-
Salehi
(2015b)
A theoretical
framework for
the study of
the economic
forces shaping
the relationship
between the
structure of the
financial network
and systemic risk
They focus on an economy consisting of banks
(simulating different network structures),
which lasts for three time periods. At the
initial date, banks borrow funds from one
another to invest in projects that yield returns
both in the intermediate and final date.
The liability structure that emerges from
such interbank loans determines the financial
network, capturing the pairwise counterparty
relationships between different institutions.
They found that highly interconnected
complete financial network is the
configuration least prone to contagion.
This is because losses of a distressed
bank are passed to a larger number
of counterparties, guaranteeing a more
efficient use of the excess liquidity. Ring
networks tend to be the most fragile.
However they provided evidence that in
the case of larger shocks, networks do
not aid the system.
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Table 3.7 Continued
Author(s) Model Methodology Sample Empirical Findings
Constantin
et al. (2018)
Estimated network
linkages into an
EWS model to
predict bank
distress
The approach estimates tail-dependence
networks via equity returns and combines
them with a bank-level early-warning model
(mainly focused on the CAMELS variables).
EWS was produced using
171 European banks’ data
from 1999Q1 to 2012Q3.
The wider sample includes
243 European banks
The EWS including estimated tail
dependencies consistently outperform
the EWSs which cover solely
vulnerabilities coming from bank-
specific, sector-level and macro-
financial imbalances in order to predict
bank distress events.
Roukny et
al. (2018)
A theoretical
model to compute
the individual
and systemic
probability of
default
Using a theoretical financial network of
over-the-counter (OTC) credit contracts the
authors compute the individual and systemic
probability of default in a system of banks
connected in a generic interbank network.
Their main contribution shows that
multiple equilibria can arise from the
presence of closed chains of debt within
the network. If the default conditions of
a set of banks are mutually dependent
along cycles of credit contracts, there
exists a range of external shocks such
that the equilibrium where all those
banks default and the equilibrium
where none of them defaults co-exist.
Barroso et
al. (2018)
Insolvency
contagion within
Financial Networks
This method decomposed drivers of systemic
risk from insolvency contagion. Assessing
the drivers of systemic risk from financial
institutions debt network exposures and
capital buffers.
Quarterly data on cross-
border debt exposures and
aggregated tier 1 capital
buffers from 26 countries
during 2005 to 2014.
Their findings suggest that network
debt topology explains most of the
volatility of contagion risk and that
capital buffers are effective at reducing
contagion risk.
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3.5 Data Requirements
This section provides an overview of the different types of data required to
compute and empirically test the measures proposed to calculate systemic risk
which is summarised in Table 3.816. The most common indicators are equity prices
(55% of models) and financial institution fundamental data (45% of models). This
data is readily available to the public via stock exchanges or a range of
subscription databases (e.g. Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bloomberg
Professional Service). As mentioned previously, these have their limitations which
are widely acknowledged in the literature. For example, the use of equity prices
tends to come with the assumption of rational markets which is not always the
case, especially in the times of crisis. From an empirical perspective, Zhang,
Vallascas, Keasey, and Cai (2015) questioned whether purely equity based
measures capture systemic risk adequately. As equities become more correlated
globally (Roll, 2013; You & Daigler, 2010) this could impact the models reliability
and/or statistical significance. As an example from using bank equities, Born,
Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2014) conducted an event study focusing on how central
bank’s dissemination, the likes of a Financial Stability Report publication (and ad
hoc speeches/interviews) affect equity markets by further increasing correlation in
returns and reducing market volatility. As a number of EWS (e.g. FSI and CISS)
use correlation and realised volatility, such models may also be indirectly affected
by such announcements.
In many papers that use fundamental data from financial institutions’ balance
sheets, items or a combination of items are used as proxies for risk and in some
cases there is limited consistency (e.g. the decision to use the natural log function
or not). Also, some methodologies require interpolation, extrapolation or
disaggregating from yearly to quarterly or monthly data. Given the operational
nature of the financial institutions this technique could provide misleading
observations. Section 2.3.7 briefly outlines the issues surrounding accounting
16Within this table, 50 models are presented, six models from the previous discussion are not
included as they are theoretical and were not empirically tested with real world data.
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standards. Macroeconomic data is used in 27% of the models. Again this data is
widely available within the public domain. However, similarly to fundamental data
the frequency and time of publication varies across different countries, often
impacting comparability.
The contagion and network methods of measuring systemic risk tend to require
unique datasets (for example, Poledna et al. (2015) used data only available from
the Mexican central bank and Khandani et al. (2010) who had access to customer
transactions and credit bureau data from a sample of major US commercial banks)
and interbank market data (Canedo & Jaramillo, 2009; Elsinger et al., 2006; Tonzer,
2015). Such studies provide an insight into specific cases using data which is not
readily available in the public domain and they tend to provide interesting and
important findings, thus providing an argument for more data transparency and
availability. Previous literature (Aldasoro & Alves, 2016, inter alia) has argued
the need to use more granular data by noting that banks interconnectedness can
range differently in different layers (different asset or liability types) and thereby
the focus on a single layer may be misleading (Poledna et al., 2015). Still important
information can be obtained from one layer dataset, in particular if one is able to
decompose global systemic importance, then regulators can identify institutions to
investigate them further. Nevertheless, without unique/granular level data Aldasoro
and Alves (2016) provided evidence that simple network measures can be an inferior
alternative.
Foreign exchange data is rarely used in the systemic risk models. This data
tends to be in the form of an index or a currency pair price. As foreign exchange
transactions are over the counter, such indexes/prices tend to aggregate averages of
the bid/offer prices. In attempts to capture inter-day volatility, the spot price is often
compared to the previous price 30 minutes ago or the futures price. Interestingly,
despite the rare use of foreign exchange market data, when it is employed it tends
to be in studies covering the emerging economies and is found to be a statistically
significant indicator of systemic risk (Bae et al., 2003; Poledna et al., 2015; Sensoy
et al., 2014, inter alia). As noted by Laeven and Valencia (2013), the majority of
financial crises within developing economies originally develops from either sovereign
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default and/or the depreciation of their currency. Therefore, in future development
of systemic risk models the incorporation of foreign exchange data may provide
valuable insight.
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Table 3.8: Data Requirements
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Nicolo´ and Kwast (2002) x x
Bae et al. (2003) x x x x
Gropp and Moerman (2004) x x
Lehar (2005) x
Elsinger et al. (2006) x x
N. Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo
(2006)
x
Bartram et al. (2007) x
Rodriguez (2007) x
Bhansali et al. (2008) x
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) x x
X. Huang et al. (2009) x x x
Alessi and Detken (2009) x x
Segoviano Basurto and Goodhart
(2009)
x
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) x
Aikman et al. (2009) x x x x
Canedo and Jaramillo (2009) x x
Chen and Wang (2009) x
Gaganis et al. (2010) x x x
Kritzman and Li (2010) x x x x
Acharya et al. (2010, 2017) x x x
Khandani et al. (2010) x x
Mart´ınez-Jaramillo et al. (2010) x x
Kritzman et al. (2011) x x
Schwaab et al. (2011) x x
Giesecke and Kim (2011) x x x x
L. Allen et al. (2012) x x
Hollo et al. (2012) x x x x x
Brownlees and Engle (2012) x x
Billio et al. (2012) x
Duca and Peltonen (2013) x x x x x
Trapp and Wewel (2013) x
Girardi and Ergu¨n (2013) x x
Puzanova and Du¨llmann (2013) x x
Jobst and Gray (2013) x x
Hu et al. (2013) x x
Sensoy et al. (2014) x x x x x
Jobst (2014) x
Ye et al. (2014) x
Avramidis and Pasiouras (2015) x x x
Poledna et al. (2015) x
Hautsch et al. (2015) x x x
Tonzer (2015) x x x
Eder and Keiler (2015) x x x x x x
Aldasoro and Alves (2016) x
Kreis and Leisen (2018) x x
Alessi and Detken (2018) x x x
Constantin et al. (2018) x x x
Gibson et al. (2018) x
Papanikolaou (2018a) x x x x
Barroso et al. (2018) x x
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3.6 Challenges for Regulation and Systemic Risk
Measurement
This section highlights the key challenges that policy-makers face in terms of choice
and implementation of systemic risk measures.
Firstly, the term macroprudential regulation can be interpreted in a number of
ways. From a systemic risk perspective, it means controlling financial instability
inherent to financial markets and institutions using a top-down approach.
However, macro-prudential regulation is often considered to be an activity that
focuses on mapping and managing the economic cycle while sceptics treat it as
meaningless. Therefore, a consensus on the precise definition of macroprudential
regulation would be desirable17. As previously discussed, there is a wide range of
systemic risk measures, which when coupled with a plethora of proposed policy
instruments to address the individual type of risk leaves policy-makers facing a
conundrum. The main problem is deciding on a universally accepted regulatory
instrument (or a combination of instruments) that would be cost-effective18 in
mitigating systemic risk.
Secondly, as a policy response to systemic risk being a global issue, a
macroprudential approach would need to be led by a co-ordinated partnership of
central banks, regulators and governments with a harmonised supervisory style.
Separation of the mandates without coordination between policy-makers is an
inferior arrangement regardless of the type of shock (Lazopoulos & Gabriel, 2019).
Following the financial crisis, there were repeated calls to strengthen the
co-operation between national regulators as part of the policy response (Arner,
2009). There has been a number of proposals to develop cross-border regulations
(mainly focused on the G-SIB)19, including proposals by the WTO, BIS and IMF
17See Clement (2010) for a discussion of term macroprudential
18Cost-effective in the sense that the new regulation has a minimal effect on banking efficiency,
productivity and innovation. This would have to be based on empirical simulations which would
be a subjective and time-consuming process.
19Away from the G-SIB’s, The European Union has an example of an international supervisor,
the European Security and Market Authority (ESMA). Beginning its operations in January 2011,
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(Arner & Taylor, 2009), however this harmonised supervisory style idea currently
is a long way off. For example, Carretta, Farina, Fiordelisi, Schwizer, and Lopes
(2015) found that among the European banks there is a substantial number of
different supervisory cultures. Further, they showed that a collectivism-oriented
supervision culture20 improves the banks’ distance to default (as measured by the
Z-Score) and that a power-distance-oriented culture21 diminishes banking stability.
Also, Clark and Jokung (2015) found that regulators with a higher level of risk
aversion are associated with tighter regulations and regular intervention, whilst
low levels of risk aversion are associated with lighter regulation and infrequent
interventions. Hence, a consistent supervisory approach is desirable. This
harmonisation challenge was recently highlighted by Masciandaro and Volpicella
(2016), who investigated the economic and political drivers of the policy-makers’
decision to assign macro-supervisory powers to central banks. They found that
governments tend to be cautious when placing too much power in the hands of
independent and/or discretionary central banks.
Thirdly, when deciding what type of regulation to implement the policy-makers
face the challenge of which banks need further regulation or whether the ‘one size
fits all’ approach is sufficient. Empirical evidence can help answer this question.
For example,Vazquez and Federico (2015) found that smaller and larger banks (in
the US and Europe) were susceptible to failure for different reasons, i.e. smaller
banks due to liquidity problems and large banks due to insufficient capital buffers.
For larger banks, Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2013) found that
stronger capital reserves were linked with better equity price performance and
Chiaramonte and Casu (2017) found that for the G-SIBs, the Basel III capital and
it assesses risk to investors and financial institutions by promoting supervisory convergence and
directly supervising European credit rating agencies.
20Supervisors that are oriented towards collective outcomes, e.g., focusing on the overall stability
of the banking system, with the aim of preventing any social costs for stakeholders (Hofstede,
Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010).
21This culture is based on a strict supervision with authoritative empowerment of the regulation
and no flexibility without looking for a general consensus toward banking regulation(Hofstede et
al., 2010).
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liquidity standards have proven to be important in reducing a bank’s probability of
default.
Fourthly, another relevant issue is whether regulators should target banks as
contributors to (reducing moral hazard) or as participants of (making individual
banks safer) systemic risk. Finally, to enhance the effectiveness of measuring
systemic risk, there is a need for improved data availability and quality as
discussed previously.
In summary, continued progress is needed for policy-makers to improve their
understanding of macro-prudential regulation. They need to move towards a more
harmonised approach, improve identification of which financial institutions to target
with regulation and enhance data availability and quality.
3.7 Summary
In this paper, a systematic literature review was conducted to identify pre-2000
measures of systemic risk, with the intention to obtain a better understanding of
systemic risk, how it is measured and regulated. Since 2000, and more so following
the 2007 financial crisis, there has been an over-abundance of different definitions,
sources and measures of systemic risk. The main challenge regarding measuring
systemic risk, is that there is no single definition and the wide range of measures
developed provides no consistency in understanding systemic risk. In other words,
the definition of systemic risk changes depending on what the proposed method to
measure systemic risk actually captures. Ultimately, these measures only address
specific aspects of systemic risk. The more recent measures are moving in the right
direction to create more holistic measure of the institutions and market by
incorporating a range of idiosyncratic and market indicators. Without
macro-prudential regulation, policy-makers will continue to focus on individual
institutions which are incapable of withstanding shocks or which fail to address
issues arising from contagion. However, further research into which indicators are
the most reliable in a global context would be of obvious benefit.
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3.8 Chapter Appendix
For all the author calculations within chapter 3, the top 20 US (and European in
the case of CISS) banks was derived from the exchanged listed banks based on
market capitalisation as of the 2nd January 2007. This is prior to the financial
crisis which caused significant changes to the market capitalisation of the banks in
the sample. The observation period is between 1988 and 2015.
In order to estimate CISS for both the US and Europe, a portfolio of indexes was
created within Bloomberg Professional Service PORT function (and their historic
simulation capability) applying a similar data and method to Hollo et al. (2012).
The following data was all obtained from Bloomberg Professional Service:
• Bond Market data
– Realised volatility of the US and German 10-year benchmark government
bond index. Germany was selected as this countries bond was used by
Hollo et al. (2012)
– Yield spread between the above government bonds and the A-rated non-
financial corporations within that country (10-year maturity)
– 10-year interest rate swap spreads bracket
• Equity Market data
– Realised volatility of the S&P500 and Euronext 100, non-financial sector
stock market index
• Financial Intermediaries data
– Yield spread between A-rated financial and non-financial corporations
(10-year maturity)
– Realised volatility of the idiosyncratic equity return of the US and
European bank sector index over the respective market indexes
(S&P500 and Euronext 100)
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• Foreign Exchange Market data
– Realised volatility of the Euro exchange rate vis-a`-vis the US dollar
• Money Market data
– Realised volatility of the 3-month Euribor rate and 3-month Fed Funds
rate
– Interest rate spread between 3-month Euribor and 3-month French T-
bills rate (Europe CISS). France was selected as this countries T-bill was
used by Hollo et al. (2012)
– Interest rate spread between 3-month Fed Funds rate and 3-month US
Government T-bill rate (US CISS)
In order to estimate DIP (Figure 3.2), a similar methodology to X. Huang et
al. (2009) was applied using MatLab15a code obtained from Bisias, Flood, Lo, and
Valavanis (2012). The method to estimate DIP is two fold, firstly a probability
of default is required and secondly a forward looking correlation metrics. For the
probability of default data rather than using the method explained in X. Huang et al.
(2009), this was obtained using Bloomberg Professional Services DRSK function. See
Leeney (2015) for the methodology, this data has been used by a number of authors
such as Cetina and Loudis (2016); Cetina, Paddrik, and Rajan (2017); Laurent,
Sestier, and Thomas (2016); Nirei, Sushko, and Caballero (2016) inter alia. This
default likelihood model is based on the Merton distance-to-default (DD) measure
(Merton, 1974), along with additional economically and statistically relevant factors.
To produce the forward looking correlation metrics X. Huang et al. (2009)’s method
was applied using the geometric return for the top 20 US banks in Stata12. Then
both were combined in MatLab15a to obtain DIP.
MES (in Figure 3.3) is defined as the average return of its equity (Ri) during the
worst 5% of days of an overall market return (Rm), where the market is proxied by
the S&P500 index. The following equation is applied:
MESb =
1
Numberofdays
∑
T
Rit
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Where T is the system is in its 5% tail. Weekly geometric return of the banks as a
portfolio and the S&P500 were used. Equation 3.8 was calculated using Stata12.
In estimations CoVaR (see Figure 3.3) weekly bank (as a portfolio) equity returns
were used as well as the following US Country level data:
• 3 Month Repurchase Agreement Rate
• 3 Month Treasury Bill Rate
• Weekly return in the 10 year and 3 month Treasury Bill spread
• Weekly return in the Chicago Board Options Exchange SPX Volatility Index
(VIX)
• Weekly return in the S&P500
Note all returns were geometric, all data was collected from Bloomberg Professional
Service. CoVaR was calculated following the methodology discussed earlier (see
equation 3.4.3) using the Econometrics Toolbox within MatLab15a.
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Chapter 4
Banking Efficiency Determinants
Abstract
The aim of this paper is threefold, firstly to conduct an empirical literature review
on the banking sector efficiency over the last two decades, thereby identifying
banking level risk and regulatory variables used to assess cost efficiency. Secondly,
apply Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
to measure efficiency within the Basel jurisdictions banks. Thirdly, to investigate
the cost efficiency of United States banking sector by employing System
Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) regression analysis on a panel data of
233 commercial banks over the period of 2000 to 2015. This paper found that: (i)
within the GMM analysis econometric measures of efficiency provided more
statistically significant regression models than when using accounting based
measures of efficiency; (ii) credit and liquidity risk is negatively associated with
cost efficiency; and that (iii) regulations designed to mitigate these risks also
negatively affect efficiency.
JEL Classification: G21, D24, N20
4.1 Introduction
As financial institutions have changed over the decades from the traditional
transformation business model to a more contemporary and diverse model the
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comparison of productive performance has become more difficult. Further the
regulation landscape across the banking sector has transformed at both
transnational and domestic levels, changing the market structure via the likes of
consolidation and opening new markets to foreign banks. This provided new
challenges to academics and regulators, to answer what factors are key to growth
and productivity of banks. It may not always be possible for a financial institution
to ever become fully efficient, because several of the inputs may not be under full
control of management. With special reference to the US banking sector1, this
study examines the determinants of cost and productivity efficiency2 among US
bank holding companies (BHCs). Applying the two most commonly used
measures, the non-parametric, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the
parametric, Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides on overview
of the theoretical concept of banking efficiency and covers a broad range of
empirical findings. Section 4.3 outlines this paper’s research hypotheses derived
from the gaps or inconclusive evidence highlighted in the empirical literature
review. Section 4.4 contains two steps, first of all, it provides a discussion of the
main parametric and non-parametric methods of calculating efficiency, as well as
applying these approaches to the data. Then, step two discusses the generalized
method of moments (GMM) regression methodology and the variables used to
identify the determinants of bank efficiency. Section 4.5 discusses the main
findings in the context of the US Banks. Finally, Section 4.6 summarises this
paper’s findings.
1This is due to data availability amongst the full Basel jurisdictions sample, efficiency scores
were also calculated for Japanese, Indonesian and French Banks.
2These types of efficiency are chosen over profit efficiency due to the assumption that banks
need to enhance cost efficiency to survive. Further not all financial institutions types are motivated
by profitability.
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4.2 Theoretical and Empirical Framework
According to the organisational literature, market competition is considered to
improve a firm’s efficiency (Tirole, 1988). Historically, the literature on banking
efficiency is extensive dating back to Hicks (1935) seminal article which proposed
the quiet life hypothesis. This argues that under monopolistic competition, senior
management tend to relax and become increasingly wasteful of economic profit via
discretional expenses. Leibenstein (1966) in proposing the liquidation hypothesis
claimed that as competition increases (moves away from monopolistic)
management face pressure to increase efficiency. In contrast to these hypotheses
Demsetz (1973) introduced the relative market power hypothesis which advocates
that the banks’ market power (reduced competition) has a positive influence on
efficiency. Haber and Perotti (2008) noted that weaker institutions impede bank
efficiency negatively due to restrictions that prevent them from attracting funds in
the cheapest way or allocate them to the more profitable investment projects.
4.2.1 Empirical Literature
There has been a plethora of empirical research conducted within the banking
efficiency area over the past decades. Berger and Humphrey (1997) identified 130
studies that applied frontier efficient analysis to financial institutions from 21
countries. They were unable to reach a consensus, due to the various efficiency
methods used producing contrasting results. This seminal paper paved the way for
further research to improve banking efficiency theory and empirical research,
consistency, accuracy and usefulness. Earlier studies tended to focus on frontier
efficiency techniques, however since then research within banking efficiency has
tended to focus on methodology advances and what factors influence efficiency
scores. Recently, Bhatia, Basu, Mitra, and Dash (2018) conducted a similar
exercise to Berger and Humphrey (1997) and identified 11 different broad themes
from 103 studies spanning 19 years (1998-2017). The remainder of this section
highlights a range of empirical findings covering a number of themes relevant to
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this study3. This empirical literature review does not address efficiency within the
Islamic banking sectors, for a comprehensive review of this literature see Hassan
and Aliyu (2018).
Efficiency and Market Consolidation/Structure
Banking consolidation can impact efficiency in numerous ways, generally
management seek consolidation to enhance the bank’s current position. There are
numerous motivations to engage in merger and acquisition (M&A) activity for
example, access to new markets, increase market share, benefit from economies of
scale and rescue a failing institution.
Caiazza, Pozzolo, and Trovato (2016) asserted that banks with higher cost to
income ratios (lower efficiency) engage in domestic M&A while efficient banks
measured by SFA engage in cross-border M&A. Al-Sharkas, Hassan, and Lawrence
(2008) applied for both DEA & SFA (for cost and profit efficiency) to a sample of
440 US bank mergers (between 1986-2002). Their empirical evidence indicated
that merged banks lowered their costs due of technical efficiency4 and allocative
efficiency (mergers lowered the inputs into the efficiency models). Thus, providing
economic rationale for mergers to take place. Further, following the merger the
efficient bank was able to help improve the input efficiency of the weaker bank,
which is further economic rationale as stability of the weaker bank was enhanced.
Du and Sim (2016) found similar results in a panel of six emerging countries, the
M&A led to cost efficiency improvements (measured by DEA) but the target banks
tended to be more efficient after an M&A but no efficiency improvements were
found for the acquiring banks. Alternatively, in evidence from the Greek banking
industry, Halkos and Tzeremes (2013) found that M&A between efficient banks
does not necessarily result in an overall more efficient bank.
Subsequently consolidation alters the shape of the market and the size of the
3Using similar classifications as Bhatia et al. (2018) which have sought to identify determinants
of banking efficiency.
4A DEA Malmquist Index was produced to observe trends, these results concluded merged
banks experience greater productivity growth.
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financial institutions. For example, Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran (2009) found
that in Asian countries, country-specific conditions such as market concentration
appeared to have unfavourable influences on efficiency. As the size and diversity of
an institution increases this will add extra challenges to managers to enhance
efficiency. Rossi, Schwaiger, and Winkler (2009) found that diversification
negatively affects SFA cost efficiency in Austrian banks, however it does enhance
profit efficiency and reduces bank risk. In the context of Australian banks
(1995-2002) Kirkwood and Nahm (2006) found cost efficiency via DEA Malmquist
index has improved over time in major banks however smaller/regional banks
experience little improvement. Further, it could be observed that efficiency scores
are reflective of equity returns. Paul and Kourouche (2008) assessing a different
time (1997-2005) found alternatively that medium-size Australian banks
outperformed both smaller and larger banks in terms of efficiency improvement
(smaller banks’ efficiency mainly deteriorated). Further their results suggested the
mergers between large banks may reduce overall efficiency, however they advocated
for smaller banks to increase consolidation to improve their declining efficiency
scores. Similar evidence was found by Ariff and Luc (2008) in the Chinese banking
system as medium-sized institutions were significantly more efficient than smaller
and larger banks. Contrastingly, earlier in China X. Zhao (2000) found that larger
and smaller banks were more efficient. Within transitional European Union
countries, Stavarek (2006) investigated whether the degree of economic integration
and development increased banking efficiency (via DEA), finding that large banks
were largely inefficient. Using a similar sample Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005)
found that foreign owned banks were more cost efficient via SFA. Also Kyj and Isik
(2008) applied DEA to a panel of 150 Ukraine banks and concluded that larger
banks dominated via managerial efficiency however smaller banks increasingly
improved efficiency throughout the observation period (1998-2003). Given, that
the Ukraine is a transitional economy they suggested that the consolidation of
smaller banks could enhance efficiency (by benefiting from economies of scale) and
attract foreign owned joint-venture to further improve efficiency. These findings
indicates that just focusing on size does not fully explain efficiency differences.
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Efficiency and Ownership
Ownership type plays a significant role in explaining bank efficiency (T.-T. Fu,
Juo, Chiang, Yu, & Huang, 2016). Ownership structure, which influences
management can result in different levels of banks efficiency. For example,
institutions under state intervention/ownership could tend to be less efficient
(Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009). Reasons for this include: (i) state owned
institutions tend to be overstaffed, this was very common within communist
regimes (Abarbanell & Meyendorff, 1997; Kyj & Isik, 2008); (ii) the institutions
motivation may not be to increase profitability but to provide a public service; (iii)
also state intervention may be in reaction to bank failure. The majority of studies
that investigate ownership structure and efficiency tend to be conducted in Asia
due to the varied ownership styles and tend to be dominated by state-ownership.
Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009) found that the reduction in stated ownership of
banks in China during their reforms increased the role of foreign ownership and
was strongly favourable to both cost and profit efficiency. Also the authors found
that the big four Chinese banks5 were the least profit efficient due to poor revenue
performance and high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs). This was also
evidenced by Ariff and Luc (2008) who applied a nonparametric measure of cost
and profit efficiency to 28 Chinese banks. After applying Tobit regression, their
findings suggested that joint-owned banks (national and city-based) on average
appeared to be more cost and profit efficient than state-owned banks. Laurenceson
and Qin (2008) also found this relationship using DEA cost efficiency in 65
Chinese banks between 2001-06, albeit not statistically significant.
Contrastingly, Xiaogang, Skully, and Brown (2005) also applied DEA (to 43
Chinese banks) but found that state banks showed a relatively higher efficiency
score than joint equity and foreign investment banks. Further, they advocated that
technical efficiency tends to dominate over allocative efficiency in China. This
implies that banks need to enhance their ability to choose cost minimisation
5Namely, The China Construction Bank, The Bank of China, The Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China and The Agricultural Bank of China.
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inputs. Within Asian banks, Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran (2009) noted that it is
not just ownership, but management background which impacts efficiency.
Applying a combined approach of DEA and SFA methodology the authors found
that bank restructuring does not necessarily enhance efficiency. In general,
domestic managers appear to have a positive impact on efficiency, suggesting that
domestic banks are more likely to have local advantage over foreign banks, despite
relaxed regulations encouraging foreign bank penetration at the time of the Asian
crisis.
In the context of India, Sahoo and Tone (2009) found that following the Indian
reforms in the late 1990s, increased competition generated higher banking sector
efficiency (via DEA) and that private banks outperformed nationalised banks in
cost minimisation behaviours. Also, Jaffry, Ghulam, and Cox (2013) asserted that
over an 18 year time frame that sector average DEA efficiency improved
throughout the Indian reforms, advocating the benefits of opening the market to
foreign owned banks or foreign direct investment in the banking sector.
Investigating of efficiency in India by applying DEA, Kumar and Gulati (2008)
found that the exposure to off-balance-sheet items, employee productivity, market
share/size were major explanatory factors of this efficiency measure. However, this
study was conducted on a small sample of 27 banks over two years later. Kumar
and Gulati (2009a) analysed a larger timescale (1992 to 2006) and compared
before and after the banking reforms; similarly to their previous research they
found technical efficiency was enhanced6 due to staff productivity and increased
off-balance-sheet activity, however this time, recovery of non-performing loans was
significant. Building on this further7 Kumar and Gulati (2009b) found that size,
profitability and off-balance-sheet activity were the most influential determinants
of technical efficiency, also noting no significant differences between public and
private sector efficiency. Similarly Fujii, Managi, and Matousek (2014) found that
efficiency does vary between different ownership types in Indian banks. Elsewhere,
6T. Zhao, Casu, and Ferrari (2010) found similar regarding technological progress in India
following the reforms, however this did not translate into efficiency gains.
7Analysed 51 Indian domestic banks in 2006/7.
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in the context of Malaysia, Sufian (2007) found that domestic Islamic banks were
marginally more efficient than their foreign counterparts. Also, In the context of
Indonesia, Shaban and James (2018) found that state-owned banks tend to be less
profitable and more exposed to risk than private and foreign banks. In the event of
consolidation, domestic investors tend to select the best performers for acquisition,
which results in an overall reduction in both cost and profit efficiency of the
acquired bank.
Where ownership is via majority publicly listed, numerous studies have sought
to assess the impact of efficiency on shareholder value. Using DEA for cost
efficiency Beccalli, Casu, and Girardone (2006) found that the more cost efficient
banks equity-price performance tended to outperform their inefficient counterparts,
in the Western European market. However, such a trend was not as clear when
SFA efficiency was used. Further, explanatory variables such as size, risk and
profitability did not significantly increase their models’ power. In contrast, again
using Western European data, Fiordelisi (2008) found that profit efficiency was
better at explaining variations in shareholder value than cost efficiency. Further,
SFA cost efficiency estimations performed better than DEA estimations at
explaining shareholder value. Banks’ ownership structures that differ depending on
country was found to be more statistically significant in explaining shareholder
value rather than efficiency (irrespective of SFA or DEA calculation). Guzman and
Reverte (2008) also applied the DEA Malmquist index technique to a small sample
of Spanish banks to find that the banks with higher efficiency and productivity
change have greater shareholder value (even after controlling for conditional
performance measures such as ROA).
Efficiency and Risk
Within the efficiency literature, banking risk is an emerging theme (Bhatia et al.,
2018) with several studies investigating the interplay of risk and bank efficiency.
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Diallo (2018) advocated that during crisis periods8 efficient banks are more
resilient to credit shocks within a cross country sample, and stressed the
importance of efficiency to improve the financial sector. Earlier, Uchida and
Satake (2009) evidenced that banks with higher deposit bases in Japan were more
SFA cost efficient, suggesting that deposit does have a significant role to play
within ensuring bank management discipline. The Moral Hazard hypothesis
(Jeitschko & Jeung, 2005) suggests banks with higher capital adequacy have lower
motivation to engage in more risky practices. Therefore, if the probability of
default (PD) or NPL losses is lowered then in turn this leads to higher efficiency.
Chiu, Jan, Shen, and Wang (2008) found using Taiwanese banks that on average
efficiency scores were higher for banks with higher capital adequacy, implying that
banks with better financial status and lower relative risk operate more efficiently.
Similarly, Wang and Huang (2007) found that an increase in non-performing loans
to total loans reduces bank efficiency in Taiwan banks. However, within the
Taiwanese and Chinese banking systems other environmental factors (e.g. GDP
and inflation) should be explored (M.-Y. Huang & Fu, 2013). Sun and Chang
(2011), using Asian bank panel data, found that different measures of risk (credit,
operational and market risk) lead to significant changes to SFA cost efficiency,
both level and variability. Similarly, Inanoglu, Jacobs, Liu, and Sickles (2016),
using a frontier efficiency estimation for US TBTF banks between 1994 to 2013,
found that credit, liquidity and market risks hampers cost efficiency. Further,
effects vary across countries and time. Moving this research area forward Silva,
Guerra, Tabak, and de Castro Miranda (2016) relate network measures (see
Section 3.4.4 for a discussion) from interbank activities9 to banking SFA profit and
cost efficiency as well as risk. Their found that the core—periphery structure
contributes to better cost efficiency levels, however, they did not find any
significant evidence regarding affects to profit efficiency.
8Typically, literature usually identifies the influence of crisis on bank efficiency by introducing
the dummy variables into their model (Diallo, 2018; Luo, Tanna, & De Vita, 2016).
9In particular how compliant is the financial network to a core–periphery (similar to Figure
3.8e) structure.
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Financial innovation was seen as one of the numerous factors that changed
traditional business banking models in the lead up to the financial crisis (Beck,
Chen, Lin, & Song, 2016) influencing bank risks as well as banking efficiency.
Limited empirical studies have been conducted regarding the influence of
innovation on efficiency, typically making extensive use of subjective proxies for
innovation10. Using a unique data set, Duygun, Sena, and Shaban (2013) provided
an interesting insight into this relationship, they found that product innovation
(using trademarks registrations as a proxy) in the UK, resulted in reducing SFA
cost and profit efficiency. Suggesting that innovation in the short-term can be a
costly process, however they then found that if trademark intensity increases
(increased competition) in the sector banks react by improving their own
efficiencies. Developing on this work, Duygun, Sena, and Shaban (2014) clarified
that banks that participate in trademarking appear to be more profit efficient than
banks that do not, whilst there was no significant difference between cost efficiency
scores. Applying the Malmquist productivity efficiency measure, Duygun, Sena,
and Shaban (2016) found a positive relationship between innovation and
productivity efficiency, however, the financial crisis altered this relationship which
still persisted until 2016.
Efficiency and Regulation
As well as internal factors, external factors outside of management control, such as
economic influences (typical cycles and times of crisis) and regulation change will
also influence banking efficiency levels. For example, M.-Y. Huang and Fu (2013)
warned in the context of Taiwan that environmental factors play a significant role in
explaining bank cost frontier efficiency. Further, external influences like regulation
may have a long implementation timetable therefore effects may take a while to be
fully felt at bank level. Within the context of Germany and Austria, Hauner (2005)
found that cost efficiency and productivity on average did not improve following a
period of deregulation and bank mergers, suggesting it takes a considerable amount
10Typically diversification indicators are used as a proxy for innovation (Rossi et al., 2009).
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of time for efficiency gains to materialise. Similar results were found using US data
post the de-regulations period by Mukherjee, Ray, and Miller (2001).
Table 4.1 highlights the differing empirical findings regarding how efficiency
scores are affected by different types of regulation increase. In summary, although
many countries have followed the Basel guidelines, existing evidence on the impact
of Basel Accords on bank efficiency is mixed. Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) found
that bank efficiency is affected by level of oversight from one supervisor. The
authors found that profit efficiency is reduced when their central bank is required
to supervise more financial sectors. Further, if the central bank is independent this
also results in reduced bank profit efficiency. The quality of the regulating body
has also been shown to impact banking efficiency. Applying SFA to a panel of
circa 8000 banks from 136 countries, Lensink and Meesters (2014) evidenced that
banks operating in countries with a better regulatory environment apply more
cost-reducing technologies and can use existing technology more efficiently.
Contrastingly to Table 4.1, applying DEA efficiency to a sample of 715 banks
from 95 countries in 200311, Pasiouras (2008) found no robust impact of regulation
on efficiency, however, noting that several countries, specific characteristics were
sufficiently related to efficiency12. The authors results did support the introduction
of the Basel II regulations as in most cases it enhanced the banking system under
all three pillars.
11The authors claimed data limitations for not allowing them to use time series or panel data,
previously J. R. Barth, Caprio Jr, and Levine (2004) claimed this was a major issue for cross
country empirical research.
12Market capitalisation to GDP, bank claims to GDP, branches and ATMs relative to population,
ownership and market concentration.
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Table 4.1: Regulations impact on efficiency
Author Method Supervision
Power
Capital
Requirements
Activity
Restrictions
Market
Discipline
Transparency
Pasiouras, Tanna,
and Zopounidis
(2009)
Using SFA on 615 commercial banks
from 74 countries
Profit & Cost
Efficiency ⇑
Cost Efficiency ⇑ Profit & Cost
Efficiency ⇑
Profit & Cost
Efficiency ⇑
Lozano-Vivas and
Pasiouras (2010)
Using SFA on 752 commercial banks
from 87 counties
Profit & Cost
Efficiency ⇑
Profit & Cost
Efficiency ⇑
Chortareas,
Girardone, and
Ventouri (2012)
Using DEA on 5227 commercial banks
from 22 EU countries
Productivity
Efficiency ⇓
Productivity
Efficiency ⇑
Productivity
Efficiency ⇓
J. R. Barth, Lin,
Ma, Seade, and
Song (2013)
Using DEA on 4050 banks in 72
countries
Cost Efficiency ⇑ Cost Efficiency ⇑ Cost Efficiency ⇓ Cost Efficiency ⇑
T.-H. Lee and Chih
(2013)
Using DEA on 242 commercial banks in
China
Profit Efficiency ⇓
Manlagnit (2015) Using SFA on 17 commercial banks in
the Philippines
Cost Efficiency ⇓ Cost Efficiency ⇑ Not significant in
explaining Cost
Efficiency
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A number of authors have investigated the opposite, how increased financial
openness (deregulation) influences efficiency. Chortareas, Girardone, and Ventouri
(2013) using a sample of EU countries found that banks within countries that have
higher degrees of financial freedom have higher overall efficiency and benefit from
cost advantages. Further, this is more prevalent in countries with freer political
systems and enhanced governance. Hermes and Meesters (2015) found similar
results from a wider multi-country analysis (61 countries), where overall their
results showed that financial liberalisation programmes are positively correlated
with increased bank efficiency (measured by SFA). However, this positive
relationship is conditional on the quality of bank regulation and supervision.
Suggesting that if countries liberalise their financial markets without putting in
place strong institution level regulation, liberalization could decrease efficiency.
Also Luo et al. (2016) warned that financial openness increases bank risk, without
mediation from profit efficiency channels, thus profit efficiency may be enhanced
but other factors still enhance bank risk levels. Due to the recent financial crisis
Chortareas, Girardone, and Ventouri (2011) warns that the existing approach to
identify the impact of regulation and supervision on bank efficiency may not be
useful due to its interaction with the outputs. From a practical point of view as
previously noted, the level of regulation (e.g. capital requirements) or supervision
scrutiny impact the levels of both deposits and total loans.
4.3 Research Hypotheses
This section outlines the research hypotheses that will be under consideration in this
paper, bearing in mind identified gaps and inclusive evidence noted in the empirical
literature and the aims of this paper.
Hypothesis 1: The use of econometric calculations of efficiency is superior to
traditional accounting measures.
This hypothesis suggests that the use of SFA or DEA as a measure of
efficiency within regression analysis is superior to using traditional
accounting based measures of efficiency such as the Cost to Income Ratio.
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Hypothesis 2: Business model diversification has a negative impact on efficiency.
This hypothesis suggests that as a financial institution increases its
diversification (altering the intermediation process) this negatively affects
cost efficiency. This hypothesis will be tested using US bank panel data,
which to the best of my knowledge has not been addressed.
Hypothesis 3: Increased credit risk has a negative impact on efficiency.
This hypothesis suggests that as financial institutions face increased credit risk
this negatively affects their cost efficiency due to the impact on outputs. This
hypothesis will be tested using US bank panel data, which to the best of my
knowledge has not been addressed.
Hypothesis 4: Increased capital requirement regulation enhances efficiency.
This hypothesis suggests that as financial institutions face increased pressure
from regulators to reduce credit risk this positively affects their cost efficiency
due to the impact on outputs. This hypothesis will be tested using US bank
panel data, which to the best my of knowledge has not have been addressed
before.
Simultaneous rejection of H3 and H4 would indicate that credit risk regulation
may not be optimal given the detrimental impact on cost efficiency.
Hypothesis 5: Increased liquidity has a negative impact on efficiency.
This hypothesis suggests that as financial institutions increase their liquidity
position, this hampers cost efficiency, due to the opportunity cost nature of
holding more liquid reserves. This hypothesis will be tested using US bank
panel data, which to the best my knowledge has not been addressed before.
4.4 Methodology and Data
Holistically, there are three main widely accepted approaches to examining
efficiency within the banking sector; production, profitability and intermediation
(Eskelinen & Kuosmanen, 2013). The input and output units under assessment
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differ between approaches13, namely, the production approach uses input units
such as labour and capital, to generate output services of deposits and loans. The
profitability approach examines how efficiently its cost factors are in creating
revenues and the intermediation approach considers the units as an in-between
that accumulates funds for loans and other income activities. This paper follows
the intermediation approach, suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977), to define the
input and output variables. The input and the output variables considered for
observation are not only those commonly found in the banking efficiency empirical
literature, in this case similar to Kosˇak and Zajc (2006) inter alia. This approach
treats a bank as an intermediary, which receive funds from depositor or savers and
transforms those funds into profitable assets (loans and other earning assets).
Accordingly, the input consists of total costs, which consists of personnel expenses,
other administrative expenses and other operating expenses. Following the
estimation model proposed by Kuosmanen (2012) the outputs consist of (i) Other
Earning Assets, (ii) Total Loans and (iii) Total Deposits (see Table 4.2 for details).
Further the choice of such output variables came from the value-added approach
(Berger, Hanweck, & Humphrey, 1987). In order to control for the bank’s
heterogeneity and their operating environments several contextual variables are
included within the cost function.
Despite the large amount of research within this area the definitions of the banks’
input and output are still controversial, especially the ongoing debate to whether
deposits should be treated as an input or output (Degl’Innocenti, Kourtzidis,
Sevic, & Tzeremes, 2017). Typically, deposits are classed as an input during
intermediation approach and an output for production approach14 (An, Chen, Wu,
& Liang, 2015; Holod & Lewis, 2011). However, similar to Kuosmanen (2012) and
Molyneux and Williams (2013) inter alia this paper takes the position that
customers’ deposits are an output because customers purchase deposit accounts
from financial institutions for the service they provide (i.e. storage and payment
13Input and output selection is important as different selections can produce contrasting efficiency
scores (Das & Ghosh, 2006).
14Sealey and Lindley (1977) provide the traditional theoretical discussion of both approaches.
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Table 4.2: Efficiency Calculation Variables
Symbol Variable
Name
Description
TC Total Cost The total sum of personnel expenses, other
administrative expenses and other operating
expenses (S. Kasman & Kasman, 2015)
OEA Other Earning
Assets
The total sum of marketable securities, short-
term investments, interbank assets, long-term
investments and long-term receivables
TLOAN Total Loans The total sum of loans including, commercial
loans, consumer loans and other loans
Deposits Total Deposits Total deposits (including term deposits) received
from customers
mechanism) and that incur costs in maintaining deposits. Furthermore, as this
paper tests determinants within the US banking sector, it is common for US
customers to pay a fee to have a deposit account. The above input and output will
be used to calulate cost efficiency which this study focuses on rather than profit
efficiency. As Garc´ıa-Cestona and Surroca (2008) warned the assumptions that
banks are only focused on profit maximisation is one amongst several goals, the
widespread use of profit efficiency measures as the only comparative performance
may prove to be insufficient in certain contexts. Further, the argument that banks
need to enhance cost efficiency in order to generate profit or ultimately survive is
plausible. Also, Ariff and Luc (2008) found that within previous literature profit
efficiency levels tend to be well below cost efficiency levels, therefore suggesting
profit efficiency is subject to wider factors outside of managements control.
Further, Pasiouras et al. (2009) noted that cost efficient banks are not necessarily
profit efficient. A downside to selecting cost efficiency is that it tends to neglect
banks’ operating revenues and loan losses implications (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou,
2009). In contrast, Guevara and Maudos (2002) argue that analysis of cost
efficiency alone would offer only a partial view of bank efficiency and it is
important to analyse profit efficiency as well.
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There are many different approaches to evaluate intermediation efficiency
within banks. Traditional approaches included the analysis of financial indicators
or accounting ratios such as costs to income ratio15. Cost to Income Ratio (CIR)
also known as the Efficiency Ratio is an approximation for managerial quality. The
CIR ratio is a key financial measure, particularly important in valuing banks. It
shows a company’s costs in relation to its income. To calculate the ratio, divide
the operating costs (administrative and fixed costs, such as salaries and property
expenses, but not bad debts that have been written off) by operating income. The
ratio gives investors an indication of how efficiently the firm is being run. A lower
CIR value indicates better managerial quality. Changes in the ratio can also
highlight potential problems: if the ratio rises from one period to the next, it
means that costs are rising at a higher rate than income, which could suggest that
the company has taken its eye off the ball in the drive to attract more business.
The modern approaches focus on economic efficiency analysis calculation via
parametric, non-parametric or hybrid techniques. Abuzayed, Molyneux, and
Al-Fayoumi (2009) suggested information regarding the banks’ efficiency calculated
via econometric analysis, rather than traditional financial statement information,
can help close the gap between book value and market valuations. The inefficiency
of a bank is measured in terms of that banks deviation from a best practice
(frontier) within the industry. This study will use the two most commonly used
measures as highlighted in Section 4.2, the non-parametric, DEA and the
parametric SFA. In a brief summary, the main advantages of SFA over DEA are
that (i) it distinguishes between inefficient and other stochastic shocks in the
estimation of efficiency scores (Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007) and (ii) this
approach uses estimated averages parameter values, thus, it is not sensitive to
large data changes at the firm level. The two main limitations of SFA are the need
for assumptions regarding efficiency distribution and the functional form of the
frontier, which are not necessary in DEA. Previous studies have found a
relationship between SFA and DEA scores but a lack of robustness between the
15Typically financial institutions focused on reducing their cost to income ratio as a proxy of
cost efficiency (Beccalli et al., 2006).
133
parametric and non-parametric approaches16 (Al-Sharkas et al., 2008; Fiordelisi,
2008; Weill, 2004), therefore studies should compare efficiency scores from both
techniques. In evaluating the SFA & DEA scores persistence Eisenbeis, Ferrier,
and Kwan (1999) and Wang and Huang (2007) found scores were statistically
stable over time.
4.4.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
The parametric SFA approach originated from two innovative papers by Meeusen
and Van den Broeck (1977) and Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) who sought to
captures best practice to gauge inefficiency purely by observation of best practise
within the sample of banks tested. This approach however does not necessarily
represent a best-possible practice (Berger & Mester, 1997) depending on the
sample size or selection bias. This empirical methodolgy was later operationalised
by Battese, Rao, and O’Donnell (2004) and O’Donnell, Rao, and Battese (2008).
SFA is a form of regression which separates the influence of exogenous factors on
the dependent variable, from the measurement error (noise) and firm inefficiency is
captured in the error term. The error term in SFA, consists of two components,
one is a two-sided random error that represents noise, the other is a one-sided error
representing inefficiency. The noise is assumed to be normally distributed with a
zero mean and for cost inefficiency the error is assumed to be positively
half-distributed. As this is a structural approach the selection of the environment
and bank characteristic variables to determine best practice is particularly
important (Mester, 2008). To ensure SFA is appropriate the structural form
imposed on the analysis also has to reflect the firms’ behaviour. Theoretically
within a panel data framework (Feng & Serletis, 2009), the cost frontier model can
be written as:
Cit = f(Xit,ρ)τitζit, i = 1, . . . , I, t = 1, . . . T (4.4.1)
16On the contrary Olgu and Weyman-Jones (2008) evidence suggested consistency between
parametric and non-parametric for 10 old EU countries and 12 new EU countries’ banking systems
(164 Banks).
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This model decomposes the observed total cost (Cit) for firm i at time t, into three
elements. Firstly is the actual frontier f(Xit,ρ), dependent on Xit, which is the
vector of, input prices and output quantities (exogenous variables), and ρ, which is a
vector of parameters, that represents the minimum possible cost of producing a given
level of output for a certain input. Secondly a non-negative term τit ≥ 117, measures
firm-specific inefficiency. Lastly the random error ζit, captures the statistical noise.
The deterministic kernel of the cost frontier is f(Xit,ρ), and the stochastic cost
frontier is f(Xit,ρ)ζit. As required by microeconomic theory, f(Xit,ρ) is a linearly
homogeneous and concave function in prices and also non-decreasing in both input
prices and outputs. Following common practice in this literature it is assumed that
f(Xit,ρ) is a log-linear function form. The stochastic cost function in (4.4.1) can
be rewritten as:
cit = α + x
′
itβ + εit (4.4.2)
where cit = lnCit and α+x
′
itβ = ln f(Xit,ρ). The composite error term εit = uit+υit
consists of two parts, νit is a two-sided normal disturbance term with zero mean and
variance σ2ν and represents the effects of statistical noise; the inefficiency term υit
is assumed to be half-normally distributed. Thus, uit = ln τit ≥ 0 and υit = ln ζit.
Further in equation 4.4.2 xit is the counterpart of Xit with the input prices and
output quantities transformed to logarithms, β is a K× 1 vector of parameters and
α is the intercept. Following the most commonly used functional form in the bank
efficiency literature to identify a frontier, a transcendental logarithmic (translog)
form is applied. The empirical cost frontier model is as follows:
lnTCi,t = α +
∑
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∑
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2
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∑
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βjkyijtyikt
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ψmt ln yimt lnwijt + ϕ1 lnEit +
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2
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it +
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λm ln yimt lnEit
+
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j
ξj lnwijt lnEit + θ1T + θ2T
2 +
∑
m
κm ln yimtT +
∑
j
ρj lnwijtT
+ η lnEitT + lnOEA+ lnTLOAN + lnDeposits+ υit + νit (4.4.3)
17The cost efficiency is defined as CEit = 1/exp(u) and takes a value between 0 and 1.
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Where the dependent variable lnTCi,t is the observed total costs (personnel
expenses, other administrative expenses and other operating expenses) of bank i at
time t. yi and wi are vectors of output and inputs for the ith bank
18. Ei is the
total equity of a bank (which is treated as a quasi-fixed input)19; T is the time
trend used to capture technological changes; and lnOEA, lnTLOAN &
lnDeposits is the natural logarithm of Other Earning Assets, Total Loans and
Total Deposits respectively. As previously stated, νit is a two-sided normal
disturbance term with zero mean and variance σ2ν and represents the effects of
statistical noise; the inefficiency term υit is assumed to be half-normally
distributed20. α, β, γ, ψ, ϕ, λ, ξ, θ, κ, ρ and η are coefficients to be estimated.
Furthermore, the standard symmetry restrictions, βnm = βmn and γjk = γkj, are
applied.
4.4.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
DEA was formed in Farrell (1957) seminal work and built on by Charnes, Cooper,
and Rhodes (1978), the non-parametric methodology applies linear programming
to measure the distance of individual firms (refered to as Desision Making Units
(DMU)) from the efficient or best practice frontier. In other words, DMUs are
compared to other identified best practice DMUs (Cook & Seiford, 2009). DEA
identifies the inefficiency in firms by comparing it to efficient firms. This is as
oppose to relating a firm’s performance with statistical averages which may not be
relevant to that firm. Also, DEA does not assume any functional structure
imposed on the data in determining efficient firms. DEA allows for multiple inputs
and outputs which are readily available via published financial accounts. Input
18lnTC and input price terms are normalised by the last input price, in order to impose linear
homogeneity of degree one on the input prices.
19Equity capital is treat without any associated price as quasi-fixed in the frontier model this
is because equity levels is more difficult to alter in the short-term (compared to the outputs).
Furthermore, it is used to control for insolvency risk and the different risk preferences of banks.
20Hence in stata12 the true fixed-effects model (Greene, 2005) half-normal distribution for the
inefficiency term method was applied.
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and output weights are endogenously derived, thus avoiding subjective weights or
externally imposed weights from other samples. They are used to produce a
parsimonious scalar estimate where multidimensional interactions are
simultaneously captured (Avkiran, 2013). Mathematical programming eliminates
the impact of market prices and other exogenous components affecting actual bank
performance, as is thus superior over accounting ratios. Wang and Huang (2007)
argue that typical financial ratios from annual reports such as ROA and cost to
revenue are often compounded with other effects irrespective of the managers
performance. Halkos and Salamouris (2004) also advocate that frontier efficiency
estimation via DEA is superior to simple ratio analysis. Most early empirical
studies showed that using DEA to estimate the efficient frontier yielded robust
results (Seiford & Thrall, 1990).
However, DEA does not assume statistical noise and that the data is free of
any measurement errors, which can allow the error term to be attributed to
inefficiency. This is due to DEA assuming random variants to cancel each other.
Further, as the inputs and outputs indicators are relative to the sample, results
can be influenced by idiosyncratic risk such as regional price differences and
extreme observations. Therefore, it is common practice to scrutinise the data for
outliers to reduce the impact of measurement error. Distributions of parameter
estimates are known asymptotically and statistical significance tests such as the
T-test can be designed, however DEA makes no distribution assumption. Horsky
and Nelson (2006) acknowledged this in developing statistical significance tests for
linear programming methods. Further, Asmild and Zhu (2016) warn that
traditional DEA may potentially be biased during crisis period as it does not
control for extreme weights. For example, during the recent financial crisis a
number of institutions, (i) relied on wholesale funding rather than retail funding
(skewing input, price of deposits) (ii) and/or relied on risky asset portfolios via
exposure to the property sector (skewing outputs). In such cases it would be
inappropriate to class these banks as efficient, for the given level of risk. Following
a meta-analysis of the global microfinance efficiency, Fall, Akim, and Wassongma
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(2018) argued that use of SFA should be increased over DEA because it suffers
from inherent weaknesses such as being highly sensitive to the data and sample
size which may lead to biased estimates if there are measurement errors or outliers.
Earlier Staat (2001) also evidenced how DEA efficiency scores can be affected by
various sample sizes.
The DEA production technology constitutes a convex relationship, which is
determined by using piecewise combinations of all efficient banks. Similar to
Koetter and Meesters (2013) a formal program to obtain this set is given by:
min
Θ,λ
Θ
subject to
− yi + Yλ ≥ 0,
Θxi −Xλ ≥ 0,
λ ≥ 0
(4.4.4)
Θ is the component that reflects the efficiency of the DMUi, which is minimized.
Accordingly, the production function is put as far as possible to the outside. yi and
xi are vectors of outputs produced and inputs consumed respectively (the same
output and inputs used in 4.4.1). Y and X are matrices with all the output and
inputs of all DMUs respectively. λ is a weighted vector, which uses the linear
combination of producers corresponding to the lowest Θ. It therefore represents
the vector that measures which DMUs outperforms DMUi21. Fukuyama and Weber
(2009) pointed out that when the optimal solution to the cost function using DEA
allows for slack in the constraints that define the technology efficiency it is possible
to increase at least one output without increasing costs. This may result in two
banks being deemed equally cost efficient even though one may produce more of at
least one output.
21The constant returns to scale assumptions in equation 4.4.4 can be relaxed by factors of the
variables return to scale assumption by adding a convexity constraint (i.e. the sum of the elements
of λ should be equal to 1) (Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell, & Battese, 2005).
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Malmquist Productivity Index using DEA Frontier
Using DEA and the cost efficiency input and outputs highlighted previously
(similar to Al-Sharkas et al. (2008); Duygun et al. (2016); Guzman and Reverte
(2008); Kirkwood and Nahm (2006); Tortosa-Ausina, Grifell-Tatje´, Armero, and
Conesa (2008) inter alia) the Malmquist productivity index (MPI) (Malmquist,
1953) will be used to calculated DEA using the panel data which requires bivariate
density estimation, which was performed via kernel smoothing. The MPI measures
the productivity changes along with time variations and can be decomposed DEA
into changes in efficiency and taking into account of time variants of technology
(Fa¨re, Grosskopf, Norris, & Zhang, 1994). The input oriented geometric mean of
MPI change (similar to Total Factor Productivity change, (TFPCH)), can be
decomposed using the concept of input oriented technical change (TECHCH) and
input oriented efficiency change (EFFCH); while the technical efficiency change
can be further decomposed into scale efficiency change (SECH) and pure technical
efficiency change (PECH) components. Park and Weber (2006) following
Chambers’ (2002) Luenberger productivity indicator, combining EFFCH and
TECHCH obtains a proxy from Productivity growth (ProdGrowth). Boussemart,
Briec, Kerstens, and Poutineau (2003) showed that the Malmquist index is a linear
approximation of the Luenberger indicator of productivity growth, but they did
not discuss their exact relationship. Later Balk, Fa¨re, Grosskopf, and Margaritis
(2008) provided this relationship.
4.4.3 Data
It has been argued that efficiency is better studied and modelled with panels
(Coelli et al., 2005). Panel data provides more degrees of freedom in estimations of
parameters over cross-sectional data. On a practical level panel data allows for
time variations in efficiency scores, internally, this could account for the possibility
that management may learn from previous experiences. Externally, environmental
and regulatory factors can affect banks efficiency overtime. The bank level panel
data for which consolidated financial statements were available, were obtained via
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Bloomberg Professional Service22. The classification of a bank is based on the
industry classification benchmark (Russel, 2018). All individual bank level data
was converted to US dollars for consistency purposes. The Bloomberg Professional
Service applies the foreign exchange rate at the time of the original annual report
publication date. This list of banks was derived from the exchanged listed banks
based on market capitalisation as of the 2nd January 2007. This date is at the
midpoint of the 16 year observation period between 2000 and 2015 and prior to the
financial crisis which caused significant changes to the market capitalisation of the
banks in the sample. The purpose of this time-scale is to capture the determinants
of bank efficiency since the implementation of Basel II (first proposed in June
1999).
The wider panel dataset contains banks from all the 27 Basel jurisdictions.
However, to calculate SFA and DEAs MPI for each individual bank, balanced
datasets were required. Balanced data was required for the input and output,
namely Total Cost (TC), Other Earning Assets (OEA), Total Loans (TLOAN) and
Total Deposit (Deposits). This exercise was conducted on all the banks within the
wider panel, following this SFA was first applied to all jurisdictions balanced data.
Due to sample size and the statistical significance, the 16 years’ worth of efficiency
scores were only calculated for the USA (233 banks), Japan (69), Indonesia (13)
and France (11). See Table 4.3 for a data summary of inputs. Large variations
(large standard deviations) can be seen within these summary tables, however it
reflects 16 years’ worth of data, in which time the banking sectors have grown
substantially. As both techniques compare how each institution performs at
converting inputs to outputs, year on year, to identify best practice each year, the
differences in size do not skew this. Further, the natural log of each variable is
used within the calculations. This approach also aids the suggestion that before
calculating DEA the data should be scrutinised to remove extreme outliers.
22Similar to Altunbas et al. (2017) and other authurs who used Bloomberg data, this research
considers only commercial or universal banks. Hence foreign subsidiaries, investment banks, and
non-bank financial institutions are not included in the sample.
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Table 4.3: Banks level SFA/DEA summary statistics per country
US Banks
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TC ($m) 1200.106 7820.207 2.713 135260
OEA ($m) 8733.598 69294.11 5.564 1020543
TLOAN ($m) 14405.98 79149.43 12.407 975498
Deposits($m) 15604.21 88871.45 22.538 1223312
Observations= 3728, t=16, n=233
Japanese Banks
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TC ($m) 536.011 503.935 51.573 5238.336
OEA ($m) 11290.09 22287.27 395.612 285141.9
TLOAN ($m) 20177.77 16764.61 1887.376 108623
Deposits ($m) 29101.73 28380.97 2456.61 261356.4
Observations= 1104, t=16, n=69
Indonesian Banks
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TC ($m) 841.115 1047.291 3.817 4367.603
OEA ($m) 3817.488 5165.555 5.122 19677.92
TLOAN ($m) 6510.826 9947.407 12.432 43926.27
Deposits ($m) 9139.352 12642.11 1.651 51197.27
Observations= 208, t=16, n=13
French Banks
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TC ($m) 12862.4 22500.22 224.926 104303.7
OEA ($m) 239252 468947.2 298.922 2019302
TLOAN ($m) 113546.9 214733.6 22.293 1036581
Deposits ($m) 102522.1 201951.3 676.831 776467.9
Observations= 176, t=16, n=11
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4.4.4 Efficiency Calculations
The SFA regression using Stata12 (xtfrontier command) was applied to all 27
jurisdictions balanced data individually. The only models with significant efficiency
(ν) were the USA, Japan, Indonesia, and France. Elsewhere, the regression output
was incomplete therefore the coefficients α, β, γ, ψ, ϕ, λ, ξ, θ, κ, ρ and η could not be
estimated in the cost frontier model (Equation 4.4.3). Table 4.4 contains the SFA
outputs per country. In the case of the USA and Japan as expected the inefficiency
term υit was significant to 1% and negative. However, Indonesia was significant to
5% with France’s significance being greater than 10% with a high standard error.
Also at the 10% significance level the frontier distribution for France would be
rejected given the χ2 statistic. LnTLOAN as an output for France was not
statistically significant. A potential reason behind this is the limited sample size of
only 11 banks (however the Indonesia frontier was significant with only 13 banks)
and on inspection there are wide variations (standard deviations) within the
French bank sample. Because of this the SFA efficiency scores produced for
individual banks within France are not considered to be reliable.
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Table 4.4: SFA Estimation Results per Country
USA Frontier Japan Frontier Indonesia Frontier France Frontier
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
lnOEA 0.099∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.077∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.175∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.200∗∗∗ (0.045)
lnTLOAN 0.720∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.554∗∗∗ (0.059) 0.214∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.014 (0.023)
lnDeposits -0.167∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.148∗∗ (0.068) 0.372∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.298∗∗∗ (0.055)
υ Usigma -12.579∗∗∗ (0.066) -13.200∗∗∗ (0.088) -13.650∗∗ (0.611) -21.552 (36.916)
ν Vsigma -3.290∗∗∗ (0.023) -3.920∗∗∗ (0.043) -3.090∗∗∗ (0.098) -3.416∗∗∗ (0.107)
N 3728 1104 208 176
Log-likelihood 841.863 597.419 26.196 50.838
χ2(3) 8394.342
∗∗∗ 965.528∗∗ 2230.15∗∗∗ 329.816
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%143
Figures 4.1a to 4.1d present the average yearly bank SFA scores per country.
As warned by Stavarek (2006) large efficiency variations within countries skewed
the country’s averages. Figure 4.1e suggests that the USA overall has the least
efficient banks, however, this is not necessarily the case, as the sample size is larger
compared to the other countries23. Further, Figure 4.1d suggests that France is the
most efficient on average, however as previously establish the SFA scores for France
cannot be considered as reliable. Also given the high average, almost 1 (efficient),
on a scale of 0 to 1, this further suggests the data is unreliable.
Looking specifically at the USA (Figure 4.1a), this suggests that on average
cost efficiency rose in the years towards the financial crisis and then subsequently
declined following. The rationale to explain this trend, focuses on the variable
LnTLOANS which has the highest coefficient. As an output, prior to the financial
crisis the number of loans on the balance sheets expanded considerably, relative to
total costs. Therefore, outputs enhanced relative to input, increasing efficiency.
Following the crisis the opposite trend took effect as institutions decreased their
loans books (previously illustrated in Figure 2.4 of Chapter 2). Also, declines in
cost efficiency can be attributed to a number of reasons. For example (i) financial
institutions may have incurred more costs than their counterparts in dealing with
higher levels of non-performing loans; and (ii) they may devote more resources to
strengthening capitalisation in order to achieve compliance with regulatory
requirements such as Basel III (Feng & Wang, 2018). The decline in cost efficiency
was more gradual than the rise prior to the financial crisis, as institutions sought
to increase their customer deposits (another output) base. Thus, it is important to
investigate the interaction between efficiency and risk (also implications from
regulation). The SFA scores suggest the banks became more efficient, however this
score does not take into account how the institutions acted (taking excess risk) in
this intermediary approach. Japan followed a similar trend (Figure 4.1b) subject
to slight delay given the financial crisis impacted the US first. Indonesia’s (Figure
4.1c) average SFA score was more volatile due to the small sample size.
23This variation is noted later within Table 4.6, with the SFAEFF in the US banks having a
wide spread of 0.406
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Figure 4.1: Mean Cost Efficiency via SFA
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Figure 4.2: Mean Productivity Growth Efficiency via DEA
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Productivity Growth calculated for DEA using Stata was subsequently
calculated for the same countries for comparative purposes. Given that DEA is a
linear programming process, DEA could have been calculated for the other Basel
jurisdictions subject to balance data sample size. Figure 4.2e demonstrates
consistency between the average DEA scores, with an element of a delay to the
change of the efficiency trend following the financial crisis. Generally, the USA and
Indonesia trends resemble the corresponding SFA scores, with more volatility.
Such, volatility in the scores around the crisis period is consistent with the findings
of Asmild and Zhu (2016).
4.4.5 Variable Selection and Regressions
As previously noted the dependant variables will be the parametric SFA and
non-parametric DEA. In order to compare with an accounting based efficiency
ratio the cost to income ratio (CIR) will be used. The ratio is calculated by
dividing the operating costs (administrative and fixed costs, such as salaries and
property expenses, but not non-performing loans) by operating income. According
to Chiaramonte, Croci, and Poli (2015) managerial quality is approximated by
CIR, a low value indicates better managerial quality as they are able to keep costs
down (or stable) whilst increasing income. The following independent variables
will examine the impact of banking risk characteristics and regulatory variables on
cost (in)efficiency while controlling for profitability and size. See Table 4.5 for a
descriptive summary of the variables uses within this study24 and Table 4.6 for a
statistical summary. As this paper focuses on the USA banking industry only,
other country-specific characteristics are not required as controls. Such variables
would be required if this was a cross-country study.
A proxy for Diversification (DIV) is the magnitude of non-interest income to
operating income, which greatly reflects bank participation in financial markets
24All the data used was deflated by their corresponding years consumer price index (CPI) to the
year 2000 price levels to control for inflation effects, a similar approach to Abuzayed et al. (2009);
Gardener, Molyneux, and Nguyen-Linh (2011); Molyneux and Williams (2013) inter alia.
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such as securities trading, asset management services, to name a few. The
expected relationship with efficiency is uncertain. On the one hand, a negative
relationship would suggest that diversification leads to excess risk and therefore
lower cost efficiency. Otherwise, the sign may be positive if diversification is seen
as a way for financial institutions to increase income streams more than it costs to
achieve this extra income.
To account for banks’ asset quality the variable CreditRisk is used. Financial
institutions which provide more loans, especially in the context of pre-crisis, are
expected to incur higher credit risk. This variable is expected to have an inverse
relationship with cost efficiency, as higher credit risk would theoretically increase
costs (via write off and the redress process) and lower profitably. A similar
relationship is expected for Leverage (FLVRG) as another proxy for credit risk.
The Tier One Capital Ratio (T1CR) is a regulatory variable that could have a
positive or negative effect on cost efficiency. It could possibly enhance cost efficiency
as banking regulations enhance market discipline (Pasiouras et al., 2009) which
makes the institutions safer. On the contrary having to hold extra capital could be
seen as costly, as capital affects costs through its use as a source of funding (Berger
& Mester, 1997). Within Table 4.1 on regulation impact on efficiency, all authors
found that capital requirement had a positive impact on cost efficiency. Typically
previous studies have applied dummy variables or capital requirement indexes rather
than the individual bank level measures.
A liquidity (LIQ) variable similar to Williams and Nguyen (2005) can also be
positive or negative in relation to efficiency. If increased loans helps banks to
diversify their credit risk and/or enhance interest income, a positive relationship
might be expected. However, if this enhances credit risk (due to non-performing
loans) and increases the asset/liabilities gaps this could negatively impact cost
efficiency due to the need to source extra funds.
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is another regulatory variable with an
unknown relationship with cost efficiency. This variable to the best of my knowledge
has not been tested in relation to efficiency before. This ratio as discussed in section
3.4.3 is required to be above 100% to demonstrate the financial institution has
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sufficient access to longer term funding in the event of a liquidity shortage. This is
approximated using equation 4.4.5 (Chiaramonte & Casu, 2017).
NSFR =
Equity + TotalLT
Funding
+
(
Term
Customer
Deposits
∗ 0.95
)
+
(
Current
Customer
Deposits
∗ 0.9
)
+
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andST
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Other
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+
((
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(4.4.5)
If this ratio is seen as a onus on the institutions to hold/source more funding
this would increase cost negativity affecting cost efficiency. However, as with LIQ if
it helps banks to diversify other risks and makes them safer (bringing funding costs
down) this will enhance cost efficiency.
As a control variable for profitability, Return on Assets (ROA) is expected to
have a positive relationship with cost efficiency, with the assumption that profitable
institutions are more efficient at transforming inputs into outputs. In the event of
profitability due to higher credit risk, this could result in lower cost efficiency.
To investigate the role of size (and indirectly enhanced regulation) on cost
efficiency, the dummy variable to indicated whether a financial institution is
classed as a SIFI or G-SIB. SIFI is included as another control variable (only
applicable from 2011). This variable to the best of my knowledge has not been
tested in relation to efficiency before. Due to mixed previous empirical results
regarding size, no a priori expectation is expected.
Year effects (year dummies, excluding the first year) capture the influence of
aggregate (time-series) trends. It allows to control for the exogenous increase in
the dependent variable which is not explained by the other variables. For example,
the likes of an external shock where it’s impact is restricted to a given time-period,
affecting all panel units that are not controlled by other explanatory variables.
In the first instance this study applies OLS (Tobit in the case of SFA)
regression, followed by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression to
study the relationship between banking variables and cost efficiency. The cost
efficiency scores (as the explained variable) calculated via SFA are limited to
values between 0 and 1. Thus, this dependent variable cannot be expected to have
a normal distribution. If ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was applied in
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Table 4.5: Individual Bank Explanatory Variables
Symbol Variable
Name
Description Expected
Sign
Authors
DIV Diversification Proxy for a bank’s business
model calculated by net non-
interest income to net operating
income.
+/– Beck et al. (2016)
CreditRisk Credit Risk Ratio of Non-performing loans
divided by total loans. The
higher the ratio, the lower the
quality of the loan portfolio.
– Ariff and Luc (2008);
Luo et al. (2016)
FLVRG Leverage Financial Leverage is defined as
the ratio of total assets to total
common equity. A lower figure
represents less leverage
– Fa¨re, Grosskopf, and
Weber (2004)
T1CR Tier 1 Capital
Ratio
The ratio of Tier 1 capital to
risk-weighted assets.
+/– N/A
LIQ Liquidity Liquidity is measured by the
ratio of net loans to deposits and
short term funding. Lower figure
represents higher liquidity
+/– Williams and Nguyen
(2005)
NSFR Net Stable
Funding Ratio
A regulatory ratio to measure
long-term funding
+/– N/A
ROA Return on
assets (control
variable)
Indicator of how profitable
a company is relative to its
total assets, as a percentage.
Provides an idea of how efficient
management is at using its
assets to generate earnings
+ Berger and Mester
(2003); Ariff and Luc
(2008)
SIFI SIFI Bank
(control
variable)
A dummy variable 1= classified
as a systemically important
institution or a domestically
important institution, otherwise
0
+/– N/A
Year Time (control
variable)
Time dummy variable
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Table 4.6: US Bank Efficiency Determinants Statistics Summary
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SFAEFF 3728 .751 .085 .548 .954
ProdGrowth 3495 2.144 .261 .89 4.366
CIR 10400 68.345 24.623 -9.565 580.645
DIV 10370 .862 3.899 -81.368 89.286
CreditRisk 6359 .019 .209 0 16.562
FLVRG 9353 11.818 16.229 1.142 1043.228
T1CR 9326 13.243 7.72 -4.15 438.98
LIQ 7718 .815 .197 .001 6.468
NSFR 4675 .938 .057 .646 1.787
ROA 9372 .167 53.059 -5133.206 16.126
this case the result may be biased and/or produce inconsistent parameter
estimates (Greene, 1981). Typically, the empirical literature applies the Tobit
estimation (Tobin, 1958) to avoid this issue (Ariff & Luc, 2008; J. R. Barth, Lin, et
al., 2013; Delis & Papanikolaou, 2009; S. H. Lee, 2013), using the Stata12
command xttobit for the following model:
yit = αi + βnXit + εit, εit ∼ N(0, σ2t ) (4.4.6)
where αi is the firm-specific constant effect, Xit is a 1 × L vector of bank level
financial explanatory variable which are time-varying, βn are the corresponding
vector parameters to be estimated, finally the error term, εit, which is assumed to
be normally distributed. Also, the technique of bootstrapping will be applied to
assess whether this alters the explanatory power of the variables. Simar and
Wilson (2007) first advocated the use of single and double bootstrapping as it
enhanced the statistics significance of efficiency in their empirical evidence from
the US banking sector. Further, Delis and Papanikolaou (2009) found that when a
bootstrapping technique is applied the explanatory power of certain variables was
enhanced. Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2008) also found that bootstrapping allows for
more careful analysis at firm level25. In the context of this study the model 4.4.7
outlines the equation to determine bank efficiency.
25Out of their panel of Spanish savings banks circa 90% of banks efficiency grows following
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EFFit = αi + β1DIVit + β2CreditRiskit + β3FLV RGit + β4T1CRit
+ β5LIQit + β6NSFRit + β7ROAit + β8SIFIit + Y ear + εit (4.4.7)
where EFFit will be SFA, ProdGrowth and CIR. Following the application of
Tobit and OLS regression, GMM regression is applied to the same explanatory
variables. The purpose of applying GMM is to incorporate the lag dependant
variable to test whether the previous efficiency level significantly impacts future
efficiency scores.
yit = αi + β1yit−1 + βnXit + uit, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . T (4.4.8)
where αi is the firm-specific constant effect, yit−1 is an endogenous lagged
dependant variable, Xit is a 1 × L vector of bank level financial explanatory
variable (see Table 4.5 for more details) which are time-varying and not strictly
exogenous, βn are the vector parameters to be estimated, finally the error term,
uit, assumes a mean of zero and is probably serially correlated. Daraio and Simar
(2005) acknowledged possible serial correlation as a shortcoming of multistage
DEA and SFA analysis among estimated coefficients.
Due to yit−1 being an endogenous explanatory variable (with respect to both αi
and uit). The conventional covariance estimators of equation 4.4.8 are no longer
consistent26. Endogeneity can arise by: (i) omitted variables (correlation with
errors); (ii) measurement error in the independent variable (e.g. the efficiency or
market power calculations); and (iii) reversed causality (from the lag or selection
bias) (Hall, 2005). This provides justification for adopting GMM to obtain
consistent estimates (Arellano, 2003). Further, due to the use of panel data the
GMM estimations are mostly valid for data with small T and large N . This is the
case within this paper’s sample, thus the GMM method proposed by Ahn and
bootstrapping, However, not every banks Malmquist productivity index was significantly different
from the original value before bootstrapping.
26as noted and examples by Anderson and Hsiao (1981); Arellano (2003); Hsiao (2003).
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Sickles (2000) is used. Using Stata12, a two-step system dynamic GMM approach
was applied with windmeijer-corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005) to
control for potential instances of endogeneity (Blundell & Bond, 1998) and for the
downward bias in the estimated asymptotic standard errors. The issue of
endogeneity arises due to the possibility of reverse causality that certain bank
characteristics may be determined by performance (efficiency and asset quality) or
that such characteristics may be derived by underlying unobservable factors that
impact performance. To ensure the GMM models fit correctly it is expected that
AR(1) is statistically significant due to the way it is constructed and statistically
insignificant AR(2). Therefore the output requires the p-values of AR(2) and
Hansen tests to be greater than 0.1 (10% significance) (Dovonon & Hall, 2018).
The Hansen J-statistics of over identifying restrictions should be statistically
insignificant as this indicates that the instruments are valid in the two-step system
GMM estimation. If the previous holds this implies that the models fit correctly
with statistically insignificant test statistics of second-order autocorrelation in
second differences (AR(2)) and the Hansen J-statistics (Matousek, Nguyen, &
Stewart, 2016).
4.5 Finding and Discussion
This section will present the finding from the regression outlined previously using
US bank panel data, then discuss the robustness strategies. Firstly, in the pairwise
correlation matrix for the full sample (table 4.8), all of the variables display low
correlation scores, which reduces the likelihood of multicollinearity within the
regressions. The highest relationship is between all the variables of CIR and ROA
(Control variable) at -0.507 (moderately negatively correlated). During the
regressions this relationship will be tested for multicollinearity27. Table 4.9
showing the pairwise correlation within the sample prior to the crisis demonstrates
similar results, however there is a moderately negatively relationship between cost
efficiency (SFAEFF) and productivity growth (ProdGrowth). The post crisis table
27Stata12 omits any independent variables that causes multicollinearity.
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(4.10), evidences generally higher correlation between the variables however none
raised above 0.5 (or lower that -0.5). Within all three pairwise correlation
matrices, the variables of DIV and CreditRisk, display correlation scores, with
other variables, which have low statistical significance. However, non-significant
correlation does not imply no association. To ensure that multicollinearity does
not exist amongst the independent variables the variable inflation factor (VIF) test
was conducted. The results are presented in Table 4.7. As suggested by Asteriou
and Hall (2015) a VIF less than 10 is acceptable. The highest VIF was 3.70,
therefore within this paper’s regressions there is a low level of multicollinearity.
Even with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variables multicollinearity was not
an issue. Noticeably the models with the econometric measures of efficiency as the
dependency variable had lower VIF means then the accounting based model.
Interestingly the highest VIF values were the dummy time variables surrounding
the financial crisis (year06-year09). This highlights that during this time period
variables may have become more correlated by an unpredictable exogenous shock
(the financial crisis).
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Table 4.7: US Bank Efficiency VIF Test
Variable SFAEFF ProdGrowth CIR
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
SFAEFFy−1 1.84 0.542
ProdGrowthy−1 2.66 0.375
CIRy−1 1.19 0.840
DIV 1.01 0.987 1.01 0.987 1.01 0.995
CreditRisk 1.93 0.517 1.92 0.521 1.81 0.551
FLVRG 1.20 0.833 1.19 0.839 1.17 0.853
T1CR 1.27 0.785 1.27 0.789 1.17 0.857
LIQ 1.13 0.886 1.13 0.888 1.06 0.943
NSFR 1.10 0.899 1.11 0.900 1.04 0.966
ROA 1.60 0.624 1.60 0.625 1.65 0.606
SIFI 1.28 0.779 1.29 0.783 1.16 0.865
Year01 2.01 0.496 2.01 0.499 2.02 0.495
Year02 2.05 0.488 2.03 0.492 2.05 0.489
Year03 2.10 0.476 2.07 0.483 2.13 0.470
Year04 2.23 0.448 2.21 0.453 2.49 0.407
Year05 2.32 0.431 2.31 0.433 3.01 0.332
Year06 2.39 0.419 2.36 0.423 3.20 0.312
Year07 2.48 0.402 2.45 0.408 3.54 0.282
Year08 2.60 0.386 2.46 0.407 3.70 0.271
Year09 2.57 0.390 2.37 0.421 3.35 0.298
Year10 2.39 0.418 2.22 0.450 3.14 0.318
Year11 2.21 0.452 2.06 0.486 2.88 0.347
Year12 2.22 0.450 2.09 0.479 2.83 0.353
Year13 2.09 0.479 1.97 0.506 2.55 0.393
Year14 2.00 0.501 1.99 0.512 2.36 0.424
Year15 1.93 0.518 1.84 0.543 2.27 0.441
Mean VIF 1.91 1.90 2.20
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Table 4.8: US Bank Efficiency Determinants Cross-correlation
Variables SFAEFF ProdGrowth CIR DIV CreditRisk FLVRG T1CR LIQ NSFR ROA
SFAEFF 1.000
ProdGrowth -0.127 1.000
(0.000)
CIR 0.162 -0.075 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
DIV -0.039 0.012 0.014 1.000
(0.018) (0.493) (0.209)
CreditRisk 0.004 0.017 0.042 0.001 1.000
(0.817) (0.328) (0.001) (0.930)
FLVRG 0.052 -0.007 0.088 -0.026 0.017 1.000
(0.001) (0.701) (0.000) (0.022) (0.185)
T1CR -0.160 -0.067 0.104 -0.011 -0.009 -0.147 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.323) (0.489) (0.000)
LIQ -0.012 0.108 -0.068 -0.012 -0.018 -0.040 0.014 1.000
(0.521) (0.000) (0.000) (0.369) (0.216) (0.003) (0.294)
NSFR -0.003 0.070 0.013 -0.020 0.013 -0.021 -0.102 0.537 1.000
(0.879) (0.001) (0.358) (0.178) (0.404) (0.163) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.251 -0.114 -0.507 0.031 -0.041 -0.065 0.052 0.002 -0.046 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.883) (0.002)
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Table 4.9: US Bank Efficiency Determinants Cross-correlation (Pre-Crisis)
Variables SFAEFF ProdGrowth CIR DIV CreditRisk FLVRG T1CR LIQ NSFR ROA
SFAEFF 1.000
ProdGrowth -0.492 1.000
(0.000)
CIR 0.075 -0.024 1.000
(0.001) (0.327)
DIV 0.017 0.007 0.031 1.000
(0.472) (0.770) (0.057)
CreditRisk -0.013 0.032 0.005 0.001 1.000
(0.620) (0.232) (0.810) (0.967)
FLVRG 0.056 0.026 0.058 -0.031 0.022 1.000
(0.016) (0.291) (0.001) (0.064) (0.287)
T1CR -0.028 0.021 0.228 -0.036 -0.003 -0.280 1.000
(0.233) (0.396) (0.000) (0.028) (0.896) (0.000)
LIQ -0.046 -0.126 -0.082 -0.002 -0.052 -0.094 0.101 1.000
(0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.900) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000)
NSFR -0.007 -0.088 0.010 -0.042 -0.055 -0.058 -0.083 0.599 1.000
(0.811) (0.002) (0.620) (0.034) (0.022) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.119 0.041 -0.586 0.017 -0.006 0.003 -0.096 0.080 -0.045 1.000
(0.000) (0.098) (0.000) (0.303) (0.759) (0.843) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027)
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Table 4.10: US Bank Efficiency Determinants Cross-correlation (Post-Crisis)
Variables SFAEFF ProdGrowth CIR DIV CreditRisk FLVRG T1CR LIQ NSFR ROA
SFAEFF 1.000
ProdGrowth 0.131 1.000
(0.000)
CIR 0.334 -0.176 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
DIV -0.062 0.007 0.000 1.000
(0.007) (0.774) (0.994)
CreditRisk 0.367 0.026 0.390 0.004 1.000
(0.000) (0.269) (0.000) (0.816)
FLVRG 0.078 -0.017 0.106 -0.027 0.134 1.000
(0.001) (0.474) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000)
T1CR -0.220 -0.220 -0.074 0.000 -0.144 -0.148 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.996) (0.000) (0.000)
LIQ 0.029 0.291 -0.041 -0.020 0.006 -0.032 -0.151 1.000
(0.294) (0.000) (0.040) (0.311) (0.773) (0.109) (0.000)
NSFR 0.006 0.158 0.015 -0.008 0.020 -0.015 -0.125 0.474 1.000
(0.838) (0.000) (0.469) (0.707) (0.359) (0.500) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.462 -0.079 -0.411 0.054 -0.345 -0.120 0.225 -0.072 -0.048 1.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024)
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Table 4.11: Tobit/OLS Bank Efficiency Determinants (2000-2015)
(1a) SFA (Tobit RE) (1b) SFA Boot (Tobit RE) (2a) DEA (OLS FE) (2b) DEA Boot (OLS FE)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
DIV -0.031∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.031 (0.003) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002∗ (0.001)
CreditRisk -0.467∗∗∗ (0.095) 0.467∗∗∗ (0.095) -2.431∗∗∗ (0.437) 2.431∗∗∗ (0.661)
FLVRG -0.022 (0.002) -0.023 (0.002) -0.002∗ (0.003) -0.002∗∗ (0.001)
T1CR 0.001∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
LIQ 0.019∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.019∗∗ (0.009) 0.182∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.182∗∗∗ (0.039)
NSFR 0.026∗ (0.100) 0.026 (0.159) 0.137∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.137∗∗ (0.068)
ROA -0.0174∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.0174∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.036∗∗ (0.015) -0.036∗∗∗ (0.007)
SIFI -0.521∗ (0.440) -0.521∗ (0.312) -0.084 (0.573) -0.084 (0.501)
Intercept 0.946∗∗∗ (0.056) 0.946∗∗∗ (0.063) 1.968∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.269∗∗∗ (0.028)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2723 2723 2590 2590
Log-likelihood 16387.116 16387.116
χ2(7) 511.25
∗∗∗ 408.63∗∗∗
F (250,2339) 180.452
∗ 202.211∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.395 0.395
R2 0.234 0.234
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 4.12: OLS US Bank Efficiency Determinants (2000-2015)
(3a) CIR (OLS FE) (3b) CIR Boot (OLS FE)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
DIV 0.040 (0.041) 0.040 (0.043)
CreditRisk -45.757∗∗∗ (13.570) -45.757 (33.444)
FLVRG -0.124∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.124 (0.120)
T1CR 0.212∗∗∗ (0.063) 0.212 (0.122)
LIQ 5.876∗∗∗ (1.711) 5.876 (5.381)
NSFR -1.528 (2.494) -1.528 (2.491)
ROA -6.714∗∗∗ (0.223) -6.714 (1.235)
SIFI -2.302∗ (0.598) -2.302 (4.031)
Intercept 69.657∗∗∗ (1.818) 69.657 (4.600)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
N 4462 4462
R2 0.324 0.324
F (579,3882) 6.60
∗∗∗ 88.733
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
For the determinants of SFA (Table 4.11) model 1a and 1b were used to witness
the random effects tobit regression28, as the variable value is between 0 and 1. For
the determinants of DEA productivity growth (Table 4.11) model 2a and 2b and
CIR (Table 4.12) model 3a and 3b, OLS fixed effects regression was used. For all
four models the Hausman test was conducted to ensure that fixed affects was the
appropriate method (over random affects). Notability only models 1a, 1b and 3a
were significant to 1%, the models for productivity growth, 2a & 2b were significant
to only 10% and 5% respectively, whereas model 3b was non-significant. The use
of the bootstrap technique was effective for the determinants of SFA and DEA by
enhancing the explanatory power of a number of variables, although this technique
was detrimental to the accounting based measure of efficiency of CIR as model 3b
was non-significant. The results from these tables provide statistical significance for
the majority of the explanatory variables, therefore warranting further analysis with
the inclusion of the dependent lag variables.
28Tobit is a non-linear function and the likelihood estimator for fixed affects is biased and
inconsistent.
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Table 4.13: SFA, DEA & CIR GMM of US Bank Efficiency Determinants (2000-2015)
(1) SFAEFF (2) DEA (ProdGrowth) (3) CIR
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
SFAEFFy−1 0.236∗∗∗ (0.004)
ProdGrowthy−1 -0.251∗ (0.037)
CIRy−1 0.271∗∗∗ (0.009)
DIV -0.0113∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.028∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.131 (0.012)
CreditRisk -0.0285∗∗∗ (0.004) -2.395∗∗ (0.309) 24.017∗ (12.431)
FLVRG -0.038 (0.082) -0.003∗ (0.003) -0.150∗∗ (0.011)
T1CR -0.0053∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.015 (0.001) 0.249 (0.041)
LIQ -0.0777∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.377 (0.034) 6.895∗∗∗ (1.299)
NSFR -0.135∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.428∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.539 (1.664)
ROA 0.0456∗∗ (0.006) -0.220∗ (0.008) -7.061∗∗ (0.285)
SIFI -0.542∗ (0.534) -0.135 (0.821) -2.209 (1.023)
Intercept 0.309∗∗∗ (0.004) 31.476∗∗∗ (1.017) 52.644∗∗∗ (1.397)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 2590 2440 4460
Group 231 231 559
Instruments 171 174 210
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 0.437 0.062 0.318
Hansen (p-value) 0.988 0.288 0.652
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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In the full sample table 4.13 model 1 (SFAEFF) and 3 (CIR) both the
Arellano-Bond and Sargan/Hansen tests reported to confirm the validity of
instruments underlying the GMM estimation and the absence of serial correlation
in the first difference residuals respectively. In comparing models 1 and 3, model 1
is marginally more fitting with the higher AR(2) (0.437) and Hansen value (0.988).
However, in model 2 for DEA productivity growth, the autoregressive two (AR(2))
was only significant to 10%. Thus, the null hypothesis, of no autocorrelation at the
5% significance level, cannot be rejected. Given the AR(2) of 0.062, this model (2)
for the determinants of DEA at the 5% confidence level can not be considered as
reliable. As the dependant lag (ProdGrowthy−1) was only significant at 10% this
helps explain the > 0 AR(2). In order to achieve second-order serial correlation in
differences (make AR(2) closer to 0.000), further lags of the dependent variable
(i.e. ProdGrowthy−2 or ProdGrowthy−3) could be used. However, Roodman
(2009a) suggests this could weaken the Hansen test (due to missing observations).
Furthermore, suggesting that the productivity growth of two or three years ago
influences this year’s productivity growth may theoretically be unfounded. In all
three models the results confirm the persistence of the dependent variables’ own
effect (lagged) on efficiency, which advocates their inclusion in efficiency
determinant models, this is similar to Luo et al. (2016) findings.
In relation to CIR, comparing Table 4.12 model 3a with Table 4.13 model 3,
this suggests that the introduction of the lag dependent variable (CIRy−1)
alternates the signage and significantly reduces the explanatory power of the
majority of other independent variables29. This suggests that for the accounting
based efficiency measure, the previous year’s efficiency level heavily influences the
next. However, theoretically this is unclear as CIR is a non-dynamic ratio from the
income statement of operating costs to operating income. Further, the positive
sign on the lag in model 3 suggests this would increase following years’ CIR (i.e.
lower efficiency). Given these inconsistencies, interpreting results of CIR efficiency
determinants with the lagged effect included maybe misleading.
29Achen (2001) explains why lag dependent variables can significantly impact independent
variables.
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Thus, the following interpretation relates to the determinants of SFA efficiency
(Table 4.13, model 1) as all the model specifications for this dependent variable are
appropriate and constant. First of all, the lagged effect of the dependent variable as
expected positively influences the subsequent years’ efficiency. As SFA is a measure
that compares institutions against best practice year on year, it would be expected
that institutions that ranked highly one year would maintain this the next, unless
that institution faced an idosyncratic shock to either their inputs or outputs.
Similar to Rossi et al. (2009) findings, diversification (DIV) is negative and
statistically significant which implies that the more diverse a bank’s business
model it negatively impacts cost efficiency. A potential reason for this is that
diversification reduces the traditional outputs used to measure SFA cost efficiency.
This could also be due to diversifications impacts on credit risk (which in model 1
is also negative and statistically significant). This association of credit risk to cost
efficiency implies that higher credit risk (associated with increased provisions for
NPLs) contributes to lower cost efficiency, similar to findings by Inanoglu et al.
(2016); Sun and Chang (2011). Such findings advocate that banks should restrict
their banking activities to their more traditional area of competence (Inanoglu et
al., 2016). The negative sign for leverage would further confirm this, however
FLVRG was non-significant. In order to reduce the impact of credit risk and
leverage banks under the Basel III regulations are required to hold further capital.
Within this regression, enhanced capital requirement ratios was also found to
negatively impact cost efficiency. T1CR’s negative relationship could be explained
by two reasons. Firstly, as suggested by Berger and Di Patti (2006), higher capital
requirements forces institutions to hold more capital, thus increasing institutions’
premia on potentially costly risk management activities. Secondly, higher capital
requirements increase the cost of raising bank capital (Berger & Mester, 1997),
however this may be slightly offset by the fact that this capital does not bear any
interest payments. This negative relationship between capital requirements and
cost efficiency contrast the cross-country results of J. R. Barth, Lin, et al. (2013);
Pasiouras et al. (2009). As previous studies in this area tend to use country level
measures of capital requirements, this papers finding suggests the use of a bank
163
level measure should also be considered to observe a more complete picture.
As financial institutions become less liquid (higher LIQ) this negatively impacts
cost efficiency given the role of deposits within LIQ ratio. If customer deposits
reduce, this increases LIQ, also this negatively affects SFA cost efficiency as deposits
is an output. Less liquid institutions, could have higher credit risk, resulting in them
facing higher funding costs to enhance liquidity. Furthermore, NSFR is negative
and statistically significant, which implies that institutions who are seeking/holding
extra funds face lower cost efficiency. Again, this could be a result of institutions
facing higher funding costs as they aim to meet this new statutory requirement.
The use of time dummies (2000 and 2015 were omitted) was to identify any
years that may have influenced the dependent variable. Without the time
dummies the majority of model specifications were not reliable (significant AR(2)
and/or Hansen). In Table 4.13, model 1, the years of 2007, 2008 and 2011 were
statistically significant to 1%, 1% and 5% respectively. Understandably the timing
of the financial crisis impacted the cost efficiency of banks, due to significant
changes in outputs such as total loans and deposits. Given this influence, the
following models test the same independent variables pre-and post crisis. The
literature highlights a number of possible positive implications stemming from the
exit of inefficient banks (Spokeviciute, Keasey, & Vallascas, 2019). By accelerating
the exit of these banks, crises could not only be a cause of social and economic
costs but also a source of longer-term benefits for the banking industry and the
whole economy. For instance, the value of the investments of failed banks might be
captured by surviving banks via spillovers (Knott & Posen, 2005).
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Table 4.14: SFA & DEA GMM of Bank Efficiency Determinants Pre and Post Crisis
(1a) SFAEFF Pre Crisis (1b) SFAEFF Post Crisis (2a) DEA Pre Crisis (2b) DEA Post Crisis
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
SFAEFFy−1 0.657∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.592∗∗∗
ProdGrowthy−1 -0.129∗∗∗ (0.038) -0.137∗∗∗ (0.020)
DIV -0.059∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.026∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
CreditRisk -0.022∗∗∗ (0.080) -0.017∗∗ (0.078) 0.007 (0.301) -0.985∗∗∗ (0.365)
FLVRG -0.046∗∗ (0.143) -0.055∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.004 (0.003) 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
T1CR -0.436 (0.506) -0.287∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.002)
LIQ 0.004∗∗∗ (0.009) -0.007∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.040 (0.054) 0.252∗∗∗ (0.030)
NSFR 0.054∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.051∗∗∗ (0.075) 0.054 (0.368) 0.739∗∗∗ (0.084)
ROA -0.153 (0.064) 0.203∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.003 (0.006) 0.008∗ (0.004)
SIFI -0.725∗∗ (0.138) -0.545 (0.452)
Intercept 0.292∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.348∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.045∗∗∗ (0.028) 1.792∗∗∗ (0.054)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1281 1530 1131 1309
Group 229 229 229 225
Instruments 81 119 70 106
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 0.245 0.754 0.318 0.058
Hansen (p-value) 0.587 0.457 0.189 0.908
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Both models 1a and 1b for SFA in Table 4.14 statistically fit, allowing for
comparison. Noticeably, a number of the independent variable effects are
consistent with the SFA models in Tables 4.11 and 4.13. In comparing pre and
post crisis, there were a few discrepancies. Prior to the crisis, LIQ increases (less
liquid) was positively related with cost efficiency. This could be explained by the
increased levels of loans acting as diversifying credit risk or enhancing interest
income. Also, prior to the crisis, the likes of perceived high credit ratings and
securitisation enhanced institutions’ access to cheaper liquidity. This may also
explain why the NSFR, prior to the crisis, had a positive impact on cost efficiency,
given the availability of cheaper funding. Post-crisis the opposite affects of
liquidity on cost efficiency took over, as total loans decreased and funding costs
increased for institutions that relied on wholesale funding. Another discrepancy
between pre-and post crisis related to the control variable of profitability (ROA),
prior to the crisis profitability negatively impacted cost efficiency albeit
non-significantly. Then following the crisis profitability is positively associated
with cost efficiency. This can be explained as institutions who sought to reduce
total costs (e.g. redundancy and restructuring) following the crisis in order to
return to profitability. In relation to SIFI, the full sample demonstrated a negative
relationship with cost efficiency, though only significant at 10%, but in the post
crisis regression the same relationship was evidenced with a higher significance,
suggesting that larger banks have a lower cost efficiency. This finding is consistent
with Ariff and Luc (2008); Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009); Stavarek (2006).
Further, as these institutions are subject to extra regulatory requirements this
could also explain the negative relationship to cost efficiency further. Such finding
is similar to Spokeviciute et al. (2019) who showed that financial crises do not
necessarily produce meaningful cleansing effects in the banking industry and are
indeed detrimental to the post-crisis efficiency of the sector. This finding has two
implications. First, the purpose of mitigating the short-term effect of a crisis does
not appear to go against the long-term efficiency of the banking sector. Second,
the prudential regulation aimed at strengthening bank resilience in good times
might also contribute to mitigating the effects of crisis on the longer-term
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efficiency of the banking sector. To enhance cost efficiency, large banks could
either consolidate the input base (which is harder to operationalise) or make
progress in utilisation of its outputs. For example, the closure of branches (reduce
inputs) is highly unlikely because of competition from medium-size banking retail
market and impact of on market share. Further, bank consolidation via mergers or
acquisition is unlikely due to the regulator’s mandate in preventing too big to fail.
Thus, the adequate approach to improve efficiency is by better use of existing
inputs in the financial intermediation process.
In Table 4.14, model 2b for DEA after the crisis was only significant to 10%
(AR(2) of 0.058), therefore considered unreliable. Prior to the crisis (model 2a) for
DEA, the only statistically significant variables were the lag effect (negative) and
diversification which is inconsistent from the DEA models in Tables 4.11 and 4.13.
Table 4.15: CIR GMM of US Bank Efficiency Determinants Pre and Post Crisis
(3a) CIR Pre Crisis (3b) CIR Post Crisis
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
CIRy−1 0.274 (0.169) 0.289∗∗ (0.023)
DIV 0.198∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.184 (0.129)
CreditRisk 335.846∗∗ (16.036) -14.610 (25.006)
FLVRG 0.225∗∗ (0.055) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.018)
T1CR 0.091 (0.085) 0.469∗∗∗ (0.095)
LIQ -0.362 (1.920) 1.881 (4.227)
NSFR -2.793 (3.182) 5.405 (4.326)
ROA -10.250∗∗∗ (0.372) -6.806∗∗∗ (0.533)
SIFI -2.584∗ (0.305)
Intercept 50.342∗∗∗ (2.396) 44.425∗∗∗ (4.985)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
N 2076 2384
Group 447 506
Instruments 106 106
AR(1) (p-value) 0.091 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 0.705 0.368
Hansen (p-value) 0.377 0.596
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Furthermore, as noted from Table 4.13, model 3 and Table 4.15 models 3a and 3b
for CIR, there were a number of inconsistencies amongst the independent variables.
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The lagged affect in model 3a, before the crisis, was non-significant, hence the AR(1)
only being significant to 10%, rendering this model unreliable.
4.5.1 Robustness Checks
To address the possible endogeneity concerns extra control variables are added to
the baseline specification for SFA for the full period, to observe any changes. Overall
result within Table 4.16 are quantitatively similar. The additional control variables
are to further capture banks’ profitability (ROE & TobinQ), ownership structure30
(Foreign), size (LogASize & LogLSize) and macroeconomic variables (GDP & Inf).
The first strategy applied was to incorporate further profitability ratios, Return
on Equity (ROE) and TobinQ, to see if the interaction between profitability and
cost efficiency, outweighs the impact of the other dependent variables. Within
model 2, the introduction of the further profitability variables mainly affected the
credit risk variable making it change sign albeit non-significant and enhancing
leverage’s significance slightly. Thus, profitability (which may have resulted from
extra credit risk) and credit risks interaction should both be explored in
determining cost efficiency.
The second strategy was to introduce a dummy variable indicating foreign
ownership. Within the empirical literature review numerous authors highlighted
the influences of different ownership structures on efficiency (T.-T. Fu et al., 2016;
Thoraneenitiyan & Avkiran, 2009). Thus, any significant change from the baseline
specification would suggest the need for dividing the sample to avoid endogeneity.
Further, two extra variables, relating to institution size were incorporated within
model 3. Generally model 3 was consistent with model 1, with slight differences in
significance levels. Size via total assets was consistent with the SIFI dummy albeit
non-significant. The negative relationship with the foreign ownership dummy
suggests that domestic banks are more cost efficient than foreign owned
institutions. Similar findings to Du and Sim (2016); Xiaogang et al. (2005) and
30The degree of foreign ownership is measured by bank assets that are 50% or more foreign
owned (B. N. Jeon, Olivero, & Wu, 2011).
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contrasting Ariff and Luc (2008); Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009) results. The
results may have some bearing on the debate over why most cross-border studies
of bank efficiency found that foreign affiliates, on average, are less efficient than
the domestic banks in the same nation (Berger & DeYoung, 2001).
Another strategy was to incorporate the economic variables of GDP and inflation
to determine whether macroeconomic effects (which indirectly affect all variables)
alter the baseline, which was found not to be the case. In model 4, both variables
were significant and as expected GDP growth is positively associated with efficiency
while inflation erodes cost efficiency. Finally, all additional control variables were
added to the baseline specification (model 5). Ultimately the coefficients signage
and significance remained largely the same, thus this paper’s findings remain robust
given the introduction of further control variables.
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Table 4.16: SFA GMM of US Bank Efficiency Determinants (2000-2015) Robustness
(1) SFAEFF (2) Profitability (3) Ownership and Size (4)Macroeconomic (5)All
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
SFAEFFy−1 0.236∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.615∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.649∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.652∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.661∗∗∗ (0.007)
DIV -0.0113∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.064∗ (0.095) -0.071∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.096∗∗∗ (0.035) -0.060∗∗ (0.039)
CreditRisk -0.0285∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.064 (0.521) -0.001∗∗ (0.029) -0.009∗∗ (0.029) -0.056 (0.354)
FLVRG -0.038 (0.082) -0.165∗ (0.020) -0.242 (0.051) -0.285 (0.049) -0.167∗ (0.002)
T1CR -0.0053∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.019∗∗∗ (0.084) -0.194∗∗ (0.057) -0.021∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.173∗∗ (0.050)
LIQ -0.0777∗∗∗ (0.005) -0.268∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.393∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.516∗∗∗ (0.004) -0.332∗∗∗ (0.006)
NSFR -0.135∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.013∗∗ (0.049) -0.112∗∗∗ (0.020) -0.244∗∗∗ (0.018) -0.098∗∗∗ (0.005)
ROA 0.0456∗∗ (0.006) 0.063∗ (0.033) 0.107∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.107∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.973∗∗∗ (0.064)
SIFI -0.542∗ (0.534) -0.256∗ (0.256) -0.425∗∗ (0.247) -0.498∗ (0.199) -0.226∗∗ (0.125)
ROE 0.938∗∗∗ (0.078) 0.114∗∗∗ (0.021)
TobinsQ 0.555∗ (0.085) 0.453∗ (0.045)
Foreign -0.477∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.802∗∗∗ (0.045)
LogASize -0.221 (0.959) -0.279 (0.474)
LogLSize 0.728 (0.882) 0.223 (0.485)
GDP 0.027∗∗∗ (0.057) -0.264∗∗∗ (0.061)
Inf -0.329∗∗∗ (0.069) 0.321∗∗∗ (0.001)
Intercept 0.309∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.327∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.478∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.225∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.336∗∗∗ (0.002)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2590 2588 2590 2590 2588
Group 231 231 231 231 321
Instruments 171 188 189 187 190
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) (p-value) 0.437 0.533 0.233 0.437 0.464
Hansen (p-value) 0.988 0.414 0.359 0.375 0.609
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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4.6 Conclusion
It seemed likely that the US banking industry would have sought to improved cost
efficiency to survive after the recent financial crisis, however evidence in this paper
based on econometric measurement of efficiency does not conform. This paper
examines the determinants of cost efficiency and productivity growth in the US
banking sector, pre and post financial crisis. To briefly summarise, this paper
found, in determining cost efficiency the use of SFA as a measure of efficiency
within the regression analysis provided more constant and robust results than DEA
productivity growth and the accounting based cost to income ratio, providing
evidence to support hypothesis one31. With reference to SFA cost efficiency and
business model diversity, hypothesis two is accepted as in all models DIV was
negatively associated with cost efficiency, suggesting as finance institutions deviate
from the traditional intermediation process this reduces cost efficiency. Enhanced
credit risk and leverage was found to be negatively associated with cost efficiency,
accepting hypothesis three. However, capital requirement regulation implemented
to mitigate the impact of credit risk, was also found to negatively impact cost
efficiency therefore rejecting hypothesis four. Finally, this paper’s results accepted
hypothesis five by providing evidence that increased liquidity negatively impacts
cost efficiency (except from the sample prior to the crisis).
This paper has both policy implications and also evaluates various econometric
techniques as potentially valuable analytical tools for supervisors. First, the results
both overall and pre/post crisis highlight the importance of the prudential
supervisory role in controlling the level of risk in the banking sector, as the
elevation in risk measures coupled with the growth of the sector has resulted in
declining measures of efficiency, a result that is robust to several econometric
specifications (using both econometric and accounting based measures). The
policy implication is that regulators may want better capitalised banks and
somewhat smaller or less diverse banking systems, as this is likely to imply a more
31The hypothesis was overall rejected because the use of DEA as an econometric measure was
not consistent within the regression analysis.
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efficiently functioning banking industry. However, this is not necessarily the case
with the rejection of hypothesis four. Thus, regulators should focus on ensuring
banks’ business models do not diversify too much (increasing the level of credit
risk and leverage) rather than the sole emphasis being on capital requirements to
enhance banking cost efficiency.
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Chapter 5
Banking Efficiency, Concentration,
Competition and Financial
Stability
5.1 Abstract
This paper examines the role of risk, regulation and efficiency within the banking
competition and financial stability relationship in the US banking sector. Using
System Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) regression on panel data from
2000 to 2015, this paper finds a neutral view of the competition-stability nexus,
where both competition and concentration fragility co-exist. In addition, a unique
polynomial competition-fragility relationship was also found. Interestingly when
using the Composite Index of Systemic Stress (CISS) as a measure of systemic
risk, this altered the competition-stability relationship to identify a concave
relationship. Both relationships ruled out the efficiency structure paradigm. In
regards to risk, increased credit, leverage, diversification and liquidity risk was
found to be negatively associated with financial stability. Whilst increased capital
requirements enhance stability, unexpectedly, the Net Stable Funding Ratio
(NSFR) was found to hinder stability, providing caution to regulators as this is
implemented under Basel III.
JEL Classification: G21, G23, G28, L1
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5.2 Introduction
Historically, institutions have changed via demutualisation (Tayler, 2003)
geographical diversification (Ibragimov, Jaffee, & Walden, 2011), financial
innovation (Tufano, 2003), mergers with the objective to further enhance scale
(Vallascas & Hagendorff, 2011), domestic competition policy and diversifying
revenue streams (Fecht, Gru¨ner, & Hartmann, 2012), which ultimately
transformed the market structure and the characteristics of risk financial
institutions have to manage (Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011).
Despite such changes, J. O. Wilson et al. (2010) suggest there are confines to the
extent in which banks can deviate from their traditional business model in the
effort to enhance profitability and gain further market share. Generally in most
industry sectors, competition also leads to positive change via innovation, product
quality and efficiency, the banking sector is no exception (Andrievskaya &
Semenova, 2016). However, the level of banking competition can affect (i) the
instability of the financial system (see 5.3 for an empirical review), (ii) the
significance of relationship lending (Simkovic, 2013), (iii) credit risk (lending
quality standards) (Ruckes, 2004) (iv) the tendency of lenders to exclude certain
borrowers (Favara & Giannetti, 2017; Gormley, Gupta, & Jha, 2018), and the (v)
allocation of labour, impeding efficiency (J. J. Bai, Carvalho, & Phillips, 2017).
Following the recent financial crisis important questions have been highlighted by
policy-makers regarding whether limits should be placed on the bank size,
complexity and efficiency growth. Such questions are ultimately trying to end
institutions that are ‘too-big-to-fail’. This doctrine can be somewhat misleading as
such institutions in the past have been allowed to fail, although the likes of their
depositors have been protected against losses through bailouts by governments
(Mishkin, 1999; Mishkin, Stern, & Feldman, 2006). Empirically according to Tan
and Floros (2018) there are limited studies testing the interrelationships among
risk, competition, and efficiency combined within the banking sector. As the
financial market has changed, four opposing views have arisen on how competition
and market concentration affects systemic risk. Firstly, the competition-fragility
view argues that more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit
174
margins and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking
(F. Allen & Gale, 2004; Carletti, 2008). Secondly, the competition-stability view
argues that more market power (i.e. less competition) in loan market may result in
higher institutional risk as higher interest rates can be charged to loan customers
make it harder to repay and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection
problems (Boyd & Nicolo´, 2005). Therefore, it could be argued that more
competition leads to stability. Also Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe (2009) and Schaeck
and Cihak (2012) found that banks have a tendency to hold increased capital when
they operate in a more competitive market, hence being more stable. But Berger,
Hasan, and Zhou (2009) noted that those two literature streams need not pose
opposing views due to risk-mitigating techniques. Figure 5.1 provides an
illustration of the competition-stability relationship. Thirdly, the
concentration-fragility view suggests that larger financial institutions consider
themselves to be too-big-to-fail and rely on government intervention or subsidies
which raise the issue of moral hazard within the system (Uhde & Heimeshoff,
2009) Finally, the concentration-stability view proposes that larger financial
institutions within a concentrated market may enhance profitability and thus
reduce financial instability by higher capital reserves that protect them against
external macroeconomic and liquidity shocks (Nicolo´, Boyd, & Smith, 2004). Also
F. Allen and Gale (2000) argues that a more concentrated banking industry may
be easier to regulate. Hence, supervision could be more effective and the risk of a
system-wide contagion should be reduced.
In order to investigate this competition-stability nexus this paper will examine
US banking sector panel data from 2000-2015. In addition, a number of efficiency,
risk and regulator factors will be incorporated within this relationship, given its
complex nature. This timescale includes the financial crisis, which potentially
affected the structure of the banking market. In a crisis, the number of distressed
financial institutions tends to increase, and this, in turn, leads to an upsurge in the
volume of banking bankruptcies, liquidations, and forced consolidations.
Consequently, the shape of the industry (number of banks) and the level of
competition could drastically change (Papanikolaou, 2018b). The rest of this paper
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Figure 5.1: Relationship between Competition and Stability
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is organised as follows: Section 5.3 provides on overview of the broad range of
empirical evidence investigating the banking competition-stability nexus. Section
5.4 outlines the research hypotheses developed from the inconclusive evidence
highlighted in the empirical literature review. Section 5.5 discusses the
methodology of this paper. Firstly this section, discusses the need for the GMM
regression, secondly explains the calculations of competition, concentration and
stability, and finally the extra explanatory and control variables are identified.
Section 5.6 discusses the main findings in the context of the US banking sector
then briefly summarises findings from other Basel jurisdictions. The final section
5.7 summarises this paper’s findings in relation to the research hypotheses.
5.3 Literature Review on Banking Competition
and Financial Stability
Generally, empirical studies within the competition-stability nexus advanced from
studies evaluating the effects of banking competition on profitability. According to
economic competition theory, increased competition erodes excessive returns due
to new entrants or forced operational improvement costs (Berger, Bonime, Covitz,
& Hancock, 2000; Goddard, Liu, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2011; Hung, Jiang, Liu, &
Tu, 2018). For example, within the European Union banking sector, both market
concentration and competition as well as credit and liquidity risk management,
efficiency, business model diversification all positively influence profitability (Petria,
Capraru, & Ihnatov, 2015). Thus, such variables can then be tested to find the
subsequent impact on financial stability.
Empirical evidence tends to be in the form of regression testing, typically OLS (if
lags are not included) or GMM due to autocorrelation. In addition, granger causality
testing, using dynamic panel data, is becoming more popular (Casu & Girardone,
2009; Fiordelisi & Mare, 2014; A. Kasman & Carvallo, 2014; Tan & Floros, 2018).
Originally, granger causality was designed for variable pairs within time-series or to
cross-sectional analysis, however, it has been modified to incorporate panel dynamics
(Greene, 2018). Granger causality identifies gross statistical associations between
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two variables but does not prove economic causation. When this technique is applied
via GMM, often authors (Fiordelisi & Mare, 2014; Tan & Floros, 2018) interpret
models that fail autocorrelation stage one or two diagnostic testing, which have to
be treated with caution.
The first investigation into the relationship between competition and stability
within the banking sector was conducted by Keeley (1990) who found that the US
bank failures in the 1980s were a consequence of increased competition. The
author suggested that as competition increased the benefits of having a monopoly
(monopolistic rents) erode. One consequence of higher competition within the
banking sector may be an increase of lower creditworthy loan application approvals
as institutions compete for market share, thus deteriorating the quality of banks
assets, ultimately increasing fragility. Later, Saunders and Wilson (1996) using
similar data provided support to this finding. Contrastingly, using publicly listed
thrift (similar to credit unions or mutual savings banks), Brewer and Saidenberg
(1996) were the first to find a negative relationship between banking competition
and risk (measured by equity volatility) in the US.
5.3.1 Competition-Fragility
The competition-fragility view argues that in more competitive markets banks
cannot benefit from monopolistic rents such as more stable deposits and price
setting, thus taking excess risk to attract new customers or lower profit margins
affecting stability. Leon (2015) suggested this was the case in the context of
developing countries as increased competition led to increased loan approval
decisions and reduced borrower confidence. Using the H-Statistic to measure of
competition, Yeyati and Micco (2007) found that in the 1990’s increased bank
competition enhanced eight Latin American countries’ banks risks (indirectly
reducing stability). Also, in the context of developing economies, Turk-Ariss
(2010) results show that an increased market power (less competition) leads to
higher stability due to enhanced profit efficiency, despite significant cost efficiency
losses. Turk-Ariss (2010) also included a quadratic function of the Lerner Index to
test for a non-linear relationship, however these results were insignificant.
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In a large sample of European listed banks from 2004-2013, Leroy and Lucotte
(2017) found using the Lerner index an inverse relationship between competition
and stability. They then uniquely, using SRISK (discussed in Section 3.4.2) as a
proxy of systemic risk, found the opposite, competition enhances stability due to
reduced systemic risk. This finding was due to increased correlation in risk-taking
behaviour in less competitive markets (Acharya & Yorulmazer, 2007). Also, within
Europe, ownership was seen to interfere with this relationship as Brzoza-Brzezina,
Kolasa, and Makarski (2018) showed in a series of experiments that foreign ownership
amplifies the impact of shocks on the domestic economy.
Elsewhere, Azar, Raina, and Schmalz (2016) argued that the main driver of
competition within the US banking sector arises from the banks owners. It is
argued that the larger institutions are all majority owned by the large hedge funds
and each other. Figure 5.2 broadly supports this notion, with a number of
investment management companies having ownership in all four of the largest US
Banks. Further, the banks also have equity stakes in their competitors. Azar et al.
(2016) found that within US states where common ownership increased (amongst
banks) on average the fees charged by banks for deposit accounts increased and
interest rates on savings accounts decreased. Further, the decrease in competition
also reduced the banks productivity (lowering efficiency) incentive.
5.3.2 Competition-Stability
This view advocates that increased competition enhances stability. This argument
is on the premise that less competitive markets (monopoly/oligopoly) leads to
excess risk taking. Institutions within this type of market could be deemed
too-big-too-fail, exert moral hazard and/or charge higher loan rates in the
expectation of government safety nets if they fail (Mishkin, 1999). Also, Boyd and
Nicolo´ (2005) argue that more competition lowers borrowing rates and government
subsidies, promoting better banking risk management and thus increasing stability.
In addition, banks tend to invest less in loan applicants screening technology when
competition is eroded (Papanikolaou, 2018b).
Within the US mortgage market, Mu¨ller and Noth (2018) found that banks
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Figure 5.2: The Top 10 Owners of the Top 4 US Banks (2018 Quarter 1)
Source: Adapted from Bloomberg (2018)
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with more market power significantly reduced Loan-to-Income ratios which is an
indication for safer business1. Using a panel of 8,412 commercial banks from a
single-state Metropolitan statistical area in the US, Goetz (2018) findings suggest
that competition, increases stability, as well as improves bank profitability and asset
quality.
In the context of European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009 using
Granger causality testing, Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) found a positive relationship
between competition and stability. This relationship was more prominent in
homogenous markets. However, evidence regarding concentration and stability was
ambiguous. Also within Europe, more cost efficient banks were reported to exhibit
higher market power (Delis & Tsionas, 2009). Using a MES and CoVaR as a
measure of systemic risk rather than a measure of financial stability, Silva-Buston
(2019) results also supported the view that competition increases stability in
European banking sector.
In a cross-country study, using the Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic as a measure
of competition in 45 countries from 1980 to 2003, Schaeck et al. (2009) found that
more competitive banking systems are less prone to instability. Radic´, Fiordelisi,
Girardone, et al. (2011) investigated 10 developed countries’ investment banking
sector during 2001 to 2008 and found that the competition-stability paradigm holds
and broadly supported that capital requirements reduce risk. In regards to efficiency
they found that in general, cost efficiency increases temporally precede increased
insolvency risk. Similarly, in the context of Latin American A. Kasman and Carvallo
(2014) found higher competition leads to greater stability, however, higher efficiency
is associated with increased market power (less competition). From a liquidity
risk perspective using commercial bank data from 25 OECD countries during the
period 2000 – 2010, J. Kim (2018), found that prior to the financial crisis banks
took higher liquidity risks2 with the aim to enhance market power, thus implying
1Higher market power protects their charter value, evidence to support Keeley (1990) charter
value paradigm.
2Banks transformed towards a more contemporary business model which was more reliant on
short-term funding.
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competition benefits stability. Liu, Molyneux, and Nguyen (2012) findings from
the South East Asian commercial banking sector, suggested that competition does
not increase risk-taking, thus supporting the competition-stability view. Further,
the authors found that more concentrated markets are safer. Interestingly their
regulation variable, an index including, bank activity restrictions, banking entry
requirements and diversification opportunities suggested more regulation increased
risk taking. Recently, using system GMM on Southeast Asian panel data, Noman,
Gee, and Isa (2018) found similarly that competition is associated with greater
financial stability due to lower credit risk. In the context of China, Tan and Floros
(2018) found that greater competition decreases credit risk and insolvency risk,
but increases liquidity risk. Further, Hou, Wang, and Zhang (2014) asserts that
intense market competition compels Chinese commercial banks to enhance technical
efficiency.
Elsewhere, Funga´cˇova´, Solanko, and Weill (2010) supported the competition-
fragility view within Russia during the period 2001 – 2006 and found that the
determinants of market power include the role of market concentration and risk.
In the Commonwealth Independent States Clark, Radic´, and Sharipova (2018) also
found that competition enhanced stability (using both NPL and Z-Score). They
tried to incorporate a quadratic function of the Lerner index within their main
model although the authors do not discuss this quadratic function in their findings,
which did suggest a concave relationship at a 10% confidence level.
5.3.3 Non-Linear Relationships
Following a meta-analysis of the bank competition-financial nexus literature,
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) stressed the importance of testing for potential
non-linearities which has generally been limited. Martinez-Miera and Repullo
(2010) were the first to claim that the relationship between competition and
financial stability could be non-linear, because competition can simultaneously
cause excess risk taking but also achieve higher capital buffers from larger profit
margins. The non-linear relationships tested so far include; a concave (n-shaped) a
convex (u-shaped) and a monotonic (positive and negative) relationship, see Figure
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5.1 for illustration. A convex relationship suggests that the banking system is
stable due to less competition then stability reduces, initially by increased
competition, but then returns to stable when competition increases to a certain
degree. On the contrary, a concave relationship suggests when competition is low,
stability is low (i.e. potentially due to inefficient risk management) and stability is
enhanced by increased competition, but in a highly competitive environment
stability falls. These relationships could be caused by the banking system taking
time to adjust to a new competitive environment (e.g. regulation change to allow
foreign banks to enter the market). Another example includes, in a highly
competitive banking system, the risk-shifting or spreading effects amongst banks
can result in reducing the probability of default and increases bank stability.
However, the margin effects of increased competition could lead to reduced loan
rates (as well as relaxed credit risk management) therefore lowering revenues and
profitability, in turn decreasing stability. Such dynamics/trade-offs can lead to a
non-linear relationship between bank competition and stability.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) evidenced that a non-linear (convex)
relationship theoretically exists between the risk of bank failure and market
competition. Their model identified that risk-shifting effects (identified by Boyd
and Nicolo´ (2005)) dominate in monopolistic markets whilst marginal effects
account for fewer defaults when loan rates decrease in more competitive markets.
N. Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2010) argued that there are several factors
that contribute to financial institutions’ system wide risk, e.g. bank size,
institutions’ specific probability of default and various risk factors that interact in
non-linear fashion. Contrary to other sectors, banks are funded by demand
deposits and this motivates several mechanisms of regulatory and legal
environments that influence the bank’s incentive for efficiency and risk-taking.
Using the Spanish banking sector data, Jime´nez, Lopez, and Saurina (2013) found
a non-linear relationship between market concentration and fragility, but when
using the Lerner index as the measure of competition their evidence supported a
linear competition-stability view. In Turkey, S. Kasman and Kasman (2015)
introduced a quadratic efficiency adjusted competition function into their
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robustness tests and found that a concave relationship exists for NPL as the
dependant variable, however with the Z-Score as the dependent variable the
competition-fragility view was found. In a cross-country study of 8,235 banks
operating in 23 different developed countries, Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss
(2009) included quadratic function of the Lerner index to account for the possible
non-linearity competition-stability relationship. Initially they found a concave
relationship between competition and stability however, further analysis with the
effect of competition on bank capitalisation resulted in no-relationship. Thus, the
authors concluded they found support for both the competition-fragility and
competition-stability hypotheses.
5.3.4 Relationship between Competition and Concentration
Concentration can also influence stability, it is believed that competition and
concentration can co-exist and can cause fragility and stability simultaneously
(Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009; Jime´nez et al., 2013; Liu, Molyneux, & Wilson,
2013; Mart´ınez-Jaramillo et al., 2010). In investigating this phenomenon
Mart´ınez-Jaramillo et al. (2010) found that the risk-shifting effect is more expected
in highly concentrated markets, while the margin effect tends to surface in
competitive markets. Determining banking system concentration and its
significance on a range of factors has been of interest to academics, economist and
regulators alike, because it has implications on numerus areas of economics. For
example, greater concentration within the banking sector has been associated with:
(i) increased barriers to entry for newer organisations and innovative companies
(i.e. FinTech) which may undesirably affect economic growth (Canales & Nanda,
2012; Cetorelli & Strahan, 2006; Love & Mart´ınez Per´ıa, 2014); (ii) lower
innovation and the adoption of new technologies, (J. Allen, Clark, & Houde, 2008);
(iii) it can impede the transmission of monetary policy (Drechsler, Savov, &
Schnabl, 2017); (iv) increase social imbalances and criminal active (Beck et al.,
2010; Garmaise & Moskowitz, 2006); (v) and adversely affect consumers, via lower
savings rates and higher interest rates on consumer loans (Kahn, Pennacchi, &
Sopranzetti, 2005).
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Literature has sought to understand the relationship between competition and
concentration but with conflicting results depending on what methodology was
applied. For example, in Europe Bikker and Haaf (2002) found an inverse
relationship, i.e. the higher the concentration the lower the competition. Casu and
Girardone (2006) concluded that there is no statistical relationship between
concentration and competition. Also, according to Hagendorff, Casu, and
Girardone (2009) and Claessens and Laeven (2004)3 concentration is a poor proxy
for competition, because they argue concentrated banking systems are not
necessarily less competitive than their un-concentrated equivalents. Shaffer (2004)
also noted that concentration is a weak proxy for competitive behaviour. Berger,
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich (2004) identified that market structure
cannot accurately explain competition levels. Similarly, Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and
Levine (2006) study into competition and concentration on stability found that
both concentration and competitiveness of the banking system is positively related
to stability. This suggests that concentration is an insufficient measure of
competitiveness. Bremus (2015) theoretically and empirically, argues that different
modes of cross-border banking impact bank concentration and market power
differently. Using panel dataset of 18 OECD countries, foreign lending and foreign
bank ownership coincides with lower concentration whilst its impact on
competition is mixed.
5.3.5 Concentration-Fragility
The concentration-fragility view argues that banking sectors which are dominated
by a few larger banks are more prone to instability. Similar to competition-fragility
argument this is due to the too-large-too-fail problem. In the US, Dick (2006)
noted that banking branch deregulation, which increased concentration at the
regional level, increased loan losses hampering stability. Within the EU, Ca˘praru
3Claessens and Laeven (2004) originally provided evidence of a positive and significant
relationship between bank concentration CR5 and competition P&RH, however their robustness
analysis proved the opposite, thus the rejection.
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and Andries¸ (2015) applied GMM to analyse the impact of concentration on
stability4 of 923 commercial banks during the period of 2001 to 2009. Depending
on the measure of concentration and group of countries, they found contrasting
results. Using CR5 they found that increased concentration had a negative impact
on stability for all Euro zone countries (except for new member states). When
using HHI, the concentration-stability view was found for countries outside of the
Euro zone and new member states. In another, cross-country analysis De Nicolo´,
Jalal, and Boyd (2006) found that concentrated banking markets (as measured by
HHI) are associated with greater risk of bank failures. They divided their sample
into two, (i) a cross section of circa 2500 small US banks and (ii) a panel data set
of circa 2700 banks from 134 non-Western countries. Both samples provided
evidence of concentration-fragility. In addition, De Nicolo´ and Loukoianova (2007)
using similar data found this relationship becomes stronger when controlling for
bank ownership. In the context of the Asia Pacific region, X. Fu et al. (2014)
found that greater concentration fosters financial instability due to low pricing
power, which enhances risk-taking exposure, although S.-G. Chan, Koh, Zainir,
and Yong (2015) noted that higher bank concentration in Asia reduces commercial
banks’ efficiency. When comparing systemic resilience of different market
structures (Islamic, conventional and conventional with Islamic windows) in six
GCC countries via MES, SRISK and CoVaR, Abedifar et al. (2017) identified
conventional with Islamic banks as the least resilient due to market synchronicity
and interconnectedness. This type of interconnectedness network, hampers
stability.
5.3.6 Concentration-Stability
The concentration-stability view argues that more saturated markets spread risk
around banks and increase interbank lending networks. Donaldson and Micheler
(2018) found that prior to the financial crisis more concentrated credit market
4This study claims to investigate the competition stability relationship using concentration
measure as a proxy for competition.
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networks lead to increased borrowing via non-resaleable debt (a fivefold increase in
repo borrowing) enhancing market instability. Beck et al. (2006) examined the
effect of market concentration on financial stability using data from 69 countries
and provided empirical evidence that increased concentration does not result in
increased financial instability within the market, thus confirming the
concentration-stability view. In addition, they question the appropriateness of
using the three firm concentration ratio (CR − 3) as a proxy of competitiveness.
Mirzaei, Moore, and Liu (2013) empirically investigated the effect of market
structure on both profit and stability which they claimed was a first. They
concluded that banking profits in developed countries are generally biased towards
the relative market power (RMP) hypothesis, but there was not enough evidence
to support this effect in the emerging economies. This bias towards RMP appeared
to achieve a systematic stabilising effect within the financial markets. However,
they also found a positive correlation between increased market concentration and
increased systemic risk in the advanced economies, thus confirming on the contrary
the concentration-fragility view. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) also confirmed this
view using a dataset of more than 2600 credit institutions from 25 EU countries
noting more concentrated banking markets also appear to have lower levels of risk.
Samad (2008) using a similar OLS methodology to Smirlock (1985) and
Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux, and Thornton (1994) for Bangladesh bank data
rejected the structure conduct performance (SCP) hypothesis and supports the
relative efficiency (ER) hypotheses (concepts discussed in Section 2.2). However,
bank specific factors were more consistent in explaining bank performance. The
higher the capital and reserves as a percentage of total assets the lower the risk for
the bank. Similarly, the higher the amount of loans as a percentage of deposits the
higher the risk for the bank. Also in the context of India, Das and Kumbhakar
(2016) found that higher levels of concentration allowed larger banks to impose
higher prices benefiting from significant market power, in turn being more
profitable.
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5.3.7 Quiet-Life
Relatively limited studies have sought to identify the quiet-life (QL) hypothesis
proposed by Hicks (1935). Such empirical studies aim to identify other risk
explanatory variables that impact stability more than competition or market
structure. In the context of the US, Berger and Hannan (1998) testing the QL
identified welfare losses with banks were more due to ineffciencies relative to those
due to market power. In the context of Europe, Maudos and de Guevara (2007)
attempted to test the QL hypothesis in line with the approach from Berger and
Hannan (1998), however their results showed the existence of a positive
relationship between market power and cost X-efficiency. An important
contribution within this study was to highlight the requirement to obtain both
competition and efficiency measures simultaneously. Recently, using EU data from
1998 to 2014 at both country and bank level, IJtsma et al. (2017) found that
concentration hardly affects stability which had not been previously established
within this literature, suggesting that both market-driven or regulatory forced
consolidation are not likely to alter financial stability. This finding further suggests
that neither supervisory restructuring, nor normal market-driven mergers, are
likely to be substantially harmful to financial stability. In addition, in the
Eurozone, Aparicio et al. (2018) assessed whether charter value is aligned with
supervision, they provided additional support for the idea that the relation
between risk and charter value is complex, and the relationship is not
homogeneous, regardless of the type and level of risk or the period.
5.4 Research Hypotheses
This section outlines the research hypotheses that will be under consideration in
this paper. Bearing in mind the identified gaps and inconclusive evidence noted in
the empirical literature and the aims of this paper, the aim is to test the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6: The market power paradigm persists.
This hypothesis suggests that the structure-conduct-performance paradigm
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(concentrate) and/or the relative market power paradigm (competition) exists,
in the context of the US banking sector (See Figure 2.1).
Hypothesis 7: The efficiency structure paradigm persists.
This hypothesis suggests that the relative efficiency or scale efficiency paradigm
exists in the context of the US banking sector (See Figure 2.1).
The simultaneous rejection of H6 and H7 would support the non-relationship,
quiet life hypothesis.
Hypothesis 8: Increased levels of competition negatively affects financial stability.
In the context of the US banking sector, this hypothesis would support the
competition-fragility view proposed by F. Allen and Gale (2004). The rejection
of this hypothesis would support the competition-stability view proposed by
Boyd and Nicolo´ (2005). Note that the rejection of hypothesis 6, would result
in the inability to test this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 9: Increased capital requirement regulation positively affects financial
stability.
This hypothesis suggests that increased capital requirements under the Basel
III regulations have a positive impact on financial stability. These capital
requirements are discussed further in Section 2.3.1. This hypothesis will be
tested using US bank panel data.
Hypothesis 10: Increased liquidity regulation positively affects financial stability.
This hypothesis suggests that the newly imposed Basel III regulations for
liquidity risk have a positive impact on financial stability. These liquidity
requirements are discussed further in Section 2.3.1 and 3.4.3. This hypothesis
will be tested using US bank panel data.
Hypothesis 11: Being named as a SIFI or D-SIB positively affects the institution’s
financial stability.
This hypothesis suggests that being a named a SIFI by the FSB or classed
as a D-SIB by domestic regulators has a positive impact on an institutions’
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financial stability. These classifications are discussed further in Section 2.4.
This hypothesis will be tested using US bank panel data.
Hypothesis 12: The use of recently developed models to measure systemic risk
provides contrasting results in the competition-stability nexus compared to
traditional accounting measures of financial stability.
This hypothesis suggests that the use of market level measures of systemic
risk other than using traditional accounting based measures of stability (such
as the Z-Score) alters the competition-stability relationship. Providing
evidence to support this hypothesis would support similar findings by
Abedifar et al. (2017) and Leroy and Lucotte (2017). This hypothesis will be
tested using US bank panel data.
5.5 Methodology
To examine the relationship between banking efficiency, competition, concentration
and financial stability, this study uses the following general dynamic regression
model:
Stabit = α + β1Stabit−1 + β2Compt + β3Conct + β4EFFit
+ β5BANKit + δ1Profitit + δ2Macrot + δ3Y eart + µi,t (5.5.1)
In equation 5.5.1, β are parameters to be estimated and δ are control
variables/parameters to be estimated whilst i and t refers to the individual banks
and time in years respectively. Stabit is the dependent variable denoting financial
stability for bank i at time t. Following numerous studies (Clark et al., 2018;
Noman et al., 2018; Tan & Floros, 2018, inter alia), Stabit−1, the lagged dependent
variable is incorporated to capture the persistence of financial stability. Compt and
Conct are the measured of sector level competition and concentration respectively
as discussed in section 5.5.1. EFFit is a vector of efficiency explanatory variables
as calculated previously in Section 4.4. BANKit is a vector of bank level variables
outlined in Section 5.5.3, this vector incorporates accounting based ratios for risk
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and regulatory requirements5. Most empirical studies that investigated the impact
of competition on risk mainly focus on credit risk (Tan & Floros, 2018). Thus, this
study will included other types of risk such as diversification and liquidity. Unlike
J. R. Barth et al. (2004) and Noman et al. (2018) lagged regulation variables are
not used, this is because in this study the regulatory variables are bank level ratios
rather than country level dummies or indicators (i.e. new regulations are not felt
by institutions until years after implementation). At the bank level the amount of
capital held one year will impact the same year’s risk level. Profitit is a bank level
profitability control variable. Marcot is a vector of country level macroeconomic
control variable and Y eart is a time dummy variable, to capture the effects
amongst variables. Further, µi,t = λi + εi,t, where λi is the unobservable individual
effects whist εi,t is the error term.
In order to identify and capture any non-linear relationships between financial
stability and banking competition (Figure 5.1), (Compt)
2 is incorporated (similar
to Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) and Turk-Ariss (2010)), the cubed effect
(Compt)
3 will also be tested in the case of a monotonic or polynomial relationship,
using the following equations:
Stabit = α + β1Stabit−1 + β2Compt + β3(Compt)2 + β4Conct
+ β5EFFit + β6BANKit + δ1Profitit + δ2Macrot + δ3Y eart + µi,t (5.5.2)
Stabit = α + β1Stabit−1 + β2Compt + β3(Compt)2 + β4(Compt)3 + β5Conct
+ β6EFFit + β7BANKit + δ1Profitit + δ2Macrot + δ3Y eart + µi,t (5.5.3)
As studies have shown (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009; Fiordelisi & Mare, 2014;
Jime´nez et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2012, inter alia), the interaction term of competition
and concentration (Compt × Conct) should be included to identify any moderation
effects, using the following equation:
5According to Pasiouras et al. (2009) regulations must take account of interactions between
competition, efficiency and financial stability.
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Stabit = α + β1Stabit−1 + β2Compt + β3Conct + β4(Compt × Conct)
+ β5EFFit + β6BANKit + δ1Profitit + δ2Macrot + δ3Y eart + µi,t (5.5.4)
Having a lagged dependent variable (yi,t−1) within the equation can be an issue
when applying Ordinary Least Squares, as it may be correlated with the fixed effect
error term, leading to dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). As an example, if a bank
was to experience a large negative unexpected shock to its balance sheet capital (e.g.
capital losses from operational risk), say in 2010, that shock would appear in the
error term. All else being equal, the apparent fixed effect for that bank for the whole
period (the deviation of its average unexplained capital from the sample average) will
appear to be lower. In the following substantial years the lags for 2011/12 capital and
the fixed effects with both be lower. This positive correlation between a regressor and
the error violates the Gauss-Markov (Consistency) assumption for OLS. Thus, the
estimates are obtained using the Arellano–Bond (AB) System–GMM method which
treats all the explanatory variables as endogenous, following the same rationale and
methodology as Section 4.4.5. GMM is preferred in this research area over OLS
and 2SLS because it is more efficient at taking account of heteroskedasticity (X. Fu
et al., 2014; Hall, 2005). In addition, to allow for non-linear variables to be added
to the regression, linear technigues like OLS would be inappropriate, GMM does
not assume a linear model as it compares the population moment conditions to the
sample moment conditions, thus it does not have to assume linearity (Hall, 2005).
5.5.1 Competition and Concentration Measures
The methodologies to measure the level of competition can be generally divided
into two different groups: the structured and non-structured approaches (Liu et al.,
2012). The non-structured approach relies on specific bank behaviour and conduct
that can influence its peers’ competitiveness. The structured approach focuses on
the number and size of the banks by way of concentration. Based on the assumption
that a small number of larger banks behave in the same way, they therefore become
less competitive.
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Within the banking competition literature, competition is not directly observed
(Tabak, Fazio, & Cajueiro, 2012) it is calculated econometrically. Commonly used
techniques include the Lerner Index, adjusted-Lerner Index, Panzar and Rosse
H-Statistic and the Boone Index. Alternatively, market concentration can be
directly observed by using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) or Concentration
Ratio’s (Commonly 3 and 5 firm). This section will discuss these measurements
and where appropriate will demonstrate their application, starting with the
competition measures.
The Lerner index has been widely used by economists since the mid-1930s
(Jayakumar et al., 2018) as a measure of competition however, due to the difficulty
of measuring marginal cost, it has only been used in banking literature relatively
recently. The Lerner index as calculated by following Fernandez de Guevara,
Maudos, and Perez (2005) and Fiordelisi and Mare (2014), is defined as the
difference between the marginal price and marginal cost divided by the marginal
price, as follows:
Lerneri,t =
Pi,t −mci,t
Pi,t
(5.5.5)
where P is i’s price of the output at year t and mc is marginal cost. The increase
in the Lerner index indicates a deterioration of the competition. This index takes a
value between 0 and 1, where 0 indicated perfect competition and 1 is a monopoly
(X. Fu et al., 2014). The price of output TA is calculated as total revenue (interest
and non-interest income) divided by total assets:
lnTCi,t = α0 + α1lnTA+
α2
2
lnTA2
+
3∑
j=1
βjlnPj +
1
2
3∑
j=1
3∑
k=1
δjklnPjlnPk +
1
2
3∑
k=1
γjlnTAlnPj + τ1t+
τ2
2
t2
+ τ3t× lnTA+
3∑
k=1
ψjtlnPj + εit (5.5.6)
where TCi,t is the bank’s total costs (personnel expenses, other administrative
expenses and other operating expenses). As a measure of production (output proxy)
total assets (TA) is used. The prices of the production factors (outputs) are as
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follows: P1 Price of labour: Personnel expenses/total assets
6. P2 Price of capital:
Operating costs (except personnel costs)/fixed assets. P3 Price of deposits: interest
expenses/total deposits and money-market funding. t is a time trend capturing the
dynamics of the cost function over time, and αβγδτ and ψ are coefficients to be
estimated. εit is the error term which comprises of two-components: εit = υit + νit,
νit is a two-sided error term, and υit is a one-sided disturbance term representing
inefficiency. Marginal cost can be derived from equation 5.5.6 as follows:
MCi,t =
TCi,t
TAi,t
[
α1 + α2lnTA+
3∑
j=1
γjlnPj + τ3t
]
(5.5.7)
MCi,t is substituted into the previous equation to calculate the Lerner index
for bank i at time t, thereby providing the dynamic change in market power across
banks over time. This measure is based on readily available accounting data and
can be interpreted easily. However, this measure does not capture the risk premia
within prices of institutions’ products and services, thus its positive relationship
with the size of monopoly (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2009). Further, using
the translog function (similar to the measure of efficiency, see Section 4.4) the Lerner
index assumes both cost and profit efficiency. Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012)
suggested the estimation of the price-cost margin may be a biased measure and does
not correctly measure the true extent of market power, thus advocating an adjusted-
Lerner index. They propose a correction in the form of the efficiency-adjusted Lerner
index:
AdjustedLerneri =
pii + TCi − qimci
pii + TCi
(5.5.8)
where pi is the profit of bank i, TC is the total cost, mc is marginal cost (as
previous) and q is the total output.
As efficiency will be an independent variable, the adjusted Lerner Index will
not be used within this research to avoid multicollinearity. In order to calculate
the Lerner Index for each jurisdiction of Basel, Tables 5.11 and 5.10 in the appedix
provide a statistical summary of the data used. There are jurisdictions that do not
6Total assets is used an an alternative to the number of employees due to data availability.
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appear within this table7 due to limited data availability. When attempting to
calculate their Lerner Index the models were not statistically significant. For the
calculation of the Lerner Index of the full sample (including the missing
jurisdictions), country dummies were included in order to identify whether they
significantly changed the outputs. This may have been expected given the
proportion of data coming solely from the US banking sector. This approach was
also taken in the calculation of Europe’s Lerner Index. Noticeably for many
countries the Price of Labour lacked data (especially in Japan) due to the
availability of personal expenses data. The timescales were determined based on
data availability when calculating the translog cost function for marginal cost.
From Table 5.12 and Figure 5.3, it is noticeable that the majority of countries are
closer to perfect competition (index of zero) than monopoly. The financial crisis
caused a slight reduction in competition (higher Lerner index) in many countries,
except from Russia. This may be explained by following the financial crisis and the
subsequent drop in oil price and a large number of Russian banks failures
(bankruptcy or forced merge) (Zhivaikina & Peresetsky, 2017) ultimately affecting
competition levels.
An alternative measure of competition is the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic
which infers the different degrees of competition within a sector. This measures the
sum of the elasticities of institutions revenue with respect to input prices. This
reduced-form revenue equation is calculated via
H =
m∑
k=1
∂R∗i
∂wki
wki
R∗i
(5.5.9)
where Ri refers to revenues of bank i (* indicates equilibrium values) and wi is a
vector of m factor input prices of bank i. Market power is measured by the extent
to which a change in factor input ∂wki is reflected in the equilibrium revenues ∂R
∗
i
earned by bank i. The main drawback of this Herfindahl index is the econometric
identification and interpretation, as sometimes higher values does not necessarily
7Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden and Turkey.
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Figure 5.3: Lerner Index Per Country
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imply low market power (Claessens & Laeven, 2004) and that the range of −∞ <
x > 1 indicates a degree of uncertainty (Van Leuvensteijn, Bikker, Van Rixtel, &
Sørensen, 2011). A critical feature of this approach is that it must be conducted
in long-run equilibrium (X. Fu et al., 2014) which is not always true due to market
entries and exits. A non-structural extension of the H-Statistic in order to include
lagged dependent variables (the disequilibrium approach) was proposed by Matousek
et al. (2016) following this empirical form:
lnROAi,t = β0 + β1lnROAi,t−1 + β2lnPLi,t−1 + β3lnPFCi,t−1
+ β4lnPPCi,t−1 + β5lnETAi,t + β6lnLTDi,t + β7Y ear + εit (5.5.10)
where the dependant variable lnROAi,t is bank i’s revenue in period t, which can
be replaced by two further variables, (i) the natural logarithm of revenue lnREVi,t
and (ii) the natural logarithm of interest income lnINTi,t. Similar to Claessens and
Laeven (2004); Gelos and Roldo´s (2004); Nathan and Neave (1989), lnROAi,t−1
is the lagged dependant variable, lnPLi,t−1 is the lagged natural log of the price
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of labour, lnPFCi,t−1 is the lagged natural log of the price of financial capital,
lnPPCi,t−1 is the lagged natural log of the price of physical capital. The following
are control variables of size and time, lnETAi,t is the natural log of equity to assets,
lnLTDi,t is the natural log of total loans to deposit and Y ear is the year time
dummy. Based upon the disequilibrium approach the H-Statistic that is used to
determine the degree of competition is calculated from equation 5.5.10 uses:
H =
β2 + β3 + β4
1− β1 (5.5.11)
where, H < 0 indicates a collusive oligopoly or monopoly, in which an increase
in costs causes outputs to fall and prices to increase. If firms aim to profit-maximize
they must be operating on the price elastic portion of its demand function, if not,
total revenue will fall. H > 1 indicates perfect competition, in which an increase in
costs causes some firm to exit, prices to increase and the revenue of the survivors
to increase at the same rate as the increase in costs. 0 < H < 1 indicates the
intermediate case of monopolistic competition in which an increase in costs causes
revenues to increase at a rate slower than the rate of increase in cost.
To apply this disequilibrium approach, US banking sector data was employed.
Following the approach by Matousek et al. (2016) both different (D) and system
(S), One-step (1) and two-step (2) GMM regression was applied (See Tables 5.15
and 5.16 in the appendix). First of all, with any form of regression analysis, Table
5.14 presents the variables correlation matrix. As expected total return and net
interest income are highly positively correlated (0.992), but these are both dependent
variables and will not feature in the same regression analysis. The independent
variables, Price of Labour and Price of Capital are also highly positively correlated
(0.979) therefore will be monitored for omissions (by Stata12) during the regressions
and the variable inflation factor (VIF) test will be conducted, to assess whether
both variables are needed. Table 5.15 contains the GMM H-Statistic output using
return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable, whilst Table 5.16 contains the
output when using total return (TR) and net interest income (INT) as the dependent
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variable. In all cases of the preferred system-GMM8, model specification did not fit
as the number of instruments was greater than number of groups (Roodman, 2009b).
Further, in all instances the year 2000 dummy was dropped due to collinearity. For
the dependent variables INT both 1D & 2D models were rejected due to the Hansen
J statistic being significant at 10% (non-significance, > 0.100, is required). The
distance GMM models for both ROA and TR fit, in this case the preferred model
is the one which has the lowest standard error on the dependent lag (Matousek et
al., 2016), which is ROA (Table 5.15). Further, following the VIF post regression
diagnostic testing9, in the models of TR the VIF for the lagged Price of Labour
equalled 19.64 (above 10 therefore should be removed from the model). Thus, the
highlighted column in Table 5.15, ROA two-step distance GMM, is the approach
is used to calculate the H-Statistic. The H-Statistic value of 0.7613 suggests that
over the whole period from 2000 to 2015 the United States banking industry was
under monopolistic competition. Figure 5.4 shows the H-Statistic at a yearly level,
fluctuates between perfect competition (greater than 1) to monopolistic competition,
generally in line with the Lerner Index previously calculated for the US.
The Boone Index (Boone, 2008b) estimates the level of competition by
assessing the efficiency and performance relationship, based on the assumption
that as industries become more competitive, efficient firms are rewarded whilst
inefficient firms are punished (Boone, 2008a). This measures estimates a
percentage decrease in profit resulting from a 1% increase in marginal cost. This is
determined by the parameter
(
ϑ =
ϑlnpii
ϑlnmci
)
, given by the following equation:
lnpii = α + ϑlnmci (5.5.12)
where pi is the profit of bank i and mc is marginal cost. The estimated coefficient
of ϑ is interpreted as the banks’ profit elasticity which is mainly negative, under the
assumption that institutions with greater marginal costs lose market share (Boone,
8Distance GMM often suffers from weak instruments (Roodman, 2009b).
9ROA’s average VIF was 5.21 with highest value being 8.4 (for L.lnPL), TR’s average VIF was
6.22 with highest value being 19.64 (for L.lnPL) and INT’s average VIF was 5.76 with highest
value being 9.02 (for L.lnPL).
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Figure 5.4: US Panzar & Rosse H-Statistic
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2008a). Higher competition in the sector results in the value of ϑ becoming more
negative (Clerides, Delis, & Kokas, 2015). A positive ϑ suggests that higher marginal
costs result in gaining market share, A. Kasman and Carvallo (2014) suggests this
would arise in the event of high levels of collusion or banks competing on quality.
Unlike the H-Statistic, the Boone indexes are typically monotonically related to
competition (Jayakumar et al., 2018) because the association between banking costs
and profits are both constant and monotonic. The main drawback of this approach is
that its only focus is on one relationship that is exaggerated by levels of competition,
thus ignoring other microeconomic or macroeconomic features (J. Q. Jeon & Lim,
2013; Tabak et al., 2012). Similar to the adjusted-Lerner Index, this study will
not use this measure due to inclusion of efficiency individuals variables within the
regression models. As the Boone Index incorporates efficiency within its calculation
and assumptions this could cause moderation effects with the efficiency variable.
To measure the degree of concentration the most commonly used variables are
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the three or five-bank concentration
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Figure 5.5: US Concentration Ratios
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ratio (CR3 and CR5 respectively). The concentration ratio’s are defined as the
combined market share in term of assets/loans/deposits (depending on the study) of
the three or five largest banks operating within a country. Thus, more concentrated
markets are indicated by higher values. This straightforward approach is based
on an arbitrary choice of large banks (3 or 5) in respect to the other banks, which
ignores the market share of all other banks within that country. Theoretically, Bikker
(2004) suggests this may result in two very different market structures having the
same concentration ratio.
Figure 5.5 demonstrates the concentration ratios based on US data10 for three
(C3) and five (C5) largest banks based on total assets (TA), total loans (TL) and
total deposits (Deposits). As expected there is a high correlation between the TA
and TL ratio as total loans is a large proportion of assets. Thus, in later analysis
10In order to calculate these measures of concentration for the US banking sector a balanced
dataset of the 385 banks was obtained from Bloomberg Professional Service. The top 3 and 5
banks were based on market capitalisation as of the 2nd January 2007.
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only one of these variables should be used. The first notable element is that all
C5’s are bigger than C3’s indicating that the proportion of assets/loans/deposits
is distributed amongst more of the larger banks within the sector. Secondly, the
C5’s trend is smoother than the C3’s, indicating that the former captures a large
proportion of the valuable under assessment within the sector. Thus, C5 ratios will
be used within later analysis. Finally the concentration of TA/TL is higher than
deposits within the US, suggesting that the larger banks, have less deposit relative
to loans and that deposits are more distributed across a range of banks within the
sector. This would concur with the previous literature regarding leverage and the
liquidity risk.
An alternative measure of concentrationis the HHI Index, which does not suffer
from an arbitrary cut-off point and is the most commonly used concentration
measure in literature and by regulators (Ca˘praru & Andries¸, 2015; Fiordelisi &
Mare, 2014; IJtsma et al., 2017). It is defined as the sum of the squared market
share:
HHIt =
n∑
i=1
MarketShare2it (5.5.13)
When n is the number of banks in the market and MarketShare2it is the squared
market share of bank i at time t. Again, higher values equal more concentrated
markets, however, this measures can be sensitive in the event of increased entries
from smaller banks within a short period (Rhoades, 1995). Using the same data as
the concentration ratios for the US, Figure 5.6 shows the calculated HHI for total
deposits (Deposits) and total assets (TA). Compared to the concentration ratios
the HHI is a broader measure of concentration as the scores are slightly lower but
generally follow the same trend, with increased concentration prior to the crisis then
noticeably subsequently drops after 2010. Further, confirming the concentration
ratios, HHI index of assets is higher than deposits.
In this paper to measure banking competition, the Lerner index is preferred
because it allows for the measurement of each year (rather than pooled) therefore
it can be matched with the other country and bank-specific (efficiency and risk)
variables within the panel data. Also, as seen with the calculation of P&R H-
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Figure 5.6: US Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
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Statistic this used Distance-GMM (which can suffer from weak instuments) rather
than the preferred System-GMM (Luo et al., 2016; Matousek et al., 2016; Noman et
al., 2018). However, P&R H-Statistic will be used for robustness checks as Bolt and
Humphrey (2015) warn that measures of competition within the banking sector tend
to be uncorrelated, and therefore advocates the use of more than one measure within
analysis. Bikker, Shaffer, and Spierdijk (2012) advocated the use of Both HHI and
CR5 (for assets) because each technique slightly differs in approach. HHI results
mainly from differences in the number of banks operating in the market whilst CR5
is determined by the skewness of the size distribution of banks (IJtsma et al., 2017).
5.5.2 Measures of Financial Stability
Within the competition-stability nexus literature the most commonly used
accounting based indicator to measure of individual institutions stability is
Altman’s (1968) Z-Score which was the first multivariate bankruptcy prediction
model (A. Kasman & Carvallo, 2014; Laeven & Levine, 2009; Liu et al., 2013;
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Mirzaei et al., 2013, inter alia). The fundamentals required for this model to be
applicable for financial institutions are constructed using proxies, therefore authors
have to be conscious of this. Elsewhere in literature following a review of 33
papers, since 2000 on the application of the Z-score, Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Altman,
Laitinen, and Suvas (2014) concluded it has been directly applied 16 times,
modified 14 times and used three times as a robustness check. Z-Score is
calculated using the following equation:
Zit =
ROAit + ETAit
σROA
(5.5.14)
where ROA is return on assets (proxy for performance), ETA denotes the equity
to asset ratio (proxy for capitalisation/risk aversion) and σROA is the standard
deviation of return on assets. A 3 year rolling time window for σROA is used
to allow for variation in the denominator of the Z-score. This variation captures
volatility in risk over the last 3 years. This approach avoids that the Z-scores are
exclusively driven by variation in the levels of capital and profitability. z is expressed
in units of σROA which shows the extent to which earnings can be depleted until the
bank has insufficient equity to absorb further losses. Therefore, the lower value of Z
implies a greater probability of bankruptcy (Molyneux & Williams, 2013) providing
a more direct measure of soundness compared to other measures of risk (Jayakumar
et al., 2018). Chiaramonte et al. (2015) investigated the accuracy of the Z-score, as
a proxy of bank soundness, on a sample of financial institutions from 12 European
countries over the period of 2001 to 2011. Their results indicated that the Z-score
performs as well as the CAMELS11 variables, but it has the advantage of being more
parsimonious than the CAMELS models, because it demands less accounting and
questionable data (i.e. the covariates to be used in CAMELS related analyses).
The main disadvantage of the Z-Score is that by its nature it does not capture the
correlation between other financial institutions as it is purely based on accounting
data. On a practical implementation note both Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010)
11This stands for, Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and
Sensitivity to Market Risk.
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and Laeven and Levine (2009) support the use of the natural log of the Z-Score
over the absolute value due to the latter’s skewed distribution. Lepetit and Strobel
(2015) tested for this using OECD commercial, cooperative and savings banks data
and found that the log Z-Score skewness was much lower than the simple Z-Scores12.
Alternative accounting based measures for stability include, non-performing loans
(NPL) (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009; Deli, Delis, Hasan, & Liu, 2019; Gadanecz
& Jayaram, 2008; Jime´nez et al., 2013; Noman et al., 2018). NPL is a proxy
as higher NPLs negatively impact profitability and directly relate to the problem
of debt extension. However, NPL is only confined to one aspect of the bank’s
balance sheet and does not fully capture stability (Schaeck & Cihak, 2012). Another
alternative is to include the loan loss provisions (LLP). However, both Cummings
and Durrani (2016) and Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) found that the increasing use of
LLP data being used in loss modelling resulted in the non-transparent management
of loss reserves and income smoothing within financial institutions. In an attempt to
prevent this practice in 2014 the International Accounting Standards Board and in
2016 the Financial Accounting Standards Board decided to replace the existing LLP
standards to incorporate a more forward looking approach based on expected losses
of financial instruments13 (Kru¨ger, Ro¨sch, & Scheule, 2018). Thus, the use of this
variable may provide a mis-leading view of loan quality prior to 2014. Lastly, the
use of country level dummy variables representing either bank failure or an outbreak
of a systemic banking crisis (Beck et al., 2006; Funga´cˇova´ & Weill, 2013) have been
used. As these studies makes use of bank level independent data the use of this type
of independent variable would not be appropriate for comparison purposes14.
Table 5.1 is a correlation matrix providing pairwise correlation coefficients of
Z-Score versus NPL, LLP and country level measures of systemic risk (calculated
12The authors did note that the Z-Score skewness was not an issue in itself, however it could
affect regression analysis interpretation.
13The International Financial Reporting Standards 9 (IFRS 9) and Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles Topic 326 (GAAP 326) thereby contribute to a more adequate recognition
of economic values.
14The use of time dummies within the GMM regressions will identify whether the crisis periods,
had a significant impact on the independent variables.
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in Section 3.4) based on US data. This table highlights the disparity between the
commonly used measure of financial stability (Z-Score) and the measures of
systemic risk. The Z-Score comparison versus aggregated country level systemic
risk scores suggest no correlation15, thus competition levels may influence financial
stability and systemic risk differently. Leroy and Lucotte (2017) used the Z-Score
and SRISK (another measure of systemic risk) exploring this phenomenon within
the competition-stability nexus and noted that having these two different
dimensions of risk can provide conflicting results. Noticeably, the Z-Score is also
not correlated (also no statistical significance) with NPL and LLP (which are
highly correlated with each other). A potential reason for this is that the Z-Scores
focus on profitability led stability rather than credit risk and the Z-Score captures
three rolling years of data rather than one.
Table 5.1: US Z-Score Cross-correlation with Country Measures of Systemic Risk
Variables ZScore NPL LLP CISS Mes CoVar DIP Crisis
ZScore 1.000
NPL -0.014 1.000
(0.294)
LLP -0.014 0.874 1.000
(0.225) (0.000)
CISS -0.082 0.039 0.059 1.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Mes -0.080 0.055 0.072 0.646 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CoVar -0.077 0.054 0.067 0.581 0.966 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIP -0.055 0.045 0.063 0.524 0.910 0.864 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crisis -0.073 0.032 0.067 0.711 0.629 0.566 0.524 1.000
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
15The signage is negative because lower Z-Score indicates increased default probability whilst
higher CoVar, MES, CISS and DIP means higher probability of systemic risk.
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5.5.3 Other Bank Level Explanitory Variables
The following independent variables will examine the impact of banking risk
characteristics and regulatory variables on financial stability while controlling for
profitability and size. See Table 5.2 for a descriptive summary of the variables16
and table 5.17 in the appendix for a year on year statistical summary.
To assess whether cost efficiency is positively associated with financial stability
the variable SFAEFF is included (as calculated in Section 4.4.1). It is assumed that
institutions become more cost efficient as a matter of survival, thus being positively
related to stability. It may be possible that inefficient banks in certain market
structures with low competition are able to survive. In this case the signage would be
negative. As an alternative measure of efficiency, ProdGrowth, calculated by DEA
(see Section 4.4.2) is also included with an expectation of a positive relationship
with stability.
A proxy for diversification (DIV) is the magnitude of non-interest income to
operating income, which greatly reflects bank participation to financial markets
such as securities trading, asset management services, to name a few. The
expected relationship with stability is uncertain. A negative sign may suggest that
diversification leads to risk reduction due to increased revenues steams, potentially
enhancing profitability thus lower probability of instability. Alternatively, the sign
may be positive since a higher dependence from market related income may
increase the different types of risk the bank faces, ultimately threatening stability
in the event of market downturns. In highlighting the uncertainty regarding the
influence of diversification on stability using US bank data, Ly, Liu, and Opong
(2018) evidenced that multi-bank holding companies benefited from internal
capital markets (diversification) compared to single bank holding companies.
However, at the subsidiary level these banks faced higher insolvency risk, the
authors suggested this was due to the level of risk taking with the premise of the
16All the data used was deflated by their corresponding year’s consumer price index (CPI) to
the 2000 price levels to control for inflation effects, a similar approach to X. Fu et al. (2014); Hung
et al. (2018); Liu et al. (2013); Noman et al. (2018) inter alia.
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parent’s ability to diversify income. Further, diversification can influence liquidity
as diversification at the parent holding company level enhances the bank’s ability
to increase its sourcing of external funds, therefore increasing the ability of the
parent company to withstand any liquidity shocks (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005, 2007).
Thus, in the regression analysis the interaction between DIV and LIQ will be
tested for multicollinearity and moderation effects.
To account for banks asset quality the variable CreditRisk is used. Financial
institutions which provide more loans especially in the context of pre-crisis, are
expected to incur higher credit risk. For example, Altunbas et al. (2017) identified
banks which following aggressive credit expansion policies, with unstable funding
in the years before the crisis experienced excessive credit risk during and preceding
the crisis. This variable is expected to have an inverse relationship with stability,
as higher credit risk would reduce profitability and increase the probability of
instability. A similar relationship is expected for leverage (FLVRG) as another
proxy for credit risk. As banks become more leveraged in the event of a crisis, such
institutions with greater assets than equity could face liquidity and credit risk
issues.
The Tier One Capital Ratio (T1CR) is a regulatory variable that is expected to
have a positive relationship with stability. As discussed in Section 2.3.1 the Basel
regulatory requirements were originally introduced to enhance financial
institutions’ capital to mitigate the risk of increased non-performing loans or
write-downs. For example, Anginer et al. (2018) found that greater capital reduces
system-wide fragility as measured by CoVaR and MES (see Section 3.4.2) in their
sample of 1735 publicly listed banks from 61 countries. In addition, Berger and
Bouwman (2013) suggested that increased capital increased the banks’ incentive to
engage in more relationship lending which would reduce moral hazard and default
probability. In the event of a negative relationship, if increased capital reduced
stability, this would suggest that this type of regulation may not be fit for purpose.
Also, Northcott (2004) argued that the amount of capital required may prevent
new entrants, thus protecting the market power of existing banks, allowing them
to benefit from monopolistic rents. However, Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) suggest
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that the stabilising effect of capital regulation benefits both competitive and
non-competitive markets.
A similar regulatory variable included within the regressions is the Tier 1
leverage ratio (T1LVGR) which was introduced by Basel III. This ratio represents
the relationship between a bank’s tier 1 capital and its total assets. Thus, the ratio
uses the bank’s core capital to judge how leveraged it is in relation to consolidated
assets. Higher ratios increase the likelihood of banks stability during times of
stress, therefore the ratio is expected to be positively associated with stability.
This regulatory variable to the best of my knowledge has not been tested within
the competition and stability nexus literature.
The relationship between financial stability and LIQ is expected to be positive
(negative signage). Banks that follow the traditional banking intermediation
business model (mainly funding their loan portfolio with its deposits) would be less
likely to face stability issues in the event of increase defaults. On the other hand
banks relying on short-term funding (i.e. from the money markets) to finance
longer-term loans are more exposed to refinancing problems in adverse
macroeconomic scenarios. In such circumstances, banks may find difficulty in
raising wholesale short-term funds thus increasing probability of instability.
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is regulatory variable which is designed
to enhance institutions access to longer term funding in the event of a crisis. The
relationship is expected to be positive as institutions’ that are able to access funds
in times of crisis, should be less likely to suffer instability issues. This variable to
the best of my knowledge has not been tested within the competition and stability
nexus literature. This ratio as discussed in Section 2.3.1 and 3.4.3 is required to be
above 100% to demonstrate the financial institution has sufficient access to longer
term funding in the event of a liquidity shortage. NSFR is approximated using
equation 5.5.15 (Chiaramonte & Casu, 2017).
NSFR =
Equity + TotalLT
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+
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)
+
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On the contrary, if the NSFR is seen as a burden and requires banks to
hold/source more funding which results in lowering profitability this could have
unintended consequence on stability.
As a control variable for profitability (ROA) is expected to have a positive
relationship with stability given the role of ROA in the calculation of Z-Score. In
the event of profitability due to higher credit risk, this could result in lowering
stability.
To investigate the role of size (and indirectly enhanced regulation) on stability,
the dummy variable SIFI is included as another control variable (only applicable
from 2011). This variable to the best of my knowledge has not been tested within
the competition and stability nexus literature. As SIFI and D-SIBS are subject to
extra regulation (discussed in section 2.4) this variable is expected to have a positive
relationship with stability.
Year effects (year dummies, excluding the first year) capture the influence of
aggregate (time-series) trends. It allows to control for the exogenous increase in
the dependent variable which is not explained by the other variables. For example,
the likes of an external shock where its impact is restricted to a given time-period,
affecting all panel units that are not controlled by other explanatory variables.
The inclusion of macroeconomic control variables, GDP growth (GDPc) and the
inflation rate (INF) is to take into account macro level effects on stability. X. Fu et al.
(2014) and C.-C. Lee and Hsieh (2014) suggest the inclusion of GDPc as changes in
economics activities (business cycle fluctuations) ultimately affect the performance
of financial institutions. Cubillas and Gonza´lez (2014) advocated for the inclusion
of INF as measured by the consumer price index as a proxy of macroeconomic
instability given its inverse effect on the real economy.
5.6 Financial Stability Findings and Discussion
Table 5.3 is a pairwise correlation matrix of all the US, country and bank level
explanatory and control variables. The lagged affect of the dependent variable has
a highly positive correlation (0.611) as expected, advocating the use of GMM
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Table 5.2: Country Level and Bank Level Exploratory Variables
Symbol Variable
Name
Description Expected
Sign
Authors
Explanatory Variable: measure of competition
LernerIndex Lerner Index Measure of competition +/– Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss
(2009); Clark et al. (2018); Deli
et al. (2019); Fiordelisi and Mare
(2014); X. Fu et al. (2014);
Jime´nez et al. (2013); Silva-Buston
(2019)
Explanatory Variable: measure of concentration
HHiTA Herfindahl-
Hirschman
Index
Measure of concentration based on
total assets
+/– De Nicolo´ et al. (2006); Fiordelisi
and Mare (2014); IJtsma et al.
(2017); Jime´nez et al. (2013)
Explanatory Variable: measures of efficiency
SFAEFF Cost Efficiency Parametric measure of efficiency
via Stochastic Frontier analysis (see
section 4.4.1)
+
ProdGrowth Productivity
Growth
Efficiency
Non-Parametric measure of efficiency
via Data Envelopment Analysis (see
section 4.4.2)
+ Tan and Floros (2018)
Bank Level Explanatory Variables
DIV Diversification Proxy for a banks’ business model
calculated by net non-interest income
to net operating income.
– Amidu and Wolfe (2013)
CreditRisk Credit Risk Ratio of Non-performing loans divided
by total loans. The higher the ratio,
the lower the quality of the loan
portfolio.
–
T1CR Tier 1 Capital
Ratio
The ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-
weighted assets.
+ Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss
(2009)
FLVRG Leverage Financial Leverage is defined as the
ratio of total assets to total common
equity. A lower figure represents less
leverage
–
T1FLVRG Tier 1 Leverage
Ratio
+ N/A
LIQ Liquidity Liquidity is measured by the ratio
of net loans to deposits and short
term funding. Lower figure represents
higher liquidity
– Leroy and Lucotte (2017); J. Kim
(2018); Liu et al. (2012)
NSFR Net Stable
Funding Ratio
A regulatory ratio to measure long-
term funding
+ N/A
Bank Level Control Variables
ROA Return on assets Indicator of how profitable a company
is relative to its total assets, as a
percentage. Provides an idea how
efficient management is at using its
assets to generate earnings
+ IJtsma et al. (2017); Jime´nez et al.
(2013)
SIFI SIFI Bank A dummy variable 1= classified as a
systemically important institution or
a domestically important institution,
otherwise 0
+ N/A
Macro-economic Control Variables
INF Inflation Annual inflation rate based on
consumer price index
– C.-C. Lee and Hsieh (2014); Tan
and Floros (2018)
GDPc GDP Change Annual real GDP growth rate + Cubillas and Gonza´lez (2014); Tan
and Floros (2018)
Year Time Time dummy variable Fiordelisi and Mare (2014)
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rather than OLS regression due to autocorrelation. As a control variable for
profitability, ROA has a low 0.365 correlation score against the dependent variable
LnZScore. Hartmann et al. (2014) advocate that prior to any analysis, correlation
testing for this variable conducted given the role of ROA in within the calculation
of the Z-Score. The relationship was expected to be positive as increased
profitability should enhance stability (Albertazzi & Gambacorta, 2009; Berger,
Hasan, & Zhou, 2009; Mirzaei et al., 2013, inter alia). The correlation score
between the Lerner Index and HHiTA is 0.369, albeit weakly positive, this
relationship suggests that as the Lerner Index increases (less competition), HHiTA
increases (more concentration). This concurs with economic theory that
monopolies persist in more concentrated markets (Athanasoglou, Brissimis, &
Delis, 2008; Berger, 1995; Demsetz, Goldschmid, Mann, & Weston, 1974, inter
alia). Other noticeable moderate relationships include learnerindex & SFAEFF
(-0.540) and LIQ & NSFR (0.537). The former is due to the similar variables used
in calculating both techniques. This also confirms that the use of the
adjusted-Lerner Index may result in a high correlation with the efficiency
measures, thus causing multicollinearity in the regression17 (Blalock Jr, 1963). The
latter is due to both variables measuring liquidity, one from the bank’s perspective
and the other from a regulatory requirement.
17Stata12 omits any independent variables that causes multicollinearity and the VIF averages
will be included within the findings tables and any violations (VIF > 10 will be reported).
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Table 5.3: US 2000-2015 Correlation Matrix
Variables LnZScore L1LnZScore LernerIndex HHiTA SFAEFF ProdGrowth DIV CreditRisk T1CR FLVRG T1LVGR LIQ NSFR ROA
LnZScore 1.000
L1LnZScore 0.611 1.000
(0.000)
LernerIndex -0.046 -0.181 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
HHiTA -0.077 -0.013 0.369 1.000
(0.000) (0.343) (0.000)
SFAEFF -0.071 0.021 -0.540 0.350 1.000
(0.000) (0.232) (0.000) (0.000)
ProdGrowth -0.200 -0.057 -0.124 -0.139 -0.127 1.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIV -0.123 -0.037 0.006 -0.004 -0.039 0.012 1.000
(0.000) (0.006) (0.599) (0.746) (0.018) (0.493)
CreditRisk -0.028 -0.046 0.024 -0.003 0.004 0.017 0.001 1.000
(0.048) (0.002) (0.064) (0.834) (0.817) (0.328) (0.930)
T1CR 0.017 -0.010 0.106 -0.041 -0.160 -0.067 -0.011 -0.009 1.000
(0.200) (0.455) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.323) (0.489)
FLVRG -0.103 -0.125 0.022 0.017 0.052 -0.007 -0.026 0.017 -0.147 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.130) (0.001) (0.701) (0.022) (0.185) (0.000)
T1LVGR -0.008 -0.039 0.017 -0.005 -0.152 -0.013 0.002 -0.001 0.024 -0.005 1.000
(0.576) (0.008) (0.191) (0.679) (0.000) (0.450) (0.856) (0.941) (0.058) (0.674)
LIQ -0.058 -0.023 -0.133 0.092 -0.012 0.108 -0.012 -0.018 0.014 -0.040 0.014 1.000
(0.000) (0.128) (0.000) (0.000) (0.521) (0.000) (0.369) (0.216) (0.294) (0.003) (0.335)
NSFR -0.008 0.006 -0.053 0.043 -0.003 0.070 -0.020 0.013 -0.102 -0.021 0.015 0.537 1.000
(0.615) (0.737) (0.000) (0.003) (0.879) (0.001) (0.178) (0.404) (0.000) (0.163) (0.338) (0.000)
ROA 0.365 0.196 0.017 -0.061 -0.251 -0.114 0.031 -0.041 0.052 -0.065 -0.005 0.002 -0.046 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.143) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.696) (0.883) (0.002)
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First of all, Table 5.4, presents the pool OLS regression (model 1) and fixed
effects18 regression (model 2). These were conducted to ensure that there was a
relationship between the explanatory and dependent variable, before conducting
GMM. These models both suffer from autocorrelation due to the lag dependent
variables, however the VIF test shows no multicollinearity.
Table 5.4: US Bank Pooled and FE, Competition vs Financial Stability 2000-2015
Pooled OLS (1) FE (2)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
L.LnZScore 0.477∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.332∗∗∗ (0.021)
LernerIndex 2.982∗∗∗ (0.817) 1.111 (0.875)
HHiTA 2.218 (4.008) -2.848 (4.033)
SFAEFF 83.405∗∗∗ (5.807) 118.778∗∗ (55.901)
ProdGrowth -0.685 (0.708) -0.697 (0.812)
DIV -0.010 (0.007) -0.014∗∗ (0.007)
CreditRisk -18.640∗∗∗ (2.577) -21.470∗∗∗ (3.218)
T1CR 0.002 (0.010) 0.001 (0.015)
FLVRG -0.001∗ (0.009) -0.033∗∗ (0.014)
T1LVGR -1.479 (1.385) -0.121 (1.657)
LIQ -0.247∗∗∗ (0.188) -0.059∗∗∗ (0.299)
NSFR -0.326∗∗∗ (0.041) -0.572∗∗∗ (0.053)
ROA 0.805∗∗∗ (0.053) 1.122∗∗∗ (0.068)
SIFI -0.050 (0.077) -0.098∗ (0.007)
INF -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002)
GDPc 0.012 (0.020) 0.015 (0.020)
Intercept 71.464∗ (43.437) 102.936∗∗ (47.872)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
N 1766 1766
χ2(15) 1920.357
∗∗∗
F (231,1534) 97.870
∗∗∗
R2 0.523 0.489
VIF 1.75 1.90
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
18Both fixed effects and random effects models were estimated, following the Hausman test
(P=0.000), fixed effects was deemed to be the more fitting model.
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Table 5.5: US GMM Regression, Competition vs Financial Stability 2000-2015
(1) Base (2) Add CR5 (3) U-Shape (4) Mono/Poly (5) Comp*Con
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
L.LnZScore 0.466∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.476∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.469∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.466∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.473∗∗∗ (0.004)
LernerIndex 3.764∗∗∗ (0.130) 2.925∗∗∗ (0.137) 19.314∗∗∗ (1.671) 15.773∗∗∗ (1.977) -36.613∗∗∗ (1.786)
LernerIndex2 -29.493 (53.039) -54.113∗∗∗ (4.928)
LernerIndex3 66.308∗∗∗ (5.166)
HHiTA -3.785 (3.779) -15.999∗∗∗ (1.629) 3.060∗∗∗ (0.725) -14.255∗∗∗ (1.949) -72.946∗∗∗ (3.673)
C5TA -11.225∗∗∗ (0.730) 12.152∗∗∗ (0.650) -10.785∗∗∗ (0.990) -10.852∗∗∗ (0.802)
CompCon 271.456 (82.383)
SFAEFF 37.224 (21.191) 37.224∗∗ (15.191) 48.802∗∗∗ (14.735) 38.975∗∗∗ (14.588) 47.666∗∗∗ (13.925)
ProdGrowth -0.529 (0.532) -0.781 (0.623) -0.464 (0.529) -0.640 (0.741) -0.618 (0.733)
DIV -0.013∗∗ (0.010) -0.012∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.013∗ (0.056) -0.012∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.013 (0.752)
CreditRisk -19.488∗∗∗ (0.829) -21.971∗∗∗ (0.915) -20.175∗∗∗ (0.786) -22.660∗∗∗ (0.945) -23.537∗∗∗ (0.891)
T1CR 0.026∗∗ (0.009) 0.022∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.023 (0.114) 0.026∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.027 (0.205)
FLVRG -0.031∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.028∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.031∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.032∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.031∗∗∗ (0.001)
T1LVGR 0.474 (0.448) 0.151 (0.397) 0.015 (0.477) 0.311 (0.523) 0.614 (0.468)
LIQ -0.364∗∗∗ (0.041) -0.291∗∗∗ (0.049) -0.306∗∗∗ (0.040) -0.266∗∗∗ (0.044) -0.239∗∗∗ (0.045)
NSFR -0.278∗∗∗ (0.038) -0.325∗∗∗ (0.065) -0.385∗∗∗ (0.069) -0.337∗∗∗ (0.047) -0.372∗∗∗ (0.043)
ROA 0.978∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.968∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.975∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.966∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.960∗∗∗ (0.011)
SIFI -0.047 (0.079) -0.071 (0.057) -0.099 (0.076) -0.105 (0.158) -0.001 (0.752)
INF -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.006∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.004∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.005∗∗∗ (0.000)
GDPc 0.018∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.036∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.005)
Intercept -31.230∗ (13.068) -2.637∗∗∗ (0.280) -43.479∗∗∗ (12.716) -49.458∗∗∗ (12.889) -29.012∗ (11.834)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1766 1766 1766 1766 1766
Groups 316 316 316 316 316
Instruments 217 217 217 217 217
AR(1)(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2)(p-value) 0.83 0.264 0.069 0.145 0.075
Hansen (p-value) 0.657 0.801 0.489 0.356 0.478
VIF 1.83 3.27 6.37(R) 1.31 15.5(R)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 5.5 reports the system GMM estimation of equations 5.5.1 to 5.5.4. The
bottom of the table presents the pre-and post diagnostics tests for the GMM
specification, using the dependent variable of LnZScore as a proxy for stability in
models 1 to 5. Model 1 is the baseline with only one measure of concentration
(same as the pooled OLS and FE estimation in Table 5.4) . Model 2 adds CR5
following Bikker et al. (2012) suggestion of applying two types of concentration
measure. Model 3 represents 5.5.2, adds a quadratic function to test for a
concave/convex relationship between banking competition and stability. Model 4
further introduces a cubic function to identify any monotonic/polynomial
relationship. Finally, model 5 introduces a moderating variable of competition
multiplied by concentration (Equation 5.5.4) to assess whether the interaction of
the competition and concentration impacts stability. From the regression
diagnostics, all the Sargan and Hansen tests’ null hypothesis of over-identifying
restrictions (i.e. the instruments as a group are exogenous) are not rejected
(Hansen test’s p -value greater than 0.100). AB test for null hypothesis of no first
order autocorrelation (AR(1)) in first differences is rejected (all 0.000); but AB
test for null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation in levels (AR(2)) is not
rejected (all above 0.100, except model 3).
Firstly, the baseline specification (model 1) fits, however the variable for
concentration (HHiTA) is not significant, with the introduction of the five bank
concentration ratio (model 2) both become significant and do not alter any other
variable’s signage or significance. Model 2 provides evidence for both a
competition and concentration fragility relationship. However, to confirm a linear
relationship exists, any non-linear relationship most be discounted. In model 3, the
equation itself only fits at 10% level for AR(2) and when conducting the variance
inflation factor (VIF) both LearnerIndex and LearnerIndex2 variables VIF score
was greater than 10, thus suffering from multicollinearity and should be removed
from the regression (ultimately rejecting a u/n-shape non-linear relationship).
With the introduction of a cubic function in model 4, this provides similar results
to model 2 with the linear, quadratic and cubic functions of competition all being
significant which suggests a monotonic/polynomial relationship. Finally, in
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attempting to identify any moderation effects between competition and
concentration the variable CompCon was added to model 2 which resulted in
model 5 only fitting at 10% level for AR(2) and an average of VIF greater than 10,
thus rejecting the model.
The following interpretation of the explanatory variables is from model 4 in
Table 5.5. This shows that the Lerner Index is positively polynomial19 and
significant relative to lnZScore20 as well as both measures of concentration
coefficients being negative21. This finding suggests that competition-fragility and
concentration-fragility can co-exist (a neutral view of the competition stability
nexus, X. Fu et al. (2014) found similar). Thus, having lower pricing power
(Brewer & Saidenberg, 1996) and excessive concentration (De Nicolo´ et al., 2006;
Dick, 2006) can simultaneously lead to financial fragility in the US. Regarding
efficiency, cost efficiency (SFAEFF) as expected positively influences stability, thus
advocating the assumption used in Chapter 3, of calculating cost efficiency rather
than profit efficiency. On the other hand, productivity growth was non-significant
related to stability.
Regarding the risk explanatory variables, diversification has a significant
negative sign which suggests that increased diversity (higher DIV) negatively
affects stability. This may be due to the increased activity away from the
traditional role of a bank and an intermediator results in excess risk, further, as
institutions engage in more market based activities (e.g. proprietor trading) this
changes the types of risk they face. CreditRisk, as expected, provides a negative
significant relationship with stability, thus confirming, increased non-performing
loans relative to total loans impact profitability and then stability. In addition,
increased leverage (FLVRG) and lower liquidity (LIQ) both negatively impact
financial stability. Again this was expected, for example if financial institutions
19The linear LernerIndex is positive, the quadratic is negative and cubic is positive again, which
suggests a change (a kink) in the direction of the relationship.
20A greater Lerner index value equals less competition (Monopoly=1) this finding suggests an
increase in Lerner Index enhances Z-Score.
21Higher HHiTA or CR5 equal more concentration.
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become more leveraged they may face higher liquidity issues if counterparts trigger
a run on their assets, which would increase the likelihood of instability. When
observing the regulatory explanatory variables of T1LVGR and SIFI they were
non-significant. From observing Table 5.17 the former may be due to this variable
consistently being higher than the 3% requirement from Basel III. From the
statistical summary, the lowest average Tier 1 Leverage Ratio was in 2000 (author
calculated) at 8% with a low standard deviation. Over the years to 2015 the
average trend is an overall increase in this ratio, unlike the fluctuating trend of the
Z-Score. Further, in the pairwise correlation matrix (Table 5.3) this variable is
uncorrelated with the majority of other variables (ranging from -0.152 to 0.024).
The latter may be due to only coming into effect since 2011 so this dummy
variables is only relevant for a third of the full sample time-scale22. The Tier 1
Capital Ratio is positively associated with financial stability, thus providing
evidence that this regulatory requirement is justified. In a cross-country study,
(Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2009) similarly found that competition-fragility
hypothesis exists due to riskier loan portfolios, but this is partially offset by higher
capital ratios. These findings are also similar to Klomp and De Haan (2015) who
found that stricter capital regulation enhanced the banks’ Z-Scores. In addition
Kapan and Minoiu (2018) also found similar in the US with evidence to support
the idea that higher capitalised banks were able to maintain credit supply when
faced with liquidity shocks during the crisis. Elsewhere in the context of Australia,
Bui, Scheule, and Wu (2017) found that a moderate increase in bank capitalisation
is sufficient to maintain financial system resilience, even after taking economic
downturns into consideration. Contrasting this positive regulatory requirement
finding, the NSFR is statistically negatively associated with financial stability
which contrasts Klomp and De Haan (2015) finding that liquidity restrictions have
most positive effect on stability for commercial banks. This liquidity requirement
is to ensure that financial institutions have access to longer term stable funding in
the event of a crisis. Nevertheless, this result suggests that there may be an
22There were also no significant changes in the year time dummies 2011 to 2015, suggesting the
insignificance of this variable.
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unintended negative consequence on profitability (Wei et al., 2017), due to higher
funding costs, which affects stability. Also, Schmitz and Hesse (2014) noted banks
tend to hold on to liquidity during periods of systemic uncertainty, increasing costs
for banks seeking more stable funding. Another potential reason may arise from
the banks changing their funding habits if they require a certain types of funding.
For example, Donaldson and Micheler (2018) argue that if banks increased
non-resaleable debt (repos) as a source of funding it could create new credit
networks23 which can act as a source of systemic risk i.e. a bank’s default will
impact its counterpart creditor and that creditors’ creditors. In addition, when
controlling for regulatory conditions within the GMM regression this decreases the
reported estimates, thus supporting the notion that banking systems with more
activity restrictions are more likely to suffer from systemic financial distress (Beck
et al., 2006).
5.6.1 Robustness Checks
To address any possibility of endogeneity extra control variables were added to
model 4 from Table 5.5 to observe any changes. These robustness checks are
presented in Table 5.7 and they are quantitatively similar to the baseline
specification. In addition table 5.6 presents a dynamic panel autoregressive model
using fixed effects, which provides similar results to the GMM specifications. The
values of the modified Durbin-Watson statistic and Baltagi-Wu LBI-statistic
indicates no autocorrelation (the values can be between 0 and 4). For these two
statistics, p-values are not reported (Born & Breitung, 2016). Bhargava, Franzini,
and Narendranathan (1982) published critical values for their statistic, but no
tables are available for the Baltagi–Wu (LBI). Baltagi and Wu (1999) did derive a
normalized version of their statistic, but this statistic cannot be computed for
datasets of moderate/large size.
Four different strategies were tested, model 2 uses the P& R H-Statistic
23If a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but
must borrow via a new contract.
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(disequilibrium approach) as a measure of competition rather than the Lerner
Index (De Nicolo´ et al., 2006; Moch, 2013; Noman et al., 2018; Schaeck et al.,
2009), model 3 incorporates an accounting based measure of cost efficiency, model
4 includes additional profitability control variables and model 5 accounts for
ownership and size. Finally, all additional variables were added within the same
regression (except for PRH due to multicollinearity)24. First, the models with
extra control variables fit the GMM specifications, albeit model 3 which is only
significant to 10% in the second order of autocorrelation. The first strategy to
ensure this relationship between competition and stability is consistent when
applying another type of competition measure. When applying the P& R
H-Statistic as an alternative measure of competition this also provides a
polynomial competition fragility relationship25. The only noticeable difference
within model 2 is the change in signage for cost efficiency (SFAEFF), this may be
due to the way the efficiency measure is calculated which uses similar data and
approach to the calculation of the Lerner Index but not similar to the P& R
H-Statistic calculation. The P&R H-Statistic was not used within the original
model (Table 5.5) due to data limitations when calculating this measure of
competition (unbalanced data), which may have affected the GMM results. For
model 3, the ideal test to incorporate further efficiency measures would have been
to use the efficiency-adjusted measures of competition (adjusted-Learner or the
boone indicator). However as expected when attempting to include the
adjusted-Lerner Index as another alternative measure for competition, these
variables and the efficiency variables were omitted due to multicollinearity. Thus,
the cost to income accounting-based efficiency ratio (C.-C. Lee & Hsieh, 2014) was
incorporated instead which did not alter the baseline. Another strategy was to
corporate profitability ratios (ROE and TobinQ) which are not used in the
24This result is not presented within this table due to size constraints, however this model was
also quantitatively similar to the baseline model.
25Note the signage is the opposite to LernerIndex (i.e. Linear=negative, quadratic=positive,
cubic=negative) this is because the higher the P& R H-Statistic the greater competition (the
Lerner Index is the opposite).
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calculation of the Z-Score, again these did not alter the baseline model except from
increasing the lagged affects coefficient value. Finally, extra control variables for
foreign ownership (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009; De Nicolo´ & Loukoianova, 2007;
Noman et al., 2018; Schaeck et al., 2009) and size (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss,
2009; Clark et al., 2018; X. Fu et al., 2014; Tabak et al., 2012) were included.
Similarly this did not alter the baseline model, noticeably, both variables for size
where statistically negatively related to stability, like diversification this suggests
that the larger the bank is, the greater the risk of instability.
Table 5.6: Robustness US Dynamic Panel Autoregressive Model 2000-2015
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
L.LnZScore 0.073∗∗∗ (0.025)
LernerIndex 83.525∗∗∗ (6.375)
LernerIndex2 -64.717∗∗ (37.861)
LernerIndex3 92.390∗∗ (48.353)
HHiTA -13.112∗∗ (8.539)
C5TA -7.440∗∗ (4.303)
SFAEFF 18.302∗∗ (8.987)
ProdGrowth -0.322 (0.127)
DIV 0.017∗∗ (0.007)
CreditRisk -25.592∗∗∗ (3.941)
T1CR 0.016∗ (0.017)
FLVRG -0.052∗∗∗ (0.017)
T1LVGR 0.826 (2.036)
LIQ -0.185∗∗∗ (0.007)
NSFR -0.730∗∗∗ (0.024)
ROA 1.264∗ (0.076)
SIFI -0.054 (0.077)
INF -0.007∗∗∗ (0.004)
GDPc 0.066∗∗∗ (0.019)
Intercept 2.570∗∗∗ (0.242)
N 1549
Modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson 1.701
Baltagi-Wu LBI test for autocorrelation 2.016
F (224,1324) 47.577
∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 5.7: Robustness GMM Regression, Competition vs Financial Stability 2000-2015
(1) Baseline (2) P&R H (3) EFF (4) Profit (5) Ownership and Size
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
L.LnZScore 0.466∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.464∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.476∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.504∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.465∗∗∗ (0.005)
LernerIndex 15.773∗∗∗ (1.977) 9.116∗∗∗ (2.124) 22.571∗∗∗ (1.772) 16.529∗∗∗ (12.753)
LernerIndex2 -54.113∗∗∗ (4.928) -10.452∗∗∗ (3.936) -36.309∗∗∗ (3.258) -55.866∗∗∗ (47.769)
LernerIndex3 66.308∗∗∗ (5.166) 15.245∗∗∗ (1.020) 46.308∗∗∗ (5.166) 65.578∗∗∗ (59.272)
PRH -0.193∗∗∗ (0.021)
PRH2 0.643∗∗∗ (0.037)
PRH3 -0.519∗∗∗ (0.026)
HHiTA -14.255∗∗∗ (1.949) -25.675∗∗ (3.639) -2.514 (2.215) -9.942∗∗∗ (1.481) -13.472∗∗∗ (2.149)
C5TA -10.785∗∗∗ (0.990) -11.678∗∗ (2.705) -4.464∗∗∗ (1.173) -7.060∗ (0.780) -9.568∗∗ (1.075)
SFAEFF 38.975∗∗∗ (14.588) -135.015∗∗∗ (15.645) 12.574∗ (4.588) 21.054∗∗∗ (9.547) 84.295∗∗ (14.558)
CIR -0.009∗ (0.001)
ProdGrowth -0.640 (0.741) -0.886 (0.441) -0.659 (0.734) -0.615 (0.823) -0.635∗∗∗ (0.035)
DIV -0.012∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.015∗ (0.105) 0.021∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.022∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.010∗ (0.001)
CreditRisk -22.660∗∗∗ (0.945) -20.559∗∗∗ (0.770) -21.321∗∗∗ (0.824) -21.055∗∗∗ (1.156) -20.835∗∗∗ (0.874)
T1CR 0.026∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.022∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.021∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.014∗∗ (0.004) 0.038∗∗∗ (0.004)
FLVRG -0.032∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.033∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.021∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.144∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.045∗∗∗ (0.002)
T1LVGR 0.311 (0.523) 0.116 (0.342) 0.078 (0.476) 7.082 (4.573) 0.140 (0.517)
LIQ -0.266∗∗∗ (0.044) -0.421∗∗∗ (0.052) -0.327∗∗∗ (0.082) -0.061∗∗ (0.072) -0.745∗∗∗ (0.141)
NSFR -0.337∗∗∗ (0.047) -0.219∗ (0.095) -0.761∗∗∗ (0.080) -0.380∗∗∗ (0.099) -1.291∗∗ (0.110)
ROA 0.966∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.972∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.877∗∗∗ (0.013) 1.080∗∗∗ (0.025) 1.018∗∗∗ (0.018)
ROE 0.008∗∗∗ (0.001)
TobinQ 0.047 (0.001)
Foreign -0.052 (0.247)
LnASize -0.794∗∗∗ (0.107)
LnLSize -0.693∗∗∗ (0.109)
SIFI -0.105 (0.158) -0.214 (0.555) -0.975 (0.485) -0.005 (0.758) -0.145 (0.254)
INF -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.008∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.002∗∗ (0.001)
GDPc 0.036∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.061∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.025∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.031∗∗∗ (0.006)
Intercept -49.458∗∗∗ (12.889) -114.753∗∗∗ (13.477) -1.203∗∗∗ (0.454) -5.158∗∗∗ (0.356) -84.910∗∗∗ (12.373)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1766 1766 1766 1652 1754
Groups 316 316 316 301 310
Instruments 217 217 224 235 226
AR(1)(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2)(p-value) 0.145 0.120 0.059 0.268 0.186
Hansen (p-value) 0.356 0.176 0.231 0.256 0.156
VIF 1.31 1.16 4.51 2.98 2.01
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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5.6.2 Financial Stability vs Systemic Risk
Table 5.8 assesses the competition-stability nexus using measures of systemic risk
rather than financial stability. Model 1 is the baseline model identified in Table 5.5
with Z-Score as the dependent variable. Model 2 applies non-performing loans as a
dependent variable as another proxy of financial stability. CoVaR26, CISS and DIP
are the dependent variables of systemic risk within model 3, 4 and 5 respectively.
Firstly, models 2, 3 and 5, either failed the pre or post-regression diagnostics
(1st/2nd order autocorrelation or Hansen test) thus, interpreting them would be
misleading. CISS (model 4) as a dependent variable for systemic risk provided a
number of statistically reliable models using GMM. Initially, CISS provided
evidence supporting a competition-fragility relationship between systemic risk and
competition, but not a polynomial/monotonic relationship due to limited
statistical significance on the cubic and quadratic functions of Lerner. However,
model 4 presents the final model for CISS which advocates a concave27 relationship
between systemic risk and competition within the US. This finding suggests when
competition is low (monopoly) systemic risk is high, as competition increases
systemic risk reduces however, when competition gets close to perfect competition
systemic risk increases again. Similar to Leroy and Lucotte (2017), by comparing
both financial stability and systemic risk independent variables, contrasting results
are evidenced. Both models 1 and 4, suggests perfect competition results in
increased financially fragility (low financial stability and high systemic risk)
however, in the case of monopoly the results contrast (high financial stability but
high systemic risk). Noticeably both models also suggest a change in direction
between monopoly and perfect competition, with Z-Score being polynomial and
CISS being a concave relationship. In addition, both models advocate the
concentration-fragility relationship in the US.
26MES was applied as an independent variable too, however its results were very similar results
of CoVaR, given their very high positive correlation noted in Table 5.1. Silva-Buston (2019) had
a similar issue, but in their study they preferred the use of MES due to statistical significance.
27Mathematically y = −x+x2 is a convex shape, however the interpretation of the Lerner index
is the opposite, higher the score means lower competition.
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Table 5.8: US GMM Regression, Competition vs Systemic Risk 2000-2015
(1) Baseline (2) NPL (3) CoVaR (4) CISS (5) DIP
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
L.LnZScore 0.466∗∗∗ (0.004)
L.NPL 0.851∗∗∗ (0.011)
L.CoVar 0.385∗∗∗ (0.010)
L.CISS 0.365∗∗∗ (0.029)
L.DIP 0.053∗∗∗ (0.008)
LernerIndex 15.773∗∗∗ (1.977) -62700.819 (70538.829) -5.429∗∗∗ (0.241) -7.494∗∗∗ (0.663) -1.840∗∗∗ (0.128)
LernerIndex2 -54.113∗∗∗ (4.928) 243745.354 (265433.455) 21.605∗∗∗ (0.907) 13.651∗∗∗ (1.213) 8.336∗∗∗ (0.480)
LernerIndex3 66.308∗∗∗ (5.166) -319992.753 (328742.026) -28.119∗∗∗ (1.121) -11.837∗∗∗ (0.595)
HHiTA -14.255∗∗∗ (1.949) 1327.207 (7164.833) 0.304∗∗∗ (0.028) 8.977∗∗∗ (0.578) 0.491∗∗∗ (0.014)
C5TA -10.785∗∗∗ (0.990) -1404.788 (3509.189) -0.374∗∗∗ (0.016) 9.295∗∗∗ (0.328) -0.180∗∗∗ (0.008)
SFAEFF 38.975∗∗∗ (14.588) -149737.843∗∗ (63099.752) -1.061∗∗∗ (0.227) -7.568 (5.095) -1.683∗∗∗ (0.121)
ProdGrowth -0.640 (0.741) -318.486∗∗ (124.094) 0.007∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.235 (0.120) 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
DIV -0.012∗∗∗ (0.001) 30.070∗∗∗ (7.189) 0.049∗ (0.027) 0.002 (0.001) 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
CreditRisk -22.660∗∗∗ (0.945) 5036.832∗∗ (2352.252) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.685∗∗∗ (0.189) -0.005 (0.004)
T1CR 0.026∗∗∗ (0.005) -39.136∗∗ (15.738) 0.012 (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) -0.001∗∗∗ (0.003)
FLVRG -0.032∗∗∗ (0.001) 8.186∗ (4.351) 0.017 (0.002) -0.004 (0.035) 0.03 (0.085)
T1LVGR 0.311 (0.523) 1773.579 (2033.690) -0.003 (0.007) 0.090 (0.167) 0.012∗∗∗ (0.004)
LIQ -0.266∗∗∗ (0.044) 167.704 (264.953) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.023) -0.001∗ (0.001)
NSFR -0.337∗∗∗ (0.047) -3295.576∗∗∗ (343.237) -0.002 (0.001) 0.115∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.008 (0.068)
ROA 0.966∗∗∗ (0.010) -15.257 (24.894) 0.003∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.005∗∗ (0.002) -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
SIFI -0.105 (0.158) 25.044 (8.254) 0.004∗ (0.001) 0.024 (0.087) 0.003 (0.085)
INF -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) 1.720 (3.129) 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.005∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
GDPc 0.036∗∗∗ (0.005) -89.261∗∗∗ (14.770) -0.006∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.041∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
Intercept -49.458∗∗∗ (12.889) 137402.819∗∗ (53429.707) 1.544∗∗∗ (0.192) 2.661∗∗∗ (4.350) 1.597∗∗∗ (0.103)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1766 1930 2027 2027 2027
Groups 316 316 287 287 287
Instruments 217 218 218 212 218
AR(1)(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2)(p-value) 0.145 0.000(R) 0.050(R) 0.403 0.397
Hansen (p-value) 0.356 0.982 0.066(R) 0.362 0.000(R)
VIF 1.31 8.26 4.28 5.16 3.68
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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5.6.3 Other Countries’ Results
In order to assess the banking competition-stability nexus for the other Basel
jurisdictions, various connotations of equation 5.5.1 were applied to the different
countries, panel datasets, without the risk and regulatory explanatory variables
due to data availability. For countries where cost efficiency and productivity
growth was not calculated (in Section 4.4) the cost to income ratio was included as
a proxy for cost efficiency. Table 5.9 presents the final models for each country
which produced a statistically sound model28.
In summary, linear competition-fragility was found within the Indian (model 2)
and European29 (model 5) banking sectors. Due to the heterogeneous nature of
different banking sectors, cross-country study comparisons should be treated with
caution. For example, comparing model 5 with the previous finding from the US
would be inappropriate. Further, Feng and Wang (2018) found that European
banks have lower profitability compared to US banks due to lower returns on
earnings assets, higher funding costs, and lower scale efficiency. Thus, the
dynamics of profitability and stability in Europe would be very different than the
US banking sector. Non-linear relationships were found within the Japanese
(model 1) and Russian (model 4) banking sectors which were found to have a
concave (n-shaped) relationship between banking competition and financial
stability whilst the Indonesian banking sector (model 3) was found to have a
convex (u-shape) relationship. In addition, all models suggest a
concentration-fragility relationship and that cost efficiency enhances financial
stability. For the sectors where a linear relationship of banking competition and
financial stability was found both were tested for a monotonic/polynomial
relationship however, both models with the quadratic and cubic added failed the
28The Basel jurisdictions which did not produce individual results include: Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, South Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands,
Turkey and the United Kingdom.
29The calculation for Europe includes the following countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
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Hanson J test (0.000). Within the model for Europe, country dummies were added
similar to Beck et al. (2006); Schaeck et al. (2009); IJtsma et al. (2017) to account
for specific country heterogeneous factors as Bos, Koetter, Kolari, and Kool (2009)
warned that failure to account adequately for heterogeneity can distort the
regression measures.
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Table 5.9: Other Country GMM Regression, Competition vs Financial Stability 2000-2015
(1)Japan (2) India (3) Indonesia (4) Russia (5) Europe
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
L.LnZScore 0.563∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.442∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.457∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.215∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.569∗∗∗ (0.023)
LernerIndex 78.131∗∗∗ (8.154) 203.454∗∗∗ (28.565) -4.147∗∗ (1.872) 8.838∗∗∗ (1.195) 2.329∗∗∗ (0.355)
LernerIndex2 -104.051∗∗∗ (11.064) 7.468∗∗ (3.467) -33.523∗∗∗ (4.086)
HHiTA -98.761∗ (60.017) -323.175∗∗∗ (41.395) -19.772∗∗∗ (4.723) -1.794∗∗ (0.767) -5.531∗ (2.957)
C5TA -12.667∗ (6.543) -70.213∗∗∗ (12.365) -14.352∗∗∗ (3.360) -42.667∗ (9.543) -4.136∗∗ (1.719)
CompCon -1068.686∗∗∗ (150.450)
SFAEFF 347.342∗∗∗ (66.157)
ProdGrowth -0.751 (0.994)
CIR 0.030∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.017∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.009∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.022∗∗∗ (0.005)
ROA 1.298∗∗∗ (0.119) -0.005 (0.005) 0.094∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.637∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.509∗∗∗ (0.060)
INF 0.022 (0.015) -0.013∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
GDPc 0.110∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.000 (0.008) 0.131∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.007 (0.009) 0.085∗∗∗ (0.009)
Intercept 301.177∗∗∗ (59.961) 5.166∗ (1.973) 9.658∗∗∗ (2.361) 0.368∗ (0.152) 2.130∗∗ (1.007)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummy No No No No Yes
N 612 332 338 180 5258
Group 107 80 93 68 596
Instruments 69 37 39 34 94
AR(1)(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.000
AR(2)(p-value) 0.764 0.239 0.729 0.114 0.136
Hansen(p-value) 0.525 0.546 0.904 0.904 0.974
VIF 6.89 5.06 3.22 4.58 1.07
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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5.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the role of risk, regulation and efficiency in the banking
competition and financial stability relationship in the US banking sector, using
system-GMM regression on panel data from 2000 to 2015. Firstly, this paper finds
a neutral view of the competition-stability nexus where both the competition and
concentration fragility co-exist. Interestingly, the introduction of a cubic function
within this analysis, finds a unique polynomial competition-fragility relationship.
This relationship also ruled out the efficiency structure paradigm within the US.
These findings accepts hypotheses 6 and 8, thus reject hypothesis 7. The risk and
regulatory explanatory variables found compelling results. As expected higher
bank level credit and liquidity risk as well as increased leverage and diversification
was found to be negatively associated with financial stability. The incorporation of
bank level regulatory requirements within this study allowed for the assessment of
whether they directly enhanced stability. Increased T1CR was found to improve
financial stability accepting hypothesis 9. However, unexpectedly, the NSFR was
found to hinder stability (rejecting hypothesis 10), providing caution to regulators
as it is implemented under Basel III. This study was unable to provide support for
hypothesis 11, when incorporating the dummy variables for SIFIs they were not
found to be statistically related to financial stability. However, with the addition
of size as a control variables within the robustness checks this highlighted the need
for extra regulation for larger institutions as it was negatively associated with
financial stability. Finally, this chapter attempted to identify any changes in the
competition-stability nexus when using country level measures of systemic risk
rather than accounting based measures of financial stability. Out of the systemic
risk measures calculated in Section 3.4, only the Composite Indicator of Systemic
Risk (CISS) developed by Hollo et al. (2012), produced a statistically robust
model. Using CISS did indeed provide a contrasting view of the
competition-stability nexus within the US banking sector. However, because only
one measure of systemic risk provided evidence within this study, hypothesis 12
was rejected.
This paper highlight several important issues for policy-makers in the US.
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First, to prevent excessive concentration30, regulators should adopt a more
cautious approach to evaluating and approving mergers and acquisitions at the
national level. Also, in robustness checks indicate that smaller bank size may
improve financial soundness. Secondly, from a regulation point of view, as Basel
III’s NSFR is implemented this needs to be monitored closely (by the banks
management and regulators) given its potential unintended consequence of
increasing funding costs (lowering cost efficiency) subsequently lowering
profitability, thus, hampering financial stability. Finally, the evidence that banking
competition has contrasting effect on individual bank stability and sector level
systemic risk implies that new regulation/competition policy should be assessed at
both microprudential and macroprudential levels to ensure before/during
implementation.
30This is because both low competition and high concentration was found to hamper financial
stability.
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5.8 Chapter Appendix
Lerner Index Calculation
Table 5.10: Full Sample and European, Lerner Index Translog Specification
Statistics Summary
Full Sample 1995-2015 Europe 1995-2015
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
TC 16406 2366.451 9506.593 2093 8860.729 18973.53
TA 16525 61398.67 256687.1 2125 221585 484339.6
PL 10336 1.669 10.391 2073 1.838 4.118
PFC 13539 .037 .051 2014 .047 .068
PPC 16097 2.842 4.679 2096 3.763 7.092
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Table 5.11: Country Lerner Index Translog Specification Statistics Summary
USA 1995-2015 Japan 1999-2015 India 2001-2015 Russia 2001-2015
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
TC 9669 693.546 5823.534 1402 1441.61 4554.362 502 2088.139 3805.995 447 1305.415 4271.778
TA 9625 15204.38 131975.6 1405 95259.98 311281.3 504 28165.81 50183.21 459 16852.82 57688.81
PL 5341 1.517 14.001 112 .918 1.098 490 1.642 1.271 368 1.787 4.669
PFC 7132 .027 .021 1383 .003 .004 479 .069 .044 431 .066 .026
PPC 9450 2.425 3.006 1402 1.386 2.122 503 3.356 2.333 393 3.257 6.545
Bazil 1995-2015 Indionesia 1995-2015 China 2003-2015 UK 1995-2015
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
TC 328 5847.251 12950.38 550 500.903 833.591 254 14028.23 20556.28 133 25500.77 23473.26
TA 334 43518.1 106450.2 556 5866.29 11246.42 254 470987.9 709965.4 134 845644.9 928278.3
PL 298 4.372 4.164 541 1.792 4.903 230 .724 .46 134 1.977 4.273
PFC 279 .172 .11 530 .088 .069 254 .021 .007 127 .03 .016
PPC 310 13.646 14.69 548 3.305 5.035 254 1.724 1.088 134 3.725 6.037
Spain 1997-2015 Italy 1995-2015 France 1998-2015 Switzerland 1995-2015
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
TC 123 13366.88 17877.96 369 4256.804 9301.262 289 11229.3 20560.25 549 3215.062 12130.66
TA 123 322327.1 417542.7 378 105391.8 239654.1 289 324222.1 647317.6 554 84552.6 278907.7
PL 122 1.119 .587 374 1.352 1.825 282 1.611 .947 552 1.6 2.954
PFC 123 .036 .017 366 .037 .025 288 .047 .02 524 .024 .018
PPC 123 1.886 .974 377 3.445 7.006 289 3.183 1.783 552 3.046 5.248
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Table 5.12: Lerner Index Per Country
Year Full
Sample
Euro Brazil China France India Indonesia Italy Japan Russia Spain SwitzerlandUK US
1995 0.1860 0.1439 0.1750 0.0074 0.1619 0.2289 0.1358 0.2088
1996 0.1888 0.1424 0.1664 0.0800 0.1353 0.1746 0.1504 0.2055
1997 0.1748 0.1527 0.1414 0.1142 0.1393 0.1257 0.2110 0.1317 0.2298
1998 0.2015 0.1561 0.1349 0.1080 0.1003 0.1822 0.1040 0.2159 0.1194 0.2128
1999 0.2004 0.1309 0.1942 0.0964 0.2431 0.1135 0.2290 0.1799 0.2623 0.1334 0.2378
2000 0.2194 0.1671 0.1616 0.0889 0.0684 0.1186 0.2313 0.2178 0.1603 0.2865 0.2074
2001 0.2148 0.1761 0.1922 0.1015 0.1644 0.1311 0.1719 0.3063 0.1464 0.2127 0.1224 0.0277 0.2381
2002 0.2386 0.1431 0.2205 0.1078 0.2114 0.1175 0.1472 0.3594 0.2163 0.2015 0.1648 0.0857 0.3027
2003 0.2638 0.1522 0.2437 0.2918 0.1451 0.2485 0.2035 0.1451 0.3914 0.2716 0.2854 0.1647 0.2008 0.3242
2004 0.2669 0.1969 0.2219 0.3154 0.1709 0.2994 0.3195 0.0617 0.4274 0.2005 0.3275 0.2669 0.2526 0.2946
2005 0.2779 0.2231 0.2414 0.3421 0.1814 0.2761 0.2429 0.0892 0.4346 0.2846 0.2927 0.2462 0.2766 0.2756
2006 0.2764 0.1729 0.2474 0.3381 0.1718 0.2529 0.2471 0.1058 0.4089 0.2954 0.3074 0.1890 0.2791 0.2444
2007 0.2725 0.1979 0.2572 0.3582 0.0605 0.2508 0.2815 0.0815 0.3526 0.2529 0.2660 0.1458 0.2417 0.2011
2008 0.2564 0.1527 0.1454 0.3726 0.0301 0.2430 0.2999 0.0045 0.3187 0.2462 0.2639 0.0156 0.2268 0.2053
2009 0.2554 0.1544 0.2749 0.3502 0.2120 0.2540 0.3012 0.0120 0.2944 0.0242 0.3477 0.0454 0.1542 0.2915
2010 0.2736 0.1894 0.2758 0.3745 0.1601 0.2687 0.3485 0.0696 0.3498 0.0004 0.4005 0.0129 0.2290 0.3170
2011 0.2773 0.1822 0.2422 0.3449 0.1420 0.2784 0.3443 0.0407 0.4107 0.0610 0.3026 0.1306 0.2224 0.3128
2012 0.2793 0.1800 0.2169 0.3588 0.1795 0.2554 0.3648 0.0782 0.3891 0.0711 0.3301 0.0335 0.1174 0.3148
2013 0.2879 0.2142 0.1882 0.3561 0.1883 0.2406 0.3710 0.0545 0.3892 0.0727 0.2609 0.1439 0.2421 0.3373
2014 0.3254 0.2070 0.1425 0.3842 0.2070 0.2329 0.3464 0.0802 0.3943 0.0493 0.3159 0.2108 0.2649 0.3348
2015 0.3141 0.2025 0.2364 0.3725 0.1848 0.2923 0.4326 0.0308 0.4439 0.0733 0.3757 0.0588 0.2476 0.3267
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Table 5.13: Country Lerner Index Correlation Matrix
Country Full
Sample
Euro Brazil China France India Indonesia Italy Japan Russia Spain SwitzerlandUK USA
Full
Sample
1.000
Euro 0.759 1.000
Brazil 0.473 0.291 1.000
China 0.495 0.292 -0.351 1.000
France 0.606 0.487 0.359 -0.056 1.000
India 0.572 0.369 0.410 -0.232 0.366 1.000
Indonesia 0.826 0.719 0.392 0.647 0.490 0.678 1.000
Italy -0.668 -0.432 -0.377 -0.548 -0.264 -0.621 -0.676 1.000
Japan 0.801 0.650 0.316 -0.262 0.542 0.640 0.719 -0.218 1.000
Russia -0.312 -0.180 -0.024 -0.530 -0.484 -0.075 -0.584 0.397 0.151 1.000
Spain 0.827 0.528 0.679 0.258 0.602 0.725 0.738 -0.702 0.571 -0.516 1.000
Switzerland-0.329 -0.042 -0.368 -0.442 -0.087 0.032 -0.536 0.550 0.106 0.552 -0.524 1.000
UK 0.618 0.596 0.217 0.048 0.224 0.715 0.473 -0.543 0.349 0.153 0.497 0.078 1.000
USA 0.724 0.491 0.441 -0.051 0.781 0.276 0.609 -0.403 0.598 -0.592 0.619 -0.271 0.204 1.000
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Panzar & Rosse H-Statistic Calculation
Table 5.14: P&R H-Statistic Variable Cross-correlation Matrix
Variables lnROA lnTR lnINT L1.lnPL L1.lnPFC L1.lnPPC lnETA lnLTD
lnROA 1.000
lnTR 0.134 1.000
(0.000)
lnINT 0.124 0.992 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
L1.lnPL 0.059 0.258 0.248 1.000
(0.031) (0.000) (0.000)
L1.lnPFC -0.086 -0.194 -0.179 -0.162 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L1.lnPPC 0.095 0.224 0.199 0.979 -0.172 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnETA 0.171 0.019 0.012 0.036 -0.251 0.130 1.000
(0.000) (0.419) (0.609) (0.188) (0.000) (0.000)
lnLTD 0.054 0.027 0.090 -0.037 0.287 -0.006 0.179 1.000
(0.019) (0.247) (0.000) (0.174) (0.000) (0.793) (0.000)
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Table 5.15: Panzar & Rosse H-Statistic Under the Disequilibrium Approach (ROA)
Variable LnROA LnROA LnROA LnROA
1D 2D 1S 2S
L.lnROA 0.252∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.5321∗∗∗ 0.5524∗∗∗
L.lnPL 2.340 1.8780∗ -0.5837 -0.5335
L.lnPFC -0.185 -0.0830 -0.2015∗∗∗ -0.1792∗∗∗
L.lnPPC -1.557 -1.189 0.6024 0.5612
lnETA -0.038 0.1263 0.0694 0.0989
lnLTD 0.153 0.1244 0.0633 0.0082
2001.Year 0.012 0.032 -0.9402∗∗ 0.3477∗∗∗
2002.Year 0.158 0.1743 -0.6905∗ 0.5732∗∗∗
2003.Year -0.060 0.0003 -0.8861∗∗ 0.3763∗∗∗
2004.Year -0.184 -0.0819 -0.9185∗∗ 0.3691∗∗∗
2005.Year -0.182 -0.0909 -0.9417∗∗ 0.3519∗∗∗
2006.Year -0.193 -0.1340 -0.9555∗∗∗ 0.3270∗∗∗
2007.Year -0.172 -0.1352 -0.9411∗∗∗ 0.3465∗∗∗
2008.Year -0.382∗∗ -0.3740∗∗∗ -1.1463∗∗∗ 0.1656
2009.Year -0.482∗∗∗ -0.4984∗∗∗ -1.2674∗∗∗ 0.0421
2010.Year -0.173 -0.1931 -1.0487∗∗∗ 0.2633∗∗∗
2011.Year -0.217 -0.1990 -1.1371∗∗∗ 0.1638∗∗∗
2012.Year -0.263 -0.2088 -1.1695∗∗∗ 0.1192∗∗
2013.Year -0.399 -0.2967 -1.285∗∗∗ 0.0129
2014.Year -0.458 -0.3153 -1.3105∗∗∗ 0.000
2015.Year -0.576 -0.4049 -1.40424∗∗∗ -0.0946∗∗∗
Instrument 68 68 121 121
Group 112 112 114 114
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.344 0.245 0.822 0.807
Hansen 0.444 0.444 0.565 0.565
H-Statistic 0.7995 0.7613 -0.3907 -0.3358
χ2(22) 170.596
∗∗∗ 185.67∗∗∗ 814.67∗∗∗ 723.88∗∗∗
Obs. 946 946 1116 1116
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Table 5.16: Panzar & Rosse H-Statistic Under the Disequilibrium Approach (TR and INT)
Variable LnTR LnTR LnTR LnTR LnINT LnINT LnINT LnINT
1D 2D 1S 2S 1D 2D 1S 2S
L.lnTR 0.5128∗∗ 0.5253∗∗ 0.9925∗∗∗ 0.9908∗∗∗
L.lnINT 0.5057∗∗∗ 0.4534∗∗∗ 0.9882∗∗∗ 0.9877∗∗∗
L.lnPL 0.0630 0.0735 -0.0808 -0.0590 -0.1780 -0.1147 -0.0441 -0.0113
L.lnPFC -0.0866 -0.0457 -0.0446∗ -0.0466∗∗ -0.0120 -0.0138 -0.0383 -0.0371
L.lnPPC -0.1415 -0.1736 0.0409 0.0252 0.1790 0.0999 -0.0054 -0.0381
lnETA -0.0110 -0.0099 0.0079 0.0040 -0.0028 0.0145 0.0134 0.0079
lnLTD 0.0437 0.0586 0.0369 0.0458 0.2346∗∗∗ 0.2260∗∗∗ 0.0777∗∗ 0.0845∗
2001.Year 0.013 -0.1073 0.0567 -0.0581 0.000 -0.2010 0.0089 0.0229
2002.Year -0.0678∗∗∗ -0.1750 -0.0190 -0.1343 -0.1073∗∗∗ -0.3041∗∗ -0.1116 -0.0947
2003.Year -0.0861∗ -0.1757 -0.0065 -0.1256 -0.0784∗ -0.2834∗∗∗ -0.0601 -0.0447
2004.Year -0.0850 -0.1657∗ 0.0200 -0.0969 -0.0356 -0.2570∗∗∗ -0.0138 -0.0038
2005.Year 0.0399 -0.0389 0.1345∗∗∗ 0.0165 0.1575∗∗ -0.0669 0.1652 0.1693∗∗∗
2006.Year 0.1340 0.0324 0.1410∗∗∗ 0.0220 0.2429∗∗∗ 0.0279 0.1544 0.1604∗∗∗
2007.Year 0.1836∗∗∗ 0.0632 0.1060∗∗ -0.0170 0.2483∗∗∗ 0.0416 0.0841 0.0923
2008.Year 0.1248 -0.0050 -0.0089 -0.1298 0.1403∗∗ -0.0640 -0.0757 -0.0726
2009.Year 0.1230 0.0021 0.0026 -0.1222 0.1205∗ -0.0917 -0.0940 -0.0890
2010.Year 0.0885 -0.0131 -0.0289 -0.1504 0.1487 -0.0660 -0.0377 -0.0278
2011.Year 0.0524 -0.0323 -0.0425 -0.1603 0.1401 -0.0841 -0.0598 -0.0513
2012.Year 0.0363 -0.0387 -0.0440∗ -0.1641 0.1434 -0.0832∗ -0.0701 -0.0587∗∗
2013.Year -0.0052 -0.0693∗ -0.0647∗∗∗ -0.1821 0.1354 -0.0894∗∗∗ -0.0818 -0.0747∗∗∗
2014.Year 0.0220 -0.0416∗∗∗ -0.0188 -0.1435 0.1832 -0.0473∗∗∗ -0.0363 -0.0244
2015.Year 0.0507 0.000 0.000 -0.1229 0.2259 0.000 -0.0138 0.000
Instrument 68 68 121 121 68 68 121 121
Group 112 112 114 114 112 112 114 114
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.124(R) 0.256(R)
AR(2) 0.240 0.300 0.353 0.347 0.204 0.287 0.004(R) 0.004(R)
Hansen 0.204 0.204 0.564 0.564 0.097(R) 0.097(R) 0.521 0.521
H-Statistic -0.3389 -0.3072 -11.3070 -8.7204 -0.0222 -0.05212 -7.4535 -42.5934
χ2(22) 1787.81
∗∗∗ 1683.22∗∗∗ 36927.04∗∗∗ 1.75e+06∗∗∗ 2149.85∗∗∗ 1417.51∗∗∗ 1.62e+06∗∗∗ 30836.59∗∗∗
Obs. 946 946 1116 1116 946 946 1116 1116
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 5.17: US Bank Data Statistical Summary per Year
2000 2001 2002 2003
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
ZScore 265 15.789 21.876 297 15.262 21.755 349 12.832 14.665 354 14.043 18.684
SFAEFF 233 .8514682 .000647 233 .8514243 .0005618 233 .8508806 .0005435 233 .8506131 .0005066
ProdGrowth 233 2.139184 .1441777 233 2.264351 .1078278 233 2.278662 .0897878
DIV 396 .7 1.118 396 .513 3.812 432 .857 3.03 434 -.341 31.478
CreditRisk 165 .005 .004 179 .007 .008 186 .007 .009 199 .09 1.174
T1CR 387 13.147 10.2 389 11.852 4.171 425 12.17 6.536 428 12.232 6.182
FLVRG 370 11.319 4.492 382 11.451 4.688 381 11.605 5.594 404 12.09 12.745
T1LVGR 166 .08 .04 175 .079 .032 181 .082 .029 200 .084 .031
LIQ 342 .823 .162 330 .83 .169 357 .805 .184 379 .817 .226
NSFR 236 .934 .092 252 .93 .094 263 .917 .094 280 .922 .096
ROA 370 .887 1.565 382 .693 4.076 381 .811 4.186 404 1.039 .561
2004 2005 2006 2007
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
ZScore 349 18.065 28.413 372 30.232 179.412 389 17.555 26.551 475 12.024 15.998
SFAEFF 233 .8504767 .0004539 233 .8509025 .0003962 233 .851483 .0003636 233 .8517447 .0003681
ProdGrowth 233 2.154787 .1444895 233 1.933258 .1313388 233 1.870692 .1162483 233 1.94046 .1094215
DIV 520 .668 1.739 538 .983 4.707 548 1.43 33.004 551 1.231 7.181
CreditRisk 304 .006 .008 398 .005 .007 433 .005 .007 501 .009 .011
T1CR 516 12.407 5.981 531 12.461 5.359 539 12.935 7.597 536 12.186 5.205
FLVRG 415 11.409 3.891 499 11.461 4.134 530 11.034 3.472 529 10.793 3.517
T1LVGR 316 .087 .026 418 .09 .027 471 .096 .049 528 .096 .034
LIQ 463 .834 .231 468 .843 .198 463 .865 .183 467 .892 .174
NSFR 358 .937 .1 371 .943 .091 366 .954 .118 364 .952 .105
ROA 416 .995 .556 499 1.037 .582 529 .933 1.219 529 .735 .841
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2008 2009 2010 2011
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
ZScore 490 5.653 11.424 484 4.568 27.183 480 5.271 14.414 479 6.581 17.29
SFAEFF 233 .8513615 .0004384 233 .851358 .0005823 233 .8511438 .0005089 233 .8509728 .0004831
ProdGrowth 233 2.729239 .3408884 233 2.316827 .316714 233 2.115565 .2201283 233 2.11716 .1332425
DIV 546 2.474 22.32 536 .748 7.984 536 3.583 76.622 553 -15.837 360.449
CreditRisk 502 .021 .031 492 .031 .028 492 .033 .03 495 .029 .028
T1CR 518 11.863 4.363 508 12.445 5.713 507 13.679 7.091 508 14.125 5.235
FLVRG 522 11.362 3.979 518 12.362 5.765 512 14.384 35.198 506 13.979 19.643
T1LVGR 509 .094 .028 497 .094 .03 494 .098 .034 489 .098 .03
LIQ 458 .904 .228 385 .846 .15 346 .81 .158 312 .792 .151
NSFR 375 .953 .104 306 .935 .117 294 .93 .128 261 .922 .132
ROA 522 .043 1.539 517 -.241 1.706 513 .142 1.278 511 .254 2.299
2012 2013 2014 2015
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
ZScore 460 12.929 81.618 443 12.007 21.371 444 12.005 14.591 452 13.54 19.73
SFAEFF 233 .8507923 .0004896 233 .8505874 .0005023 233 .8504324 .000557 233 .8503713 .0005614
ProdGrowth 233 2.090742 .1194777 233 2.076538 .1010007 233 2.082867 .1207849 233 2.051759 .1027117
DIV 545 .22 22.875 510 1.073 9.948 505 1.243 4.671 508 .888 3.596
CreditRisk 473 .024 .035 445 .017 .027 455 .012 .018 457 .01 .021
T1CR 479 14.528 4.966 447 14.549 4.287 455 14.601 4.663 464 14.132 4.806
FLVRG 496 14.383 50.413 489 11.288 15.485 471 10.527 8.108 475 9.911 4.678
T1LVGR 455 .101 .036 413 .343 4.85 420 .102 .028 428 .101 .028
LIQ 315 .796 .153 277 .81 .152 240 .824 .159 218 .841 .153
NSFR 257 .933 .123 239 .936 .099 223 .948 .101 230 .951 .098
ROA 501 .67 1.059 491 .829 1.028 473 .8 .68 477 .892 .782
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary of Thesis Findings and Implications
The motivation for this study was to identify the impact of market competition and
banking risk management on the wider banking system and how this has changed
following the financial crisis of 2007/8. The three linked papers within this thesis
aimed to address relevant elements of this motivation to provide theoretical and
practical contributions within this area. From the original aims and objectives in
Section 1.2 the following research questions were derived:
1. How does the academic literature define and measure systemic risk? This
thesis surveys the previous literature to answers this question in Chapters 2
and 3.
2. What are the determinants of banking efficiency in the Basel jurisdictions?
This thesis empirically answers this question in Chapter 4.
3. How does banking competition impact stability in the Basel jurisdictions?
This thesis empirically answers this question in Chapter 5.
In order to answer research questions two and three, 12 research hypotheses were
identified (see Section 1.6 for more details) for empirical testing. Table 6.1 provides
a summary of which hypotheses were accepted or rejected with their implications
for regulation in the context of the US banking sector. Although the aim of this
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thesis was to address all the Basel jurisdictions due to data availability (outlined
in Sections 1.3, 4.4.3 and 5.5) the majority of the empirical evidence made use of
US banking sector data. Where possible efficiency, competition, concentration and
systemic risk measure were calculated for all jurisdictions for descriptive statistics
purposes.
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Table 6.1: Hypothesis Summary
Chapter Hypothesis Summary Implications in the context of the US Banking Sector
4 Hypothesis 1: The use of econometric
calculations of efficiency is superior to
traditional accounting measures.
Rejected* This thesis found that the use of SFA as a measure of efficiency was statistically significant
within the efficiency determinates regression analysis. However, the use of both DEA (another
econometric measure) and CIR (an accounting based measure) was not constant. This finding
suggests studies of efficiency determinates in the US banking sector should make more use of
SFA as an econometric relative objective measure of efficiency.
4 Hypothesis 2: Business model
diversification has a negative impact
on efficiency.
Accepted This finding implies that a more diversified banks business model negatively impacts cost
efficiency. Thus, as banks become more diverse the management need to be mindful of the
overall impact on cost efficiency. As they seek new revenue streams this may hamper the cost
base and increase other risks such as credit risk and leverage.
4 Hypothesis 3: Increased credit risk
has a negative impact on efficiency.
Accepted This association of credit risk to cost efficiency implies that higher credit risk (associated with
increased provisions for NPLs) contributes to lower cost efficiency. Such findings advocate
that banks should improve their credit risk management in order to lower the levels of NPLs.
This is because from an efficiency measure viewpoint, input costs of NPLs negativity impacts
the banks via the cost of recourse and re-investment costs.
4 Hypothesis 4: Increased capital
requirement regulations enhances
efficiency.
Rejected Basel III regulations require banks to hold further capital, however this was found to negatively
impact cost efficiency. Higher capital requirements increase institutions’ cost of capital and
premia on potentially costly risk management activities. Regulators need to be aware of the
unintended cost of regulation. Capital requirements may make banks safer from a buffer point
of view however, it may hamper banks cost base and profitability.
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Table 6.1 Continued
Chapter Hypothesis Summary Implications in the context of the US Banking Sector
4 Hypothesis 5: Increased liquidity has
a negative impact on efficiency.
Accepted As banks become less liquid this negatively impacts cost efficiency. If customer deposits reduce
this negatively affects SFA cost efficiency. Less liquid institutions could have higher credit risk,
resulting in them facing higher funding costs to enhance liquidity. Furthermore, the NSFR
was negatively statistically significant, which implies that institutions who are seeking/holding
extra funds face lower cost efficiency. Again, this could be a result of institutions facing higher
funding costs as they aim to meet the new statutory requirements.
5 Hypothesis 6: The market power
paradigm persists.
Accepted From Figure 2.1 the market power paradigm was empirically found in the context of the US
banking sector. This thesis found a neutral view of the competition-stability nexus, where
both competition (relative market power) and concentration (structure conduct performance)
fragility co-exist. From a competition regulation point of view, such empirical findings
advocate a more oligopoly/monopolistic market structure to improve overall stability.
5 Hypothesis 7: The efficiency
structure paradigm persists.
Rejected Due to the acceptance of hypothesis 6, this simultaneously rejects hypothesis 7 and a no
relationship, quiet life, paradigm in the US banking sector (see Figure 2.1).
5 Hypothesis 8: Increased levels of
competition negatively affects financial
stability.
Accepted In line with hypothesis 6, this thesis found that increased banking competition negatively
impacts stability i.e. competition-fragility in the US banking sector. Thus, competition policy
regulators should be more cautious when a banking market becomes more competitive (entry
restrictions) as, for example, banks may take excess risk to attract new customers.
5 Hypothesis 9: Increased capital
requirement regulation positively affects
financial stability.
Accepted Increases in the Tier 1 Capital Ratio is positively associated with financial stability, thus
providing evidence that this regulatory requirement is justified from a financial stability point
of view. Note the implications from hypothesis 4.
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Table 6.1 Continued
Chapter Hypothesis Summary Implications in the context of the US Banking Sector
5 Hypothesis 10: Increased liquidity
regulation positively affects financial
stability.
Rejected NSFR was statistically negatively associated with financial stability. This liquidity
requirement is to ensure that financial institutions have access to longer term stable funding
in the event of a crisis. Nevertheless, this result suggests that there may be an unintended
negative consequence on profitability, due to higher funding costs, which affects stability. A
potential reason may be the banks changing their funding habits if they require certain types
of funding. Thus, as this regulation is implemented banks and regulators need to closely
monitor this unintended consequence. Note the implications from hypothesis 5.
5 Hypothesis 11: Being named as a
SIFI or D-SIB positively affects the
institutions financial stability.
Rejected* This thesis was unable to provide support for hypothesis 11, when incorporating the dummy
variables for SIFIs they were not found to be statistically related to financial stability. However,
the addition of size as a control variables within the robustness checks highlighted the need for
extra regulation for larger institutions as it was negatively associated with financial stability.
5 Hypothesis 12: The use of recently
developed models to measure systemic
risk provides contrasting results in the
competition-stability nexus compared
to traditional accounting measures of
financial stability.
Rejected* Only the Composite Indicator of Systemic Risk (CISS) was statistically significant within
the competition-stability regression analysis. Using CISS did indeed provide a contrasting
view of the competition-stability nexus within the US banking sector. However, because only
one measure of systemic risk provided evidence within this study, more empirical studies are
encouraged to understand how systemic risk measures as a dependent variable impact the
competition-stability nexus.
*Within this thesis empirical evidence was found to support these hypotheses albeit not in its entirety, thus rejected.
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To summarise the findings for research question 1, Chapter 3 determined the
main challenge regarding systemic risk, is that there is no single definition and
given that at least 56 measures have been developed to measure systemic risk,
there is limited consistency in the understanding of this phenomena. In addition,
each individual measure of systemic risk only addresses specific aspects where
authors use a definition to suit their model. The more recent measurement
techniques attempt to create a more holistic view by incorporating institutional
level risk within country level networks. Such methods, however, require more
granular or competitively sensitive data as well as computing power. The majority
of these techniques (network and contagion measures) lack transparency making
them difficult to interpret and replicate.
Chapter 4 addresses research question 2, as empirical evidence found that
following the financial crisis the US banking system as a whole did not improve
cost efficiency as measured by SFA. Compared to traditional accounting based
ratios of efficiency (e.g. cost to income ratio), relative econometric measurements
of efficiency were statistically significant within the regression models, thus
advocating their use in empirical studies (Abuzayed et al., 2009; Beccalli et al.,
2006; Fiordelisi, 2008). The assessment of the determinants of cost efficiency found
that in all empirical models diversification was negatively associated with cost
efficiency (Beck et al., 2016; Rossi et al., 2009; Thoraneenitiyan & Avkiran, 2009).
Also both leverage and credit risk were found to be negatively associated with cost
efficiency (Bhatia et al., 2018; Sun & Chang, 2011). Investigating the implications
of regulation on cost efficiency found that capital requirement designed to protect
institutions from capital shocks hampers cost efficiency (contrasting previous
empirical findings). Also, increased liquidity holdings advocated by regulators
negatively impact the cost efficiency . Both highlight the potential unintended
consequence of regulation cost.
Chapter 4 has both policy implications and evaluates various econometric
techniques as potentially valuable analytical tools for supervisors. First, the
empirical results both overall and pre/post crisis highlight the importance of the
prudential supervisory role in controlling the level of risk in the banking sector, as
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the elevation in risk measures coupled with the growth of the sector has resulted in
declining measures of efficiency, a result that is robust to several econometric
specifications (using both econometric and accounting based measures). The
policy implication is that regulators may want better capitalised banks and
somewhat smaller or less diverse banking systems, as this is likely to imply a more
efficiently functioning banking industry. However, this is not necessarily the case
with the rejection that increased capital requirement improves efficiency. Thus,
regulators should focus on ensuring banks business models do not diversify too
much (increasing the level of credit risk and leverage) rather than the sole
emphasis being on capital requirements to enhance banking cost efficiency.
To summarise the findings for research question 3, Chapter 5 evidenced a
neutral view of the competition-stability nexus where both competition and
concentration fragility co-exists in the US banking sector. To the best of my
knowledge, the only other time this relationship was found was by X. Fu et al.
(2014) who studied the Asian Pacific region. In addition a unique polynomial
competition-fragility relationship was found. This relationship also ruled out the
efficiency structure paradigm. As expected from the explanatory variables higher
bank level credit and liquidity risk as well as increased leverage and diversification
were found to be negatively associated with financial stability (Azar et al., 2016;
De Nicolo´ et al., 2006; Leroy & Lucotte, 2017; Turk-Ariss, 2010). In assessing the
role of regulatory requirements in improving financial stability, increased Tier 1
Capital Ratio (T1CR) was found to improve financial stability (Kapan & Minoiu,
2018; Klomp & De Haan, 2015). However, unexpectedly, the NSFR was found to
hinder stability, again a potential unintended consequence of holding cash or the
cost of seeking stable funding, on profitability and subsequently stability.
Empirical evidence was unable to find if being classified as SIFI enhances or
hampers financial stability as the variables were not statistically significant within
the regression analysis. However, the addition of size as a control variables within
the robustness checks highlighted the need for extra regulation for larger
institutions as size was negatively associated with financial stability. Lastly, this
chapter attempted to identify any changes in the competition-stability nexus when
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using country level measures of systemic risk rather than accounting based
financial stability measures similar to Leroy and Lucotte (2017). Out of the
systemic risk measures calculated in chapter 3, only the Composite Indicator of
Systemic Risk (CISS), produced a statistically robust model. Using CISS did
provide a contrasting view of the competition-stability nexus within the US
banking sector. Given limited previous empirical evidence and as only one measure
of systemic risk provided statistically significant evidence within this thesis this
advocates for more future research to understand this phenomenon.
These findings highlight several important issues for policy-makers in the US.
First, to prevent excessive concentration1, regulators should adopt a more cautious
approach to evaluating and approving mergers and acquisitions at the national
level. Also, in robustness checks indicate that smaller bank size may improve
financial soundness. Secondly, from a regulation point of view, as Basel III’s NSFR
is implemented this needs to be monitored closely (by the banks’ management and
regulators) given its potential unintended consequence of increasing funding costs
(lowering cost efficiency) subsequently lowering profitability, thus, hampering
financial stability. Finally, the evidence that banking competition has contrasting
effects on individual bank stability and sector level systemic risk implies that new
regulation/competition policy should be assessed at both microprudential and
macroprudential levels before/during implementation.
6.2 Generalisability of Findings
Generalisability describes the extent to which research findings can be applied to
settings other than that in which they were originally tested (Øvretveit, Leviton, &
Parry, 2011). Within this thesis the main findings discussed were all from regression
models that fit the required statistical specifications outlined in the methodology
1This is because both low competition and high concentration were found to hamper financial
stability.
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sections and only the variables that were statistically significant to 99%2. This
significance level is saying is that a result (relationship or difference) of the size found
in the sample has a low probability of having occurred if there is no relationship
in the population. However, there is still a probability (of 1%, using a significance
level of 0.01 for example) that the findings are a coincidence of the sample (Bell,
Bryman, & Harley, 2018; Muijs, 2004).
Despite the efficiency determinants paper (chapter 4) making use of data from
the US banking sector, the majority of the empirical findings can be generalised
elsewhere. This is because the paper focuses on bank level data rather than sector
level. The variables that were found to be determinants of efficiency are all common
variables which are available irrespective of the banking sector under examination3.
However the regulatory bank level data (such as capital requirements T1CR) is only
relevant to the banking sectors under the jurisdiction of the Basel Accords. Thus,
the interpretation of the regulation implications can only be generalised to other
Basel jurisdictions. Elsewhere, the regulatory implications of this thesis provide
insightful information for policy-makers, and aim to ensure consistency amongst
banking sector jurisdictions (homogeneous banking sectors). The finding that the
use of SFA is preferred in the context of the US banking sector regressions cannot
be generalised as this is a relative measure of the sample only. From Chapter 5,
the main findings of a neutral view of banking competition and financial stability
relationships in the context of the US cannot be generalised elsewhere, as this finding
is from sector level specific data. The methodology can be replicated elsewhere to
identify the relationship in different countries subject to data availability. This
was attempted in Section 5.6.3 to evidence the banking competition and financial
stability relationship within the other Basel jurisdictions. The findings from this
chapter specific to bank level and regulatory variables can be generalised elsewhere,
similar to the findings in Chapter 4.
2The empirical findings that were significant to 90% or 95% were also discussed, with caution,
as the thesis emphasised on the findings which were 99% statistically significant.
3This is dependent on the data availability and the accounting standards within the country of
observation.
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6.3 Original Contribution to Theory and
Literature
The findings of this thesis enrich the existing literature in several important ways.
In order to contribute to the developing literature of banking systemic risk, this
thesis aimed to take a more holistic view of this topic in order to identify the many
interpretations of this phenomena. The Systemic Risk Measures and Regulation
Challenges paper (Chapter 3) is one of the first systematic literature reviews in this
area. The paper contributes to theory in a number of ways, firstly by identifying
and critiquing the various techniques developed (56 models) to measure systemic risk
by academics and regulators. This systematic literature review aimed to provide a
comprehensive overview of the models developed to measure systemic risk. Thus,
this paper can inform future research as it identifies what has been done before in
order to generate new ideas and learn from previous limitations. Secondly, the data
required for these models were also collated and presented within a table (3.8) to
illustrate the most commonly used datasets. This paper advocates for an increase
in research using network theory as this area aims to provide a more comprehensive
overview of systemic risk. Furthermore, the use of foreign exchange data to measure
systemic risk was only identified three times, despite these studies finding the foreign
exchange rates to be a statistically significant indicator of systemic risk. To the best
of my knowledge table 3.8 is the first of its kind. This table, which identifies the most
common dataset applied, can be used to inform future research. Researchers can use
this table identify the data gaps to investigate different datasets or a combination of
alternative datasets. Finally, in conjunction with Chapter 2, the various definitions
and types of macro-prudential regulation were visited, in order to identify a number
of challenges of regulating systemic risk adding to a growing area of policy-oriented
research (Carretta et al., 2015; Clark & Jokung, 2015; Masciandaro & Volpicella,
2016).
The Banking Efficiency Determinant paper (Chapter 4) introduced new
additional empirical evidence to the ongoing debate of what impacts cost efficiency
within the banking sector. The literature review featured various trends, issues
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and advances within efficiency analysis that could be useful in future academic
research to identify best practice and areas of concern. By understanding the
multiple aspects of banking efficiency, researchers within this area can create
methodologies to identify industry best practice and advocate preferred business
models to the rest of the sector. This paper has contributed to the banking
efficiency literature by: (i) evidencing that the use of SFA to measure cost
efficiency within the US banking sector is preferred as a relative measure within
regression analysis; (ii) identified that increased business model diversification
(which may be strategic) can have the unintended consequence of hindering cost
efficiency due to its interaction with credit risk; (iii) provided a unique breakdown
of how cost efficiency determinants changed pre and post-crisis; (iv) and assessed
bank level regulatory requirements rather than country level, which allows
institutions management and regulators to observe a more direct impact of
regulation. Noticeably, the requirements of T1CR and NSFR under Basel III both
hindered cost efficiency. Such findings add to the literature surrounding the costs
of regulation compliance. These regulations are designed to enhance the
institution’s balance sheets to withstand shocks, however, their practical
implication results in lowering cost efficiency which could ultimately affect
long-term profitability. To the best of my knowledge this is the first empirical
study of efficiency determinants to find a statistical significance of such bank level
regulatory ratios, providing an incentive for further research4.
The Banking Efficiency, Concentration, Competition and Financial Stability
paper (Chapter 5) combines the knowledge from Chapters 2 and 3 and calculations
from Chapters 3 and 4, in order to contribute to knowledge. Adding to the
extensive body of empirical findings in this area, a neutral view of the
competition-stability nexus was found within the US banking sector for the first
time. Both competition and concentration fragility were found to co-exist,
suggesting having lower pricing power (high competition) and excessive market
4Previous empirical evidence by Pasiouras et al. (2009); Chortareas et al. (2012); J. R. Barth,
Lin, et al. (2013); Manlagnit (2015) found a positive relationship between capital requirement
regulation (dummy variable or sector level indicators) and efficiency.
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concentration can simultaneously cause financial fragility. Such empirical findings
advocate a more oligopoly/monopolistic market structure to improve stability. As
a unique polynomial competition fragility relationship was found, this suggests
that as competition moves from monopoly to perfect competition, financial
stability drops, but at a given level of competition (oligopoly or monopolistic)
there is a positive change in stability until competition increases further. In
addition, the concave relationship found using a measure of systemic risk also
suggests that oligopoly/monopolistic market would be safer. In reaching such
findings well-established methodologies were adopted, however a number of novel
explanatory variables such as T1CR, T1LVRG and NSFR were explored.
Uniquely, no other empirical study in this area has introduced a cubic function to
test for a monotonic or polynomial relationship. Potentially, previous studies that
identified a linear relationship (but ruled out a concave/convex relationship) may
have not explored this alternative relationship. The polynomial relationship
suggests risk-shifting effects between the different levels of competition, thus,
stressing the importance to incorporate risk-based explanatory/control variables
within this type of regression analysis. Further, helping to advance this literature,
measures of systemic risk (which were identified and measured in Chapter 3), were
used as dependant variables to assess any changes in the competition-stability
relationship. To date, the use of systemic risk measure within this empirical
literature is rather limited (Leroy & Lucotte, 2017). This chapter found
contrasting results between financial stability (Z-Score) and systemic risk (CISS)
and competition, which advocates the notation for future research in the area to
help explain this phenomenon.
From the bank level regulatory explanatory variables, the majority were found
to be statistically significant in line with existing literature and theory. However,
complementing the finding in Chapter 4 that NSFR hindered cost efficiency, it was
also found to hinder stability. This empirical evidence suggests as financial
institutions seek to enhance stable long-term funding this could hinder profitability
and subsequently stability. As the NSFR requirement is implemented under Basel
III and financial institutions start reporting their actual figures, its impact at the
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bank level should be explored further.
6.4 Original Contribution to Practice
As well as the contributions to literature, the findings of this thesis are of interest
to practitioners and regulators. From Chapter 3, when determining cost efficiency
within banks empirically all the independent variables in this study were
predetermined, thus practitioners and policy-makers can correctly infer what
enhances cost efficiency. For continuous monitoring of cost efficiency SFA is a
relative measure of efficiency that can be used by practitioners to identify industry
best practice. Regulators can seek to understand how the best practice banks
maintain this status to encourage others to do the same or to introduce new
management principles. For example, because more diverse business models were
found to hamper cost efficiency, when banks seek regulatory approval to expand or
create new business entities, regulators could require additional efficiency
feasibility studies. This would force banks to understand the unintended
consequences of expanding further to enhance their implementation strategy and
risk management. Also, the sector level efficiency measures using SFA can help
supervisors monitor efficiency levels following mergers and acquisitions (sector
consolidation).
Drawing from Chapter 4’s results policy-makers can infer what any changes to
competition level will do to levels of financial stability or identify which financial
institutions are more likely to be in trouble given their poor capital ratios,
diversified business model and/or too much reliance on market funding. Whether
excess credit/liquidity risk or more risky business models are driven by market
competition levels (or from the risk preferences of management), this is of interest
to policy-makers and should be explored during future regulation changes
consultations. Also, with the introduction of the NSFR under Basel III, both
banks and regulatory authorities should carefully consider their long-term liquidity
levels to balance its impact from increased competition with decreased cost
efficiency.
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The finding that competition affects both financial stability and systemic risk
differently has important policy repercussions. First, the fact that competition has
contrasting effects on individual bank stability and sector level systemic risk
implies that new regulation/competition policy should be assessed at both
microprudential and macroprudential levels. As discussed in Section 2.3.3 the
Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of competition is responsible for
anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, however, the banking supervisors and
the Department of Justice can overturn any decision if it is in the national interest
(e.g. in the event of financial stability issue). Thus, secondly on a practical level
for such bodies, this thesis’ results suggest that more anti-competitive policy
should be introduced in the US banking system to maintain micro-financial
stability. However, a monopolistic market should also be avoided as this hampers
systemic risk (macro) and a concentration-fragility relationship was empirically
found. Further, the empirical evidence suggested that any potential negative effect
of this type of policy on individual risk-taking behaviour should not arise because
the Basel III regulatory requirements corrects incentives for individual risk-taking.
In addition, the effectiveness of bank level regulations in shaping financial stability,
such as Basel III, should be investigated along with the level of competition and
concentration in a disaggregated method to help ascertain more efficiency policies.
As Basel III’s liquidity regulations are implemented, the finding of this thesis
that the NSFR hampers both cost efficiency and financial stability provides a
warning to banks and regulators of its unintended consequences. As noted in
Section 3.4.3 its introduction has been widely seen as a positive step to prevent
future liquidity crises (Ashraf et al., 2016; Chiaramonte & Casu, 2017; P. King &
Tarbert, 2011; Pakravan, 2014). However, this thesis’ findings adds to a growing
body of research which seeks to assess its impact before it fully comes into effect
(DeYoung et al., 2018; Dietrich et al., 2014; Goodhart et al., 2012; Wei et al.,
2017). The empirical evidence within this thesis supports the ideas discussed by
Schmitz and Hesse (2014) that banks tend to hold on to liquidity during periods of
systemic uncertainty. Thus, if banks require to seek more stable funding this could
significantly increase costs hampering both cost efficiency and profitability (Wei et
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al., 2017)5. In addition, the factor increases on customer deposits as a source of
funding from BIS (2010a) to BIS (2014)(See Table 3.4) can lead to increased
competition levels which again was found to hamper stability, therefore these
factor increases should be reviewed. Regulatory authorities also should identify the
nature of the competitive pressure banks face while implementing optimal
regulatory regimes. As the banking sectors empirically analysed within this thesis
tend to be homogeneous, individual banks’ business models may be heterogeneous,
thus this ‘one size fits all’ regulatory requirement may not be appropriate for all
institutions. This may force banks to diversify (to enhance funding sources) which
again was found to hamper cost efficiency and financial stability. These
multifaceted conflicts require careful consideration and review by regulators.
Because this study is based on a NSFR proxy, a direct comparison with results
from the BCBS (e.g. the most recent BIS (2019)) cannot be conducted. As
mentioned previously (see Section 3.4.3), there are gaps between annual report
data and the data required for calculating the new liquidity ratios, justifying calls
for further disclosure. Thus, it is likely that this thesis’ results are less accurate
than BCBS’s research. Nevertheless, the empirical findings clearly highlight a need
for a better understanding of the banks’ business models and their evolutions as
the NSFR is implemented. For these reasons, more policy-oriented research and
monitoring is necessary to better align the regulatory initiatives with the inherent
risks of different business models and market structures.
6.5 Limitations and Future Research
Although the present research employed well-known and reliable methodologies,
there are certain limitations that need to be considered. These limitations can
potentially be addressed by future research. This section also provides direction for
further research and identifies areas that require extra academic/regulatory
attention.
The first limitation is related to the data utilised in this thesis. This study
5The market value of certain securities which constitutes a stable funding increase with demand.
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used annual panel data (converted into dollars if required) supplied by Bloomberg
Professional Service. However, empirical research within the competition-stability
nexus is more frequently making use of quarterly panel data when investigating
individual countries. As US banks are required to submit quarterly results (10-Q
Filings) to the Securities and Exchange Commission, more gradual data is available.
However, whenever conducting cross-country empirical analysis this is not available
everywhere. Further, this thesis aimed to provide empirical finding from all the
Basel jurisdictions, however, due to bank level data limitations this was not possible.
Within the relevant chapter all efforts were made to produce findings from as many
jurisdictions as possible. Lastly, as shown in Section 3.5, the data used to calculate
systemic risk ranges greatly. Thus, it is not possible to replicate each measure of
systemic risk. Also, the more unique techniques are only available to researchers
or regulators with privileged data access, thus advocating for more data to become
available to help researcher advance this area.
A second limitation despite various robustness checks in each empirical paper to
control for endogeneity and the use of GMM, the relationships noted in this research
should be treat with caution. The results presented within the empirical papers by
design are more correlation than causal relationships, due to the possible endogeneity
concerns affecting the estimates (Altunbas et al., 2017; Laeven & Levine, 2009). As
an example, financial institutions that have a higher risk appetite are more likely
to have characteristics associated with a riskier profile (i.e. higher credit risk and
leverage), thus higher distress indicators during crisis periods. In such a scenario
the causality chain would transmit from risk to the banking variables, rather than
the opposite, which is noted throughout the literature review in this thesis. Despite
whether the findings within this research cannot be given as a causal interpretation,
the results remain of interest to regulators and policy-makers, from a forecasting
relationship perspective. Given that all dependent variables are predetermined from
institutions’ annual reports, managers, stakeholders and policy-makers can infer
which banks may be more cost efficient (Chapter 4) or which market structure is
more likely to suffer during a crisis period (Chapter 5).
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6.5.1 Future Research
Identified from Chapter 4
In order to enhance Chapter 4 further, the data used could have been scrutinised
further for extreme outliers using a technique called Jackknifing (Shao & Tu,
2012). Furthermore, this method could have been used as a robustness test to
compare DEA scores with and without Jackknifing. However, within Chapter 3
bootstrapping was used as an alternative, this resampling technique is considered
as a more transparent approach (Baxter, 2001). In addition, Moradi-Motlagh and
Saleh (2014) emphasised that bootstrap DEA provides confidence intervals and
bias corrected estimates of pure technical efficiency scores. Bootstrap results show
the importance of incorporating sample variation and bias in estimating efficiency
scores.
To progress the banking efficiency literature, Kuosmanen and Kortelainen
(2012) developed Stochastic Semi-Nonparametric Envelopment of Data (StoNED)
which is a hybrid approach that combines the DEA-type non-parametric frontier,
with the SFA-style stochastic homoscedastic composite error term. StoNED has
less restrictive assumptions which allows it to have a wide application range. It is
also more robust to uncertainty surrounding stochastic noise and the functional
form of the frontier (Kuosmanen, 2012). It is worth noting that this method does
not aim to provide specific sources of inefficiency. Extensions of this method have
aimed to understand more about the efficiency transmission6. In addition, Fa¨re
and Grosskopf (2000) introduced the network model to understand the carry-over
effects of efficiency, Tone and Tsutsui (2010) enhanced this model using a
slacks-based measure, which can deal with inputs and outputs and carry-overs
separately. They then further enhanced this model with a dynamic model after
discovering that carry-over transmits from a division to the same division at the
next period (Tone & Tsutsui, 2014). Such recent developments could be used in
the future to compare with previous empirical research conducted using SFA
6See Avkiran (2015) for a conceptual framework of the current article’s on efficiency analysis
for banks and Tone and Tsutsui (2014) for a graphical representation of the different DEA models.
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and/or DEA.
Identified from Chapter 5
The novel findings within Chapter 5 can be explored further. As suggested
previously, empirical studies which have found a linear relationship between
banking competition and financial stability (which may have already discounted a
concave/convex relationship) should assess whether a monotonic or polynomial
relationship exists. Such reassessment may provide a more holistic view of the
banking competition and financial stability relationship. As systemic risk
measurement techniques become more readily available (more transparency and
data), such measures should be explored within the competition-stability nexus
literature. Currently, very little empirical research has investigated the impact of
competition or concentration on systemic risk. Such research has provided
contrasting results, thus, it is an attractive area to progress the literature. The
challenges regarding measuring systemic risk are outlined in Chapter 3, but briefly,
various techniques require certain datasets and enhanced computing capabilities,
whilst others need to be more transparent (e.g. open source code). Lastly, as
found within this thesis, at the bank level regulatory requirements such as T1CR
and NSFR have unintended consequences by reducing efficiency, profitability and
stability. Therefore as these requirements come into force under Basel III, further
research of their direct impact on banks would be welcome.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
This research has provided a number of insights into the competition-stability nexus
and has contributed to the growing literature of systemic risk, the most significant
finding of the research is that a polynomial relationship between competition and
stability can exist. This phenomenon to date has not been attempted, thus, previous
empirical results, which suggest a linear relationship, may need to be reviewed. In
addition, the inclusion of systemic risk measures into this body of literature can
produce contrasting empirical results, suggesting competition levels affect micro-
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economic and macro-economic factors differently. This has entirely justified the time
and effort that has gone into this thesis and, in conjunction with the identification
of further areas, has resulted in the articulation of significant original thought in an
increasingly important area of study.
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Table 6.2: Summary of Variables Used within this Thesis
Variable Variable Name Description Bloomberg Mnemonic/Calculation
C3/5 3 or 5 Firm
Concentration Ratio
This is a country level measure of market concentration.
Calculated by comparing the top 3 or 5 banks (via market shares)
assets relative to the markets total assets.
Code in Stata
CIR Cost to Income Ratio
(Efficiency Ratio)
This measures the managerial quality, approximated by the
cost to income ratio. A low values of CIR indicates a better
managerial quality. This is calculated by dividing the operating
costs (administrative & fixed costs, such as salaries and property
expenses, this does not include write offs and non-performing
loans) by operating income.
eff ratio
CreditRisk Credit Risk (Assets
Quality)
Calculated as a ratio of non-performing loans divided by total
loans. The higher the ratio, indicates the lower the quality of the
banks loan portfolio.
bs non perform loans
bs tot loan
Crises Indicates a country in
crisis
This is a Dummy variable, 1 indicates if the country the bank is
located is classed as in a crisis period , 0 if not
Following Laeven and Valencia (2013)
definition of crisis timing.
DEA Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA)
A non-parametric method to estimation the production efficiency
frontier. It is used to empirically measure productive efficiency
of decision making units (Banks in this case). The Malmquist
Productivity Index (MPI) measures the productivity changes
along with time variations and can be decomposed into changes in
efficiency, taking into account time variants of technology (Fa¨re
et al., 1994).
Linear Programming in Stata
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Table 6.2 Continued
Variable Variable Name Description Bloomberg Mnemonic/Calculation
Deposits Total Customer
Deposits
Total deposits received from customers (Both demand and term
deposits) and amounts due to banks. bs customer deposits
DIP Distressed Insurance
Premium
Distressed Insurance Premium is as an ex ante country level
systemic risk metric which represents a hypothetical insurance
premium against a systemic financial distress, defined as total
losses that exceed a given threshold of total bank liabilities (15%).
Code in Matlab
DIV Diversification This is a proxy for a banks’ business model, calculated via net
non-interest income to net operating income. Such a proxy is
used because the magnitude of non-interest income greatly reflects
bank participation within the financial markets such as securities
trading and asset management services.
non int inc
is oper inc
Expenses Expenses This is a proxy for operational expenses of the bank. This is
calculated by operating costs divided by total assets. Higher the
ratio suggests more the bank makes us of less expenses, thus more
cost efficient.
is operating expn
bs tot assets
FLVRG Leverage Financial Leverage is defined as the ratio of average total assets to
average total common equity. The higher the ratio would indicate
a more riskier business strategy.
fncl lvrg
G-SIB Globally Systemic
Important Banks
This is a Dummy variable, 1 if the bank is classed as a G-SIB (by
their countries regulatory body), 0 if not.
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Table 6.2 Continued
Variable Variable Name Description Bloomberg Mnemonic/Calculation
HHI The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index
This is a country level measure of market concentration. This is
calculated by squaring the market share of each bank competing
in a market and then summing the resulting numbers.
Code in Stata
IntIncome Interest Income This is the total interest income from loans, federal funds sold,
resale agreements and other short-term interbank investments.
Additionally this includes federal funds sold and repurchase
agreements, deposits at interest with other banks and interest
from direct financing lease receivables.
is int inc
LIQ Liquidity The Banking balance sheet liquidity is measured by the ratio of
net loans to deposits and short term funding (LIQ). An increase
in LIQ would suggest to a higher probability of bank distress.
bs tot loans
bs st borrow + bs customer deposits
LLP Provisions for loan
losses
This is the accounted provisions for loan losses. This variable
could be negative when the bank has recovered previous loan
losses. Note this figure, may include other provisions if they are
not disclosed separately.
is prov for loan loss
LnASIZE Bank Size Natural log of total assets. This includes the sum of cash & bank
balances, Federal funds sold & resale agreements, Investments for
trade & sale, net loans, investments held to maturity, net fixed
assets, other assets, customers’ acceptances and liabilities.
bs tot asset
LnLSIZE Bank Size Natural log of total loans. Includes Commercial, Consumer &
Other loans. bs tot loan
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Table 6.2 Continued
Variable Variable Name Description Bloomberg Mnemonic/Calculation
MarketCap Market Capitalisation This is the total monetary market value of all of a bank’s
outstanding shares at accounting period end date. historical market cap
NETIN Net Income This is the profits of the bank after all expenses have been
deducted. net income
NPL Non-performing Loans Gross Non-performing Loans, which are loans in default or close
to default, and do not accrue interest. All loans that have an
impairment provision are classified as non-accrual.
bs non perform loans
NSFR Net Stable Funding
Ratio
The Net Stable Funding Ratio as proposed in Basel iii, seeks
to calculate the proportion of available Stable funding via the
liabilities over required stable funding for the assets.
NSFR is approximated using equation 5.5.15
(Chiaramonte & Casu, 2017) as discussed in
section 3.4.3.
OEA Other earning assets This is the sum of marketable securities, short-term investments,
interbank assets, long-term investments and long-term receivables. earn asset - bs tot loan
PFC Price of Financial
Capital
This is calculated via total interest expenses divided by short term
assets. is int expenses
st borrowing and repo + bs customer deposits
PL Price of Labour This is calculated via the banks personal expense dived by total
assets.
is personnel exp
bs net fix asset
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Table 6.2 Continued
Variable Variable Name Description Bloomberg Mnemonic/Calculation
PPC Price of Physical
Capital
This is calculated via the banks non-interest expenses divided by
fixed assets.
non int exp
bs net fix asset
PRH Panzar-Rosse
H Statistic
(disequilibrium
approach)
This is an alternatively measure of market competition, follow the
method proposed by Matousek et al. (2016).
GMM regression using Stata
ProdGrowth Productivity Growth Following the method proposed by (Park & Weber, 2006) to
calculate productivity growth following the malmquist index. effch + techch
ROA Return on Assets ROA is calculated as the ratio of its net income in a given period to
the total value of its assets. Return on Assets (ROA) in percentage
is an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total
assets.
return on asset
ROE Return on Common
Equity
Measure of a bank’s profitability by revealing how much profit a
company generates with the money shareholders have invested, in
percentage.
return com eqy
SFAEFF Stochastic Frontier
Analysis (SFA)
SFA is used to examine cost efficiency, using a fixed-effects model
Greene (2005) with a half-normal distribution for the inefficiency
term.
Code in Stata
SDROA Standard deviation of
ROA
This is a calculation of the 3 years rolling standard deviation of
ROA.
Code in Stata
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Table 6.2 Continued
Variable Variable Name Description Bloomberg Mnemonic/Calculation
Solvency Solvency risk (also
known as ETA)
Proxy of for banking solvency. A low Solvency suggests high
leverage, which makes banks less resilient to shocks, all else being
equal.
total equity
bs tot asset
T1CR Tier 1 Capital Ratio This is The ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets as
proposed within the Basel Accords. The minimum ratios set by
the U.S. Federal Reserve and the OTC are 4% for commercial
banks and 3% for savings and loans, respectively.
bs tier1 cap ratio
T1LVGR Tier 1 leverage ratio The Tier 1 leverage ratio is the relationship between a banking
organisation’s core capital and its total assets, as proposed within
the Basel Accords. The Tier 1 leverage ratio is calculated by
dividing Tier 1 capital by a bank’s average total consolidated
assets and certain off-balance sheet exposures.
bs tier1 capital
bs tot assets
TAHHI The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index
based on Total Assets
An alternative measure of market concentration using total assets. Stata Code
TC Total Cost A proxy of the banks total costs following method proposed by
S. Kasman and Kasman (2015). non int exp + is int expenses
TEHHI The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index
based on Total Equity
An alternative measure of market concentration using total equity. Stata Code
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Table 6.2 Continued
Variable Variable Name Description Bloomberg Mnemonic/Calculation
TLOAN Total Loans This is the sum of loans includes, commercial loans, consumer
loans and other loans. bs tot loan
ZScore Z-Score Proxy for bank default which is measured as a bank level financial
stability measure. This calculation is discussed in section 5.5.2. Z =
(ROA +ETA)
SDROA
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